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PREFACE 
This volume is based on my degree dissertation produced for the 
General Staff Officers' Course at the National Defence College and 
published in Finnish as issue no. 1/2001 of the publications of the 
Department of Strategic Studies at that college, under the title "Si-
vi.ilisotilas yhteist jö la•iisinliallintaoperaatiossn" (Civil-military cooper-
ation in crisis management operations). My supervisors for this work 
were Col. Pertti Salminen, Dr.Pol.Sci., and Klaus Törnudd, former 
Finnish Ambassador to France and the United Nations, to both of 
whom I wish to express the warmest possible thanks for their guid-
ance at all stages. I also received excellent support from the Interna-
tional Department of the General Staff and the officers serving there. 
It was Professor Kalevi Ruhala who suggested while I was serv-
ing in the ISAF operation in 2002 that I should update my disserta-
tion in the light of more recent experiences, and I have him to thank 
for his own personal role in encouraging me to study CIMIC activity 
further and to publish this research. It is to be hoped that the obser-
vations and ideas presented in this volume will provide additional 
support for CIMIC planning in connection with future operations. I 
would also thank Mr. Malcolm Hicks, without whose fluent and styl- 
Major Petteri Kurkinen graduated from the General Staff Officers' Course at the 
Nationål Defence College in 2001, having previously served as chief of the CIMIC 
Office of the Finnish Battalion (S5 of FinBn) in the SFOR operation for the period 8/ 
1997 — 1/1999 and as CIMIC advisor to the Multinational Division (North) head-
quarters (MND(N) HQ G5/advisor) in 2001. He also served in the ISAF operation 
in 2002, as operation officer in the CIMIC branch of the Finnish Detachment in 
Afghanistan. At present he is attached to the Headquarters of the Eastern Com-
mand of the Finnish Defence Forces. 
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ish translation it would not have been possible to make the results 
of my work available in English to the extent achieved here. 
My interest in CIMIC activity and in research into it was aroused 
in 1998, when I was serving as CIMIC officer at the headquarters of 
the Finnish Battalion in the SFOR operation. It was in that operation 
that CIMIC activity became a part of the operative aspect of the mis-
sion to the extent that is common nowadays, although admittedly 
the maintaining of good relations with representatives of the local 
population and administration has always formed an inherent and 
very natural part of Finnish peace-keeping activities. This may be 
traced to the nation's military culture as a whole, for the defence of 
our own country has traditionally been governed by a principle of 
close cooperation between the military and civil authorities.One es-
sential requirement for a comprehensive study of CIMIC activity was 
a knowledge of civilian organizations and their ways of working. 
This I have gained partly through training in cooperation between 
military and civilian authorities in crisis areas arranged by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The perspec-
tive adopted was predominantly in line with UN views. This provid-
ed me with valuable information on such topics as the way in which 
various civilian organizations work in operations of different kinds 
and how they look upon collaboration with the military. I would like 
to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Fred Polk and Mr. Josef Reiterer 
for the high-quality instruction I received in these matters. 
Finally I would like to thank my family and friends, above all 
Virpi and similarly Jyrki and Minna, for the support and encourage-
ment that I have received from them in the course of this work and 
when serving abroad as part of the international community. 
I have had the opportunity to work with representatives of many 
nationalities in peacekeeping operations, and national differences 
in ways of doing things have very often come to the fore in the con-
text of CIMIC activities, but in spite of these differences all the na-
tionalities taking part have without exception had the same objec-
tive in mind, to restore peace and guarantee adequate living condi-
tions for the local people. Success in CIMIC work calls for coordina-
tion within the military organization, and this is only possible when 
all the people working in this branch accept the goals laid down for 
it. 
One of greatest challenges for CIMIC staff in the future will be 
to participate very closely in the planning processes affecting their 
own organization, as this is the best way of ensuring that local con-
ditions, ways of life and special characteristics are taken into account 
when planning the role to be played by their own troops. 
When I was serving in the ISAF operation the commander once 
described CIMIC acivity very aptly in just two words: COOPERATE 
— COORDINATE. 
Mikkeli, 27t'' November 2003, 
Petteri Kirkinen, 
Major, G.S. 
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1 THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY 
COMPONENTS AS OBJECTS OF 
INVESTIGATION 
1.1 Towards a broad-based concept of crisis management 
operations 
It was widely believed that the end of the Cold War would herald a 
new era of peace in international relations, but contrary to these op-
timistic expectations, regional conflicts, especially ones of an ethno-
political nature, have increased in number, at least momentarily, and 
have become part of our everyday reality in Europe. At the same 
time the changes that have taken place in the international system 
have meant that such crises have adopted a more rapid tempo than 
previously.' 
Conflicts can differ greatly in their nature and form. Perhaps 
the most significant as far as international politics are concerned are 
conflicts of interest, in which the interests of certain states or groups 
are openly at variance. The occurrence of such conflicts is partly de-
pendent on the ability of states to protect the rights of different sec-
tors of the community, most notably minorities, so that they do not 
feel that the state and its actions, or any other groups within society, 
are a threat to their own sense of community. Internal conflicts within 
states were indeed typical of the situation in the 1990s, one promi-
nent exacerbating factor being nationalism, which served as a polit-
ical catalyst in numerous serious crises, e.g. in the formerYugosla-
via.2 
In recent years the international community has been faced with 
the consequences of globalization. Movements opposed to the he-
gernony enjoyed by the United States and the West in general and to 
the globalization trends that were perceived to be linked with this 
began to emerge around the turn of the millennium, the most con-
spicuous perhaps being the manifestations of radical Islam in the 
Middle East and Central Asia and the mass demonstrations held at 
meetings of heads of state in the West, e.g. the riots in Seattle, Gothen-
burg and Genoa. The most destructive act directed at the supremacy 
of the West to date was the series of terrorist attacks on New York 
and Washington on 11th September 2001.3  
The means of exercising control over international or ethnopo- 
litical conflicts that are available to the international community are 
either peaceful, involving negotiation and mediation between the 
parties concerned, or based on the use of force. Examples of the lat-
ter would include the pre-emptive air strikes on Serb targets in Bos-
nia undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
on a mandate from the United Nations (UN) in 1995 for the purpose 
of bringing the conflict under control and preventing it from escalat-
ing.4 
Traditional peace-keeping operations have required the agree-
ment of the parties involved to the placement in the crisis area of 
troops having no part in the dispute, who use of force is restricted to 
self-defence. The UN peacekeeping operations in the area of the 
formerYugoslavia nevertheless demonstrated that the modes of ac- 
tion available to such troops are inadequate for achieving the de-
sired outcome, and the international community was obliged to look 
for new approaches.' 
In the extended notion of peacekeeping, the use of internation-
al troops does not necessarily presuppose acquiescence by the par- 
ties to the dispute, although all such operations so far have taken 
place with the agreement of at least one party. On the other hand, 
the use of force is still reactive in nature, i.e. it is governed by the 
same principles as in a traditional peace-keeping operation.' 
Nowadays these extended peacekeeping operations, also known 
as crisis management operations, may be led by a coalition, a group 
of countries formed specifically for this purpose, or an individual 
state. These actors have their own military organizations and can 
command and service their own troops. They are also typically able 
to act independently in relatively large operations. The UN, on the 
other hand, lacks these crucial advantages. It is thus to be expected 
that the leading role of a coalition or co-ordinator state will be a 
prominent factor in military crisis management operations in the 
future, the mandate for such an action being obtained from the UN 
or a regional organization such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This mandate is required at least to 
set out the judicial basis for the operation, define its nature, the rights 
of the troops engaged in it and the limitations on their actions. It 
should also define the goal of the operation.' 
The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) operations have been based on UN mandates and a power-
ful military presence by which attempts have been made to create 
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appropriate conditions for resolving the crisis. Both have involved a 
high degree of military pressure and intervention on the part of the 
international community, and both have been characterized by the 
fact that the representatives of the military organization have taken 
virtually all the functions of society in the area under their immedi-
ate supervision at the initial stage in the operation, thus enabling 
the international civilian organizations to begin their own opera-
tions.8 
One precondition for the success of a crisis management oper-
ation is a detailed knowledge of the special conditions prevailing in 
the area concerned. These always have to be taken into considera-
tion by the international instances when planning, preparing and 
implementing their own activities. Typical aspects of the operating 
environment for past and present crisis management initiatives in 
the Balkans have been the huge refugee problems relative to the 
size of the population, the destruction of social structures and the 
material devastation of towns and villages, together with the severe 
deterioration in the economic situation, the bitterness felt by the 
opposing parties towards each other and the spiralling of acts of 
revenge. The armed conflicts in the area have also been unusual in 
that the violence and hostilities have not been confined to the front 
lines between the troops but have spread to the towns and villages 
according to the balance of numbers between the ethnic groups. 
This has led to a need to evacuate civilian populations from their 
homes, either to safer areas within their own country or to a life as 
refugees abroad.' 
It has also been necessary for the international military organ-
izations in Bosnia and Kosovo to take account of the influence of 
other actors on the execution of their operations, including interna-
tional organizations (JOs), international and national non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), representatives of the local adminis-
trations and the population of the area.10 
The guidelines for the actions of the military organization and 
the main civilian organizations in a crisis management operation 
are laid down separately for each operation in the agreement that 
governs it, and it is clear that the success of each actor is dependent 
on a knowledge of the tasks and ways of working of the others. It is 
not easy to work in a multinational environment in which the number 
of separate actors is large and the prevailing conditions place great 
demands on the collaboration ability of the representatives of the 
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various organizations.' 
The international community in Bosnia and Kosovo has sought 
a solution to the crises and the need for peaceful development in the 
area through a holistic approach in which a broad, complex non-
military component has grown up alongside the military activity.12  
The organizations responsible for these non-military tasks in the 
Europe of today are principally the UN and OSCE, while the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has now initiated measures for developing its ca-
pabilities to a level that would allow it to operate in the main areas of 
civilian crisis management in the future.13  
National and international non-governmental organizations 
have a significant role to play in the development of a society that 
finds itself in crisis, often being capable of issuing an early warning 
of such a situation. They are also capable in many instances of rapid, 
flexible, diversified action of a kind that can be put into effect easily. 
Their role tends to be emphasized further in cases where interna-
tional organizations can no longer show the necessary commitment 
to an area.' 
The increase in the number of factors involved in crisis man-
agement operations nevertheless presents new challenges for all the 
organizations concerned, above all in terms of collaboration ability. 
The military organizations have had to develop their functions in a 
new direction, known as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), in or-
der to achieve their goals and be capable of coordinating coopera-
tion with civilian actors and making full use of the resources availa-
ble. The planning of such activity has been greatly influenced by the 
doctrine of Civil Affairs adopted in the United States, experiences in 
the former Yugoslavia and the operational patterns of those states 
that have adopted a Total Defence system. We shall use the abbre-
viation CIMIC in the discussion below to refer to CIvil-MIlitary 
Cooperation."' 
Most of the countries that have taken part in the Bosnia and 
Kosovo operations have adopted CIMIC as one branch of their troops' 
crisis management operations, but considerable national differences 
exist nowadays both at the theoretical level and in matters of practi-
cal implementation, representing a potential source of friction with-
in the international military organization. A good example of this 
was provided by experiences with the initiation of the ISAF opera-
tion."  
The military organizations have done much to development their 
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capabilities for working together with other actors involved in crisis 
management operations, and experiences in the Balkans have served 
as a catalyst in this respect. The British commander of the KFOR 
troops in 1999, Sir Michael Jackson, for instance, said in a seminar 
on leadership in crisis management operations held in Holland on 
5th - 7th June 2000 that the successful running of such an operation 
required, among other things, control over the"vacuum phenome-
non", by which he meant that the military needed to have means of 
participating in the restoration of practically all aspects of society. 
He also laid weight on possession of the expertise required under 
the prevailing conditions and of the correct attitude towards this 
task." 
Representatives of the civilian component are still to some ex-
tent lacking in the ability to cooperate with an international military 
organization, and some civilian actors do not necessarily even wish 
to do so. For the main civilian organizations, the Lead Agencies, this 
is virtually essential, however, and they have already developed their 
functions and capabilities in this field. The UN, for example, has set 
up a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) to im-
prove coordination between political, military and civilian functions 
within an operation. Practical activities in the field are nevertheless 
frequently hampered by shortages of staff and inadequate means of 
communication.' 
Well-functioning contacts with the representatives of the local 
administration and population are essential for those in charge of 
the international military and civilian components, and this calls for 
cooperation and co-ordination between actors in order to exploit all 
the available resources to the full. The active exchange of intelligence 
is one means by which international actors can demonstrate their 
professional skills and their integration with the local population." 
1.2 Purposes of this research, the topic and its delimitation 
Two principal purposes can be stated for this research, the first of 
which is to set out principles for the planning of CIMIC in connec-
tion with peacekeeping or crisis management operations. This will 
be done by distinguishing the sectors of civilian crisis management 
and the problems that troops may encounter in future operations. 
This is closely connected with the trends discernible in European 
ipJ 
crisis management and the discussion that has evolved around this. 
It should be possible in the framework of this research to provide 
examples that may be of help in planning and implementing such 
activities, training staff and integrating functions at both a national 
and an international level. It is possible to achieve this aim by ex-
ploring the ways in which the military component can provide sup-
port for the civilian component and making a survey of the factors 
that impose limitations on this. The treatment of this topic will be 
based on interviews with experts. The second purpose is to create a 
theoretical foundation for CIMIC on the basis of existing guidelines 
and research. Experiences of CIMIC will be reviewed primarily from 
a Finnish perspective. 
The main topic of the work can be summed up in the 
question: 
How can a military organization provide support for the various as-
pects of civilian crisis management in a joint operation? 
This may be approached in terms of a set of secondary 
questions: 
— What does civilian crisis management consist of? 
— What factors have influenced CIMIC as implemented by the 
Finns? 
— How has the military component provided support for the work 
of the civilian component in the SFOR, KFOR and ISAF opera-
tions? 
— How should CIMIC be organized at the various stages in an op-
eration? 
The topic is located at a multidimensional interface in a crisis man-
agement operation formed by the civilian component and the mili-
taiy component, the emphasis in the present work being upon the 
action's of the military component at this interface. 
The perspective adopted here is that of Finnish participation in 
complex crisis management operations. As a member of the EU, Fin-
land has had no reservations in committing itself to this trend, espe-
cially as the EU is engaged in constructing a relatively broad range 
of means by which it can intervene more efficiently in crises that 
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may emerge within its own boundaries or in neighbouring areas. As 
far as participation is concerned, it is important to be aware of the 
means and operational models that are currently available for pre-
venting outbreaks of violence, and if prevention in advance should 
prove unsuccessful, it is also necessary to recognise the means by 
which reconstruction can be initiated in the wake of a crisis within 
society. 
We will concentrate here on those civilian crisis management 
measures that are likely to be used in a multiple civilian-military 
operation, omitting for the present purpose measures that might be 
adopted by a civil society in the face of a major peacetime distur-
bance such as an environmental catastrophe. In other words, our 
consideration of civilian crisis management will concentrate on iden-
tifying a frame of reference for CIMIC. 
The actions of the civilian and military components of a multi-
ple crisis management operation will be examined at both the local 
and the regional level, taking note of the national level only at points 
where this is necessary for the discussion as a whole. 
The research will concentrate on the actions of national crisis 
management troops and multinational troops at the brigade level. 
Again, higher levels will be considered where this is essential for the 
discussion as a whole. 
The research is restricted to the IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and ISAF 
operations, with the principle accent on IFOR/SFOR and ISAF. 
1.3 Methods and point of departure 
This research is based on the examination of documents, backed up 
by interviews with experts. This is particularly the case with the anal-
ysis of civilian crisis management, the intention being to present 
this as a maximally broad-based entity, defining its branches of ac-
tivity in the light of experiences in the Balkans. This means that the 
branches as such constitute a vesy much wider entity than do the 
focal points designated in the EU planning work. 
The theoretical picture of CIMIC activity will be formed from 
the regulations governing the individual fields of activity together 
with other instructions, and filled out with orders and directives ap-
plying to individual operations. 
The support provided by the military for representatives of the 
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civilian component is described on the basis of interviews, the data 
being filled out with information from reports on individual opera-
tions. 
Chapter 5, which contains solutions to the problems of plan-
ning and implementing CIMIC, may be regarded as one of the re-
sults of the work. It is based on the conclusions reached as a conse-
quence of the research and observations made in the course of it. 
In spite of their undeniable role in implementing non-military 
activities, the work of the UN and OSCE will not be discussed here. 
The disposition of this research is set out in Appendix 1 and its 
frame of reference in Appendix 2. 
1.4 Definitions of certain central concepts 
CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation): 
According to NATO doctrine, CIMIC is defined as co-ordination and 
cooperation that takes places between the commander of the troops 
and the civilian population, i.e. the population of the area covered 
by the operation, its various organizations and administrative au-
thorities and representatives of international organizations and non-
governmental organizations.2° 
CIMIC will be taken in the context of this work to apply to 
activities designed for the obtaining of information on the area of 
operation, the international civilian community, the local authori-
ties and the population of the area as required for the troops in or-
der to fulfil their own objectives. CIMIC is thus looked on as a means 
by which the military component of a crisis management operation 
arranges its support in order to achieve the goals of the civilian ac-
tors as part of the overall objective of the operation.21  
Crisis: 
The term crisis as used here should be taken to refer to any distur-
bance of an economic, political or military kind, of which the ex-
treme'external manifestation is a state of war. Such an event may be 
divided temporally into a pre-crisis stage, the crisis proper and a 
post-crisis reconstruction stage. 
Crisis management: 
The term crisis management was adopted in international politics 
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in the 1990s, and appears in the final resolution of the OSCE sum-
mit meeting of 1992 at a point where the discussion concerns the 
creation of new means of preventing conflicts in advance. The UN 
terminology at that time referred to"extended peacekeeping activi-
ty". The EU adopted the term in conjunction with its new treaty which 
came into force on 1st May 1999.22 
Crisis management is taken here to mean all political, human-
itarian and economic actions taken to prevent a crisis from arising, 
prevent it from coming to a head, prevent its influence from spread-
ing or create conditions conducive to a political solution and a resto-
ration of social stability.23  
Military crisis management: 
Military crisis management means here peacekeeping activities, mil-
itary intervention or control over the prevailing situation that is ex-
ercised by military means and forms of organization for security pol-
icy or humanitarian reasons. Resort will be had to such methods in 
Enforcement 
— conditions for 
cooperation 
— situation report 
— force protection 
Stabilization 
— cooperation 
— CIMIC projects 
Withdrawal 
— transfer of 
responsibility 
— troop reductions 
— public relations 
CIMIC ACTIVITY 
OPERATIVE ACTIVITY 
— implementation 	— supervision 
— military operation 	— stabilization 
— combat readiness 
need for deterrent 
— transfer of 
responsibility 
— troop reductions 
— withdrawal 
need for deterrent 
Figure 1. Temporal and functional division of a crisis management opera-
tioa from a military perspective. 
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situations where a crisis poses a threat to international peace and 
security or infringes common concepts or norms, e.g. regarding hu-
man rights. It does not include the activities allowed for in Articles 
42 and 51 of the UN Charter. 24 
A crisis management operation may be divided temporally and 
functionally into three phases, enforcement, maintenance and with-
drawal, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Also contained in Figure 1 is an indication of the progression 
from operative activity to CIMIC activity as the operation advances 
towards its stated objective. Although the shift in emphasis is shown 
here as a smooth process, it is possible in practice that there may be 
brief shifts of emphasis within the phases depicted. The holding of 
national elections in the area of operation during the enforcement 
phase, for example, could raise the emphasis on CIMIC for a limited 
period. 
Civilian crisis management: 
Civilian crisis management refers here to the prevention of conflicts 
in advance, their resolution and the alleviation of their consequenc-
es, cooperation between the rescue authorities and the provision of 
expert advisers through international organizations, similarly the 
activities of non-governmental organizations when directed at 
achieving the overall objectives of the operation or at reconstructing 
civil society.25  
Civilian crisis management is typically multidimensional in char-
acter, involving a complex group of actors. Military crisis manage-
ment requires the support of certain elements of civilian crisis man-
agement in order to enable peaceful development to be achieved in 
the long term, and correspondingly it is apt to support the civilian 
component simply through its function of creating a secure operat-
ing environment. 
The purpose of civilian crisis management is to eliminate the 
factors that have led to the disturbance in society and thereby to 
create The conditions necessary for the state to develop independ-
ently through measures of its own.26 Fluctuations in the volumes of 
civilian and military crisis management activity as a function of time 
during an operation are depicted in Figure 2. 
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military crisis management 
civilian crisis 
emergency 	 , 	management 
assistance ` ♦ f ' 
crisis 	peace 	 stabilization 	withdrawal 
enforcement 
treaty 
minimum of 10 years 
Figure 2. Volunnies of civilian and military crisis management activity rel-
ative to time diring an operation. 
1.5 Sources, notes and validity of sources 
The principal body of source material for this work was a set of in-
terviews carried out with experts in this field between 1999 and 2001. 
The data obtained from these form the framework for the research, 
which is then filled out from documentary sources. 
Practically all those interviewed had personal experience of cri-
sis management operations, and the answers obtained from them 
represented their subjective opinions, and are therefore bound to a 
certain place or point in time. Exceptions to this are those people 
who deal with matters related to crisis management operations in 
the course of their normal work, as they were able to place their own 
experience in a wider context. These interviews have provided a val-
uable addition to the content of the present work. A few interviews 
were also conducted with foreign persons serving in Bosnia whose 
work meant that they were closely involved in military-civilian co-
operation. Their contribution has added breadth to the researcher's 
view of the situation. 
Use has also been made of the periodic reports submitted by 
Finnish contingents attached to the different operations. These re- 
ports are highly reliable, but the real content is barely relevant to a 
work of this kind, and the information available from them is mostly 
restricted to references to certain measures that were taken. They 
contain no accurate reviews of the situation or descriptions of relat-
ed tasks. Recourse was therefore had to other sources in order to fill 
in the missing information, largely the interviews and Internet sourc-
es. 
A publication in the nature of a report produced by the Swedish 
Military Academy on the basis of a seminar connected with the Haiti 
operation contains some discussion of experiences of cooperation 
between civilians and military personnel. It contains no conclusions, 
however, possibly on account of its original nature, and can be re-
garded most of all as a compilation of personal experiences. 
NATO's CIMIC doctrine has undergone considerable changes 
in the last few years. It is a practicable set of instructions for planning 
purposes on a general level, but its greatest weakness lies in the fact 
that it is intimately connected with troop activities. The troops repre-
senting a coalition are primarily under separate national command, 
and if the orders given are compatible with those of the organization 
as a whole, they will also be obeyed. This has become evident in both 
the interviews and the documents. 
Internet sources have also played a major part in this research. 
These may be grouped as follows: 1) newspaper archives, 2) organi-
zations'home pages, 3) research papers and reports, and 4) instruc-
tions and regulations. 
The majority of Internet sources are nevertheless fundamental-
ly biased. The pages produced by NATO and its subordinate organ-
izations such as SFOR and KFOR, for instance, contain no material 
that approaches its topics critically, as they concentrated for the most 
part on highly optimistic pictures of various events and actions. They 
are therefore of minimal value when studying the implementation 
of practical measures. The same also applies to the organization's 
own newspapers and other publications, although the NATO Re-
view does adopt a highly neutral attitude towards its own measures. 
As far as the study of practical measures is concerned, however, the 
above sources do not contribute The necessary criticism was applied 
to the sources mostly in the course of the work, the detailed infor-
mation obtained from the interviews being examined in connection 
with publications and reports from the same period. No source-crit-
ical material as such is to be found in this report, apart from an eval- 
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uation of the documentary evidence contained in Chapter 3, which 
discusses the regulations and special commands governing the ac-
tivity itself. 
Where mention is made in the text of events, terms and as-
sumptions that are not otherwise dealt with in that connection, more 
detailed explanations will be found in the list of references. 
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2 CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Civilian crisis management from a European Union 
viewpoint 
When setting out to examine the principles and aims of the Europe-
an Union with respect to civilian crisis management we should also 
be prepared to take note of the EU's Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the ongoing process for developing a crisis man-
agement capability, as these have influenced planning of the imple-
mentation of EU civilian crisis management.' 
The European Union has been developing its own crisis man-
agement capability as part of its Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy, the present guidelines for which are set out in the Maastricht 
Agreement, which came into force on 1st November 1993. The pur-
pose of this policy is to create stability in Europe following the polit-
ical upheavals of the early 1990s. The process was stimulated in part 
by the dissolution of the formerYugoslavia, which cast serious doubts 
on the viability and unanimity of EU foreign policy. By ratifying the 
Maastricht Agreement, the member states undertook, among other 
things, to intensify their cooperation in matters of foreign policy and 
accepted the general goal of the programme, under which the CFSP 
would concern itself with all questions of security within the organ-
ization, including the definition of a long-term defence policy, which 
might lead eventually to a common defence system.28 
The Maastricht Agreement replaced the Amsterdam Agreement 
that had applied since 1st May 1999, preserving the notions of inter-
governmental consultation and solidarity as the basic principles of 
the CFSP. Particular attention was drawn to the preparation of the 
CFSP and to achieving greater efficiency in its decision-making pro-
cedures and execution. The crucial point as far as crisis management 
is concerned is clause 17, by which the"Petersberg Obligations", i.e. 
humanitarian and rescue obligations, peacekeeping and the tasks of 
combat forces in a crisis management context, including the restora-
tion of peace, are linked to the EU agreement.29 
The EU's efforts to develop a crisis management capability of 
its own assumed concrete form at the meeting of the European Coun-
cil in Cologne on 3rd-4th June 1999. This meeting restricted the de- 
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velopment of a common security and defence system very definitely 
to crisis management and the above-mentioned Petersberg Obliga-
tions, and was of the opinion that the EU should be capable of act-
ing independently to prevent conflicts and react to crises. In order to 
do this, it would need credible military power, means of taking the 
necessary decisions and a readiness to deploy its troops in order to 
resolve international crises, although without interfering with the 
activities of NATO in this respect.30 
The European Council meeting in Cologne authorized Finland 
to work on all these security aspects in the course of its presidency 
of the EU, bearing in mind that one part of the security package was 
to consist of the member states'non-military crisis management ca-
pabilities. In accordance with this resolution, a process of construct-
ing an inventory of all the resources available within the EU was set 
in motion during the Finnish presidency, leading to the publication 
of a catalogue of these resources."' The conclusion to be drawn from 
this was that the EU had accumulated a vast amount of experience 
in civilian operations connected with crisis management, the main 
areas involved in which were the supplying of humanitarian assist-
ance, the normalization of administrative and judicial functions, 
search and rescue services and the supervision of elections and hu-
man rights.32 
The European Council meeting in Helsinki drew up a plan of 
action for developing civilian branches to take part in crisis manage-
ment operations and for facilitating their mobilization, based on im-
provements in the combined deployment of national, community-
based and non-governmental organizations and in their readiness 
to react to crisis situations. The most urgent measures to be taken 
were the formation of a resource database, mapping of the opportu-
nities for developing the state of readiness of civilian police forces 
and the creation of rapid financing mechanisms. The above guide-
lines were consistent with UN peacekeeping activities and the Bra-
him Report on the development of these, since the latter also laid 
emphasis on the strengthening of civilian police forces and the cre-
atiori of financing mechanisms capable of reacting to the initiation 
of a new operation and the needs arising in the course of it.33  
Practical experience has shown that there was a distinct need 
for developmental work of that kind. Colonel Arto Räty, command-
er of the Finnish KFOR troops in 2000, observed, for instance, that 
there were clear deficiencies in the activities pursued by the EU in 
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Kosovo, in that decision-making processes were too cumbersome 
and slow and the ways of working were unable to adapt to demand-
ing crisis management situations. The problems, he believed, were 
not so much military ones as matters of political decision-making 
and administration. Similarly the financial mechanisms available to 
the EU were incapable of channelling funds to targets in crisis areas 
with sufficient rapidity.3" 
On the basis of the decisions reached at the Helsinki meeting, 
the EU resolved in May 2000 to set up a Civilian Crisis Management 
Committee to function as a working group responsible to the Coun-
cil of the EU. The purpose of this committee was to gather informa-
tion, make recommendations and give advice on civilian crisis man-
agement to the Political and Security Affairs Committee and other 
relevant council bodies.35 
New results regarding the organization of military and non-
military crisis management functions were achieved at the Europe-
an Council meeting at Santa Maria da Feira on 19th and 20th June 
2000, when a firm intention was announced to increase the prepar-
edness and efficiency of the EU's means of reacting to crises in the 
civilian as well as the military sector, with the idea that this increased 
efficiency could be placed at the disposal of a leading world organi-
zation such as the UN or the OSCE, or else serve as an independent 
instrument of the EU. It was essential to increase the resources avail-
able in all branches of civilian crisis management, although particu-
lar attention was to be paid to branches in which the international 
community was still experiencing deficiencies. The chief focal points 
in civilian crisis management identified at that meeting were police 
activities, actions aimed at strengthening the civilian administration 
and the rule of law, and rescue services."6 This meant that the poli-
cies and initiatives outlined in Helsinki had now taken concrete shape 
and the council was requiring member states from that point on-
wards to take action to implement the general objectives and re-
source targets laid down with respect to crisis management, although 
it was always to be remembered that participation in crisis manage-
ment livas voluntary for each member state.37 
In February 2001 a rapid action system was set up by the Euro-
pean Commission to enable the EU to obtain funds quickly for a 
crisis management operation. The system can be implemented at 
once if the beneficiary is experiencing a situation that poses a threat 
to general security, personal security or the stability of the country as 
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a whole. The assistance is of a short-term nature and not subject to 
repayment, and is intended to cover all aspects except for those that 
come under the jurisdiction of the Humanitarian Office (ECHO). It 
was through this systern that the EU was able to finance its CIMIC 
activities in Afghanistan, for instance.38 It can also be used to rectify 
defects of the kind that were observed in the EU operation in Kos-
ovo in its early stages. 
The division of EU crisis management into military and civilian 
branches of activity, excluding preventive measures,39 is displayed in 
Figure 3. The range of measures available in this scheme is intended 
to enable an adequate response to be made to any situation in which 
diplomacy has proved insufficient for ensuring stability in the area 
concerned. The diagram points to a distinct deficiency in coordina-
tion between the activities of the civilian and military components, 
suggesting that efforts should be made at once to create a coordina-
tive mechanism at this point that is capable of functioning at all lev-
els in an operation. 
In the opinion of Antti Sierla, Counsellor at the Finnish Lega-
tion, the choice of focal points was influenced by the fact that rescue 
services were already well developed and their activities concentrat- 
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Figure 3. Division of crisis management within the EU. 
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ed under UN control, which made it possible to begin the planning 
work at once, and an operative model was already in existence. The 
need for a civilian police force in Kosovo, on the other hand, was 
something that emerged more strongly as the operation proceeded, 
and the choice of this focal point was influenced by the many diffi-
culties that the international community had faced in setting up such 
a force. Support for the development of the judiciary was naturally 
closely connected with policing, and the development of a civilian 
administration could also be seen, in Sierla's view, as a logical con-
tinuation of the same line of thinking.40 
It is worth noting in relation to Sierla's statement that the focal 
points of crisis management defined by the EU have arisen out of 
existing needs and assumptions regarding the capacity to respond 
to future crises, and have been influenced by the fact that the mem-
ber states already have the experience and trained personnel neces-
saiy for initiating such activities. The main problem that can be en-
visaged is that of ensuring that a sufficient number of people can be 
mobilized according to a rapid timetable. 
The balanced development of military and civilian resources will 
be essential for effective crisis management in the EU, and this will 
call for close coordination of all the EU's available means and equip-
ment, both military and civilian, at all levels of activity.`" 
Policing 
The EU member states have noted the important role played by ci-
vilian policing in the crisis management operations in the Balkans, 
and are of the opinion that particular emphasis should be placed on 
the training of local police forces in future operations, as this would 
make it possible to reduce the sizes of international police forces 
and the lengths of time for which individual policemen were drafted 
into such areas.`' 
Police activities in a crisis management operation comprise full-
scale local policing duties in addition to the traditional supervisory, 
educational and advisory tasks. The international police force in Ko-
sovo, for example, found itself having to perform routine local polic-
ing duties in the early stages of the operation, including the mainte-
nance of order and security, crime investigation, traffic control and 
border duties. Preparations for future challenges are likely to involve 
the selection and training of a large number of policemen from the 
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police reserves beforehand," and also the recognition that the police 
in certain member states have greater experience in certain fields than 
those of others. This is particularly true of crowd control, for example. 
The intention is that the police reserves set aside for future EU 
crisis management duties should comprise sufficiently strong vol-
untary groups of professionals in different fields who are capable of 
cooperation with other actors, the aim being that the EU should be 
able by 2003 to assign a force of up to 5000 police to an international 
operation in response to a request from an international organiza-
tion such as the UN or OSCE and to have the first 1000 assembled 
and ready for action within 30 days. These forces could also be de-
tailed to an independent police operation as part of a more exten-
sive EU crisis management intervention.44 
The EU's plans for developing civilian police activities in re-
sponse to crisis management needs are similar in outline to those 
set out in the Brahim Report published by the UN in August 2000, 
which encouraged member states to contribute towards the forma-
tion of a sufficiently strong police reserve. The report emphasized 
the importance of regional arrangements for staff training, defini-
tion of the necessary capability level and despatch of the force to the 
site of the operation, for example, in order to achieve the necessary 
speed of reaction."s 
The EU civilian police initiative assumed concrete form with 
the initiation of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bos-
nia on 1st January 2003, taking over from the UN's International 
Police Task Force (IPTF). The EUPM operation involves 500 police-
men from the 15 EU member states and 18 other countries. The in-
tention is to continue the work of the IPTF in accordance with the 
general provisions of the Dayton Accord for establishing a police 
service in the area that conforms to the best European and interna-
tional criteria.446 
Strepigthening of the rule of lazy 
A successful outcome for a police operation will require of the EU an 
ability to assist the target country in reforming or reconstituting its 
system of justice and penal institutions. A crisis can easily lead to 
collapse of the rule of law, growth in organized crime and corruption 
in society at large, and this poses serious challenges for the commu-
nity in its efforts at recovery.' 
26 
The Feira resolution of the European Council permits member 
states to create national systems for selecting and mobilizing judges, 
prosecutors and prison service advisors at short notice for participa-
tion in peacekeeping operations. As an organization, the EU will at-
tempt to laid down guidelines for the selection and training of judg-
es and penal advisors for international duties in collaboration with 
the UN and regional organizations, particularly the OSCE. The EU 
can also take direct action to promote the creation or reform of the 
infrastructures of local courts and prisons, and it is also willing to 
employ trained local people in such operations.48 
The EU has begun to compile a register of experts in the 
strengthening of the rule of law. The initial stage has been largely a 
matter of surveying the possibilities for this, and practical work is 
not yet at the same level as in the case of policing, partly on account 
of the considerable experience that the member states already had 
with policing as a part of peacekeeping operations, whereas no such 
experience existed in the judicial sphere. 
In October 2000 the EU arranged a seminar on"Strengthening 
of the rule of law in crisis management - concrete goals for the Eu-
ropean Union", at which a preliminary exchange of information took 
place between the EU, UN, OSCE and Council of Europe in four 
spheres: 1) concrete experiences, 2) conclusions and future prospects, 
3) viewpoints and procedures regarding a framework for justice, and 
4) questions of added value.41  
A seminar of this kind that involves the main organizations func-
tioning within a certain field can have the effect of increasing the 
resources available, but it should be noted that in this case none of 
the organizations concerned have any broad-based experience of 
practical work in the field. The people with experience were those 
who had carried out such work in the service of more specialized 
organizations, and even then the exploitation of these events and 
measures at a later date was dependent on the existence of proper 
documentation, involving clear descriptions of the situation, the ef-
fects of the environment, the measures taken and the results achieved. 
In this respect a well-defined archiving system can be decisive, as 
those working in the field within a certain operation are frequently 
there only for a limited length of time and in the service of one par-
ticular organization. 
Andrew Fyfe, deputy director of the Tuzla area in Bosnia for the 
OSCE, called particular attention to the personnel structures of the 
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various organizations and the changes in these in the course of the 
operation, taking his own organization as an example. At the begin-
ning of the operation the various organizations did not necessarily 
have real professionals available, mainly on account of the difficult 
and often dangerous working conditions, but instead they had a high 
proportion of former soldiers who had training in survival under dif-
ficult conditions. As the situation developed, however, and condi-
tions were normalized, the personnel structures of the organizations 
active in the Balkans became more heavily angled towards civil serv-
ants.so 
Strengthening of the civilian administration 
Although it has not yet been defined within the European Union 
precisely what the strengthening of a civil administration entails, it 
is stated in EU publications that the reconstruction phase after a cri-
sis should include support for the country's civilian administration. 
Member states have been asked to consider their possibilities for 
sending experts to crisis areas to train and reconstitute the adminis-
tration there." 
The reorganization and training of local and regional admin-
istrations in areas that have suffered crises is a major challenge. The 
problems may lie in inadequate social and health services, for in-
stance, and there may also be a serious refugee situation. In cases 
where the whole administration of the crisis area has collapsed it 
may be that an international organization has to take responsibility 
for all aspects of the administration at first. This cannot be a viable 
long-term alternative, however, if the aim is to seek a comprehen-
sive solution to the crisis, as responsibility has to be transferred to 
the local administration at the earliest possible juncture, once real 
training has been provided and the necessary reorganizations com-
pleted 
The measures required for planning and preparing the 
strengthening of the civilian administration can serve in a sense as a 
test of the efficiency of the EU, as no extensive preparatory work of 
this kind has been undertaken by any major organization previous-
ly. The people working on this need to be familiar with all aspects of 
the functioning of the civilian component, because all other areas of 
activity affect this either directly or indirectly. 
The reorganization of the provincial level of administration in 
Finland, for instance, has released a group of professionals who would 
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be available for operations of this kind in the future, and it would be 
important to look into who these people are and whether they would 
be interested in international duties in the future. They will scarcely 
have had any experience of crisis management operations as part of 
the international community previously, of course, and therefore their 
use for this purpose would inevitably involve a certain amount of 
additional training.53  
Civil Protection 
Disaster relief operations entail a range of search and rescue servic-
es, the functionality of which must, according to the Feira resolution, 
be ensured through reliance on the rescue services, equipment and 
resources of individual countries.s" These are naturally needs that 
can arise very suddenly and should be kept separate from the corre-
sponding functions that belong to the sphere of military rescue op-
erations.ss 
It is possible that rescue operations may have to be carried out 
in an area where the international community and all the elements 
involved in it are already working, in which case the present head-
ing covers largely individual instances dealt with using systems that 
are already in existence, on the strength of regional and bilateral 
agreements.56 One example of rescue services that can be quoted 
here concerns the 2002 earthquake in Afghanistan, in connection 
with which the ISAF troops were used to deal with the disaster, in-
clude the transportation and care of the injured.57 
Participation in rescue and humanitarian aid operations mount-
ed by various organizations and systems must always be based on a 
decision made by the government of the country concerned or other 
responsible authorities. In the case of Finland, for instance, it is a 
question of whether we are committed to international cooperation 
in actual operations as well as attendance at meetings and participa-
tion in training." 
A mechanism for cooperation and mutual assistance has al-
ready been created within the EU itself to cope with accidents and 
natural disasters, entailing the maintenance of an around-the-clock 
emergency system within the EU and a corresponding service point 
in each member country. The Commission has also drawn up a hand-
book containing information on the resources available to the res-
cue services in each country. It has been observed in the light of 
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recent experiences, however, that more needs to be done to develop 
this system, particularly with respect to defining which country is to 
lead each operation and which rescue services each is to specialize 
in.-5~ 
2.2 Experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo 
Where the focuses of attention in civilian crisis management dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter have been based on those defined by 
the EU, it must be said here that experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo 
have shown that these are not by any means the only factors to be 
considered when preparing for future non-military crisis manage-
ment work. We will therefore concern ourselves here with areas of 
activity that have particularly come to the fore in the Balkans opera-
tions, one purpose being to provide as comprehensive a picture as 
possible of the overall field of crisis management. There are some 
areas, of course, in which we still do not have very much experience, 
and this will be reflected in the content of the discussion at such 
points. At the same time, however, the division of the field used here 
can be regarded as a frame of reference for all the tasks that could 
possibly be assigned to the civilian components in a CIMIC context. 
When examining the activities of the various organizations, one 
notices that they tend to define certain focal points for themselves 
and develop their own resources in accordance with these, possibly 
in response to earlier experiences, the availability of personnel or 
visibility. The activities of certain states may be prompted by the fa-
vourable image or financial profit to be gained in given fields. The 
desire of states to assert influence over their own spheres of eco-
nomic interest can also be expected to emerge as a decisive motive 
in the future. 
From a military point of view, civilian crisis management can be 
regarded as providing support for the military effort and enabling 
some savings in terms of resources. It is important for a peacekeep-
ing force to be aware of the fields involved in non-military activity, 
what organizations are usually responsible for it, what principles 
govern their actions and how the military wing can prepare to lend 
support to the various actors forming the civilian component of a 
crisis management operation. 
Where military organizations are set up to take responsibility 
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for certain defined aspects of crisis management operations, they 
have only limited resources available for civilian crisis management, 
although they may have"dual use"resources in abundance. Similar- 
ly the attitude of the troops towards non-military activities may be 
one that tends to magnify these resources or detract from them."i0 
The following aspects of civilian crisis management that can be 
divided off as functional entities of their own are: 
— restoration of the social order 
— development of democracy and administration 
— promotion of economic recovery 
— revival of social and health services 
— improvement of the general infrastructure 
— stimulation of culture and education, 
— establishment of external relations 
— civil defence. 
— boundary patrolling and customs 
— civil protection 
— refugees and displaced persons 
Questions such as the establishment of external relations, civil pro-
tection, boundary patrolling and customs will not be dealt with here. 
Restoration of the social order 
It has been shown in practice that restoration of the social order is 
one of the most important factors in civilian crisis management if 
one is aiming at a satisfactory general outcome. The subdivision of 
this theme may be taken to be development of the judiciary, policing 
and the prison service, restoration of law and order, crime investiga-
tion and the apprehension of criminals, implementation of interna-
tional justice and the restoration of human rights." All these may be 
regarded as contributing towards peaceful development in other fields 
of civilian government, too. 
The restoration of social order calls for a sufficiently rapid re-
sponse "from the international community. A sufficiently strong po-
lice force has to be assigned to the area as soon as conditions permit, 
with priorities for action determined according to the situation. Their 
most important task is to provide safe living conditions for the local 
population and to prevent illegal actions that are likely to prove a 
threat to general security. Activities can be put in motion through 
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cooperation between the military and civilian components, although 
in order to guarantee a favourable outcome it is essential to create as 
soon as possible conditions under which the responsibility for peo-
ple's basic security lies with the local authorities. 
The bodies responsible for measures connected with the resto-
ration of social order usually belong to the UN or its system, or else 
they are formed by it to act in particular instances,6" but regional 
organizations such as the OSCE can adopt an major role in this, and 
it is possible where necessary to form independent investigatory 
groups composed for the most part of professionals in different fields 
sent by their particular countries. Thus the countries contributing 
resources form significant participants in the whole civilian crisis 
management operation.63  
At the national level, the duties to be performed comprise jneas-
ures that are directed at serving the interests of the whole system, 
and they are characteristically of a long-term nature, as attempts are 
made to ensure effects that will last well into the future. The duties 
as such may be a matter of passing laws or statutes, training local 
officials and developing working conditions. The measures needed 
at the regional and local levels are generally concrete in nature and 
for the most part have an immediate impact, e.g. crime investiga-
tion, the maintenance of law and order and the training and super-
vision of local police forces.61  
Development of democracy and administration 
All measures aimed at promoting the internal development of the 
state are subsumed under this heading. The objective should be for 
the state to meet all the (generally accepted) criteria for a democratic 
community, the subheadings which support the achievement of this 
objective being the formation of local, regional and national admin-
istrations, the implementation of democracy through legally valid 
elections, the provision of adequate education in democracy, the cre-
ation of adequate conditions for democratic actions as circumstances 
require and unbiased supervision of the enactment of the above 
measures. The creation of suitable conditions for normal political life, 
in which the representatives of minorities also have a say in decisions 
at the national level and the majority takes account of the opinions of 
the opposition, also belongs to the development of democracy.6" 
Supervision of the armed forces of the parties engaged in the 
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conflict can also be included as one aspect of the development of 
democracy. This is normally looked after by the military component 
in the early stages of an operation, but the normal procedure is to 
undertake a reorganization of duties following a reduction in the 
number of troops placed in the area so that these armed groups are 
able in the future to defend their own areas but do not pose a threat 
to their neighbours.66 
The development of administration and democracy is one of the 
most difficult areas of civilian crisis management to implement suc-
cessfully. The war that has been waged and its immediate conse-
quences will frequently have given rise to conditions in which the 
population is divided into factions, and this makes it more difficult to 
normalize the administration and achieve democracy, while all ac-
tions may be coloured further by biased attitudes adopted by inter-
nationally significant states and groupings towards the parties en-
gaged in the crisis and towards the kind of solution to be aimed at."' 
The main organizations that are in a position to implement 
measures connected with the development of administration and 
democracy are the UN and widely accepted regional organizations 
such as the OSCE, although it is also possible to make use of various 
observer organizations. One such body that functioned in Bosnia 
was the European Commission MonitoiyMission (ECMM), with the 
task of reporting to the EU on developments in the area. An organ-
ization can influence the implementation of democracy through the 
impact that its reports have on the areal assignment of resources. 
Supervision of the armed forces of the country in question at the 
initial stage in the operation is usually in the hands of the interna-
tional military organization, but responsibility is usually transferred 
later to the OSCE in the case of operations in Europe."b 
Promotion of economic recovery 
One consequence of a long-term conflict of the kind experienced in 
Bosnia is that the economic life of the area collapses almost entirely, 
typically through the virtual destruction of all factories and compa-
rable elements of the economic infrastructure. Another characteris-
tic feature of the period following such a crisis is the occurrence of 
mass unemployment.69 
The concept of economic recovery subsumes all measures tak-
en to enable the affected state to function in the future without sig- 
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nificant external economic assistance, including the development of 
financial institutions, the planning of the necessary arrangements 
for financing large-scale projects and the guiding of everyday com-
mercial life by ensuring adequate education and supervision. Sup-
port is often needed for the creation of jobs, activation of commer-
cial life and development of a taxation system. As conditions be-
come more stable, support can be considered for primary produc-
tion and small-scale industries, in the form of various loans for en-
trepreneurs.70 
Economic development needs to proceed in close interaction 
with the development of administration and democracy, for without 
a smoothly functioning administrative system and associated direc-
tion at the national level, it is impossible to create a functional eco-
nomic system. In addition, features such as corruption, smuggling 
and other forms of crime can interfere with the initiation of such 
functions."' Thus reconstruction can be attempted in all areas of life 
only when the international community has succeeded through its 
own measures in ensuring that the assistance provided and the re-
sources allotted for various purposes are being used in the preor-
dained manner. 
Responsibility for economic recovery can be assumed by any 
organization that has sufficient resources for this, both financially 
and in terms of personnel, e.g. the UN or the EU. The World Bank 
may also have a major role in organizing the necessary finance, and 
the participant states' own overseas development funds, e.g. the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), can 
similarly play a significant part.72 
One integral part of this activity is determination of the level 
aimed at in the measures to be planned and implemented, which 
should correspond to the level of development achieved by society 
in the area prior to the conflict. Attention also needs to be paid to 
the expected duration of such activities, which will be affected above 
all by the country's own resources, e.g. raw materials and skilled la-
bour force." 
Revival of social and health services 
Of all the areas of civilian crisis management it is this that is most 
obviously of a dual nature, as it consists in the initial phase of sur-
veying the need for emergency help and the provision of this help. 
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At the same time it is necessary to be able to define the resources 
available in the area in terms of both staff and materials and to iden-
tify the areas that are in need of immediate help." 
The development of effective social and health services for a 
country or countries recovering from war calls for the establishment 
of evaluatory and developmental groups of various kinds. In the case 
of an internal conflict within a single country, it is seldom possible to 
make use directly of the structures of the old system, if only because 
hospitals and other facilities in the territory of one party to the con-
flict cannot be used in the initial stage to treat representatives of the 
other party.75 
The finance available for the initial stage usually takes the form 
of donations channelled into the crisis area through an international 
organization, the most notable of these being the International Red 
Cross.76 Various voluntary organizations also play a prominent role 
at this stage." 
More long-term development of social and health services for a 
crisis area is usually entrusted to UN agencies such as the World 
Health Organization (WI IO), often working in conjunction with in-
ternational non-governmental organizations. Others can support the 
cause through individual projects of their own" 
The key element at the local level in the initial stage is the coor-
dination of aid and confirmation that it is reaching its destination, 
together with the maintenance of essential functions such as first 
aid and ambulance services, although responsibility for the latter 
should be transferred at the earliest possible juncture to the appro-
priate local authorities, after assurances that they are able to dis-
charge such responsibilities.' 
hnprovenient of the general infrastructure 
Subsumed under this heading are all the measures that are aimed at 
restoring the functional capacity of parts of the physical environ-
ment and providing the conditions necessary for the development 
of production and economic activity. These include industrial estab-
lishments, components of the agricultural system, telecommunica-
tions and the network of roads, airports and harbours. This forms an 
extremely broad field of civilian crisis management, and successful 
accomplishment of the tasks involved calls for comprehensive plan-
ning based on a thorough survey of the prevailing situation. It is also 
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important from the point of view of the whole operation that these 
activities should be closely related to the promotion of economic 
life, at least as far as the assignment of resources is concerned." 
Good road coverage, operative airports and well-functioning 
telecommunications are essential to the work of the international 
community, and if this community is required to create an infra-
structure of its own in any of these respects, every effort should be 
made to do this in such a way that the resulting facilities can be 
incorporated into the planned system at a later stage.8' 
The measures to be taken at the regional or national level usu-
ally concern whole systems or large individual installations, such as 
the construction or repair of airports, harbours or large factories. At 
the local level the measures are frequently more in the nature of 
microprojects, but it should also be possible to link these in with 
larger entities, implying that actors engaged at different levels should 
be capable of mutually coordinating and planning their activities.8' 
It is necessary to take the main problems experienced in the 
area into account when planning the development of the overall in-
frastructure. If the aim is to allow displaced persons to return home, 
provision has to be made for this, and if there are defects in essential 
services such as transport or electricity or water supplies, it has to be 
recognised that these will cause major problems. Again the solving 
of such problems calls for coordination and the combining of re-
sources among actors at different levels. 
The organization responsible for overall development of the 
infrastructure is usually the UN, but the EU adopted a significant 
role in this in the case of the operations in the Ballans and has also 
emerged as a major financer of reconstruction projects. Individual 
states have also provided considerable amounts of finance, howev-
er, as exemplified by the water supply projects financed and imple-
mented by the Finnish government in Bosnia.,3  
Civil Defence 
This is usually taken to cover all the measures that a state plans and 
takes to ensure the protection of its citizens from dangers of various 
kinds, e.g. military threats, environmental hazards, major catastro-
phes or spin-offs from crises occurring elsewhere. The measures con-
cerned may include: 
— propagation of human rights and the rights of given population 
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groups under conditions of war 
— readiness of the civilian authorities to react to emergencies 
— organization of civil defence leadership 
— warning and alarm systems 
— civil defence activities 
— evacuation plans 
— organization, training and equipping of civilian formations 
— citizens' advice and training 
— emergency supplies 
— preparation for the repair of the community infrastructure and 
essential services and the maintenance of service functions un- 
der exceptional conditions.b" 
Independent states are responsible for their own civil defence ar-
rangements, but if these systems have collapsed as a result of a cri-
sis, it is possible that an outside organization may have to take re-
sponsibility for protecting the population. Finland, for example, is 
prepared to provide support of this kind in crisis areas through the 
UN, EU or NATO and to consider providing such assistance in indi-
vidual cases of a request from a foreign government. The achieve-
ment of a level of preparedness for providing such assistance in a 
crisis area is a long-term process and involves the acquisition of 
equipment etc. that may not necessarily be of any use in the case of 
a major catastrophe at home, for instance.' 
Refugees and displaced persons 
A refugee is a person who is being or is likely to be persecuted on 
the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or mein-
bership of a particular social group and has therefore been forced to 
leave his or her own country. It is frequently impossible to return 
because the authorities in that country are unable to guarantee that 
person's safety.86 
A displaced person (DP), sometimes referred to as an internal 
displaced person (IDP), is a person who has had to leave his or her 
home area on the same grounds as a refugee but has remained within 
the same country, usually moving to an area where the majority of 
the population is of the same ethnic backgrounds' 
Some of the salient questions in the Bosnia operations, and to 
some extent also in those in Kosovo, were problems affecting refu- 
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gees and displaced persons. The 1995 agreement in Bosnia, for in-
stance, required local authorities to support minorities in their at-
tempts to return to their home areas, e.g. by ensuring that they could 
do so in safety, and the international community has also focused its 
activities to a great  extent on enabling refugees to return home, but 
in spite of all these efforts, the numbers returning have fallen well 
short of the targets."" 
Responsibility for refugees and displaced persons lies with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who 
usually engages the help of other international organizations, rather 
in the manner of subcontractors."y The local authorities also play a 
major role in this work, however, for it is in the last resort through 
their efforts that suitable conditions are created for solving the prob-
lems of refugees and displaced persons. 
The factors preventing the return of refugees may be continued 
reprisals by the opposite side in the dispute, the destruction of their 
dwellings, future economic uncertainties or the achievement of a 
better standard of living in their country of exile. Successful repatri-
ation calls for attention to be paid to the solution of all these prob-
lem s.90 
2.3 Conclusions 
Civilian crisis management is a question of a third party intervening 
to resolve a crisis and normalize conditions in the country concerned. 
It always entails a strong political steering component. 
Temporal factors are of great importance here. The reaction time 
required in the case of a major natural catastrophe is a matter of 
hours or a few days at the most, while in the case of war it is essen-
tial to be able to begin reconstructing society and ensuring the basic 
rights of the people immediately a peace treaty has been signed, as 
this can often prevent a resumption of hostilities. 
The time available for reconstruction after a war is limited to a 
few years, while other restrictions exist in terms of personnel and 
finance. It must not be forgotten, too, that the availability of resourc-
es can be altered fundamentally by changes in the political climate 
in the countries participating in the crisis management operation. 
No firm opinion has yet been expressed in discussions on civil- 
ian crisis management regarding the duration of such operations 
and for how long given organizations should be committed to them, 
although the time factor has been mentioned in discussions on the 
exclusion of development aid from the sphere of civilian crisis man-
agement. Bilateral development aid is by nature a long-term under-
taking, and it is not regarded as forming a part of crisis manage-
ment. On the other hand, experiences in the Balkans suggest that 
even crisis management can call for long-term commitment. 
It is essential to take the conditions prevailing in the area of 
operation into account when training crisis management personnel. 
The starting point is that the people working there should be famil-
iar with the tasks involved, but emphasis needs to be place above all 
on the special features of the area itself. In other words, it is neces-
sary to pay attention to the ability of the specialized staff to work in 
a certain operational environment. 
A comprehensive picture has riot yet emerged of the whole field 
of civilian crisis management. It is known to be composed of certain 
sub-fields, so that the measures taken in each tend to affect the oth-
ers, but the interfaces between these have not been clearly defined. 
This means that there is an obvious need for planning that takes the 
whole operation into account. The particular features of the crisis 
that emerge dictate what methods are to be employed in each case, 
and this calls for broad-based preparatory work geared towards fac-
ing highly differing tasks. Good operating conditions under such cir-
cumstance entail systems that permit the rapid deployment of staff 
and sufficiently prompt arrangement of the necessary finance. 
The European Union is still at the beginning of its task of de-
veloping a capability for civilian crisis management, and it is not yet 
realistic to expect it to be able to respond in the same manner as the 
UN, for instance. It has excellent prospects of being to develop such 
a non-military capability, however. The crucial question is the atti-
tude of the member countries, for they are in effect the providers of 
the resources. It is not reasonable for the EU to operate on a princi-
ple of"everyone supplies everything", but rather the EU should at-
tempt to divide the focal points between its members, as should be 
quite possible once the process of cataloguing the resources availa-
ble has been completed. It should then be possible to observe the 
same principles in the assembly of resources as in the areas of mili-
tary specialization, where the member countries have indicated the 
types of troops that they have more experience in providing than 
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other countries do, e.g. the Finnish CIMIC company. 
The EU is engaged in constructing for itself a set of instruments 
by which it will be able to react to possible disturbances in the social 
order. Attention should be paid at the planning stage to facilitating 
coordination between the various elements by forming units with a 
satisfactory functional capacity, as experience suggests that one ma-
jor barrier to successful action is a lack of coordination mechanisms. 
If due attention is paid to the interfaces between areas of activity at 
the planning stage and to the necessity for measures designed to 
link them, it will be possible to increase their combined impact. 
Up to now the European Union has not been sufficiently good 
at predicting future problems and challenges. Instead, planning and 
preparation have consistently lagged a step behind the true situa-
tion. For instance, by concentrating on acquiring police reserves of 
the kind that would have been necessary for dealing with the prob-
lems that emerged at the early stages in Kosovo, the EU prevented 
itself from preparing to deal with the subsequent situation, in which 
the need was for a group of international observers. Its planning 
needs to be capable of addressing simultaneously the needs of a 
possible new operation and future developments in existing ones. 
This would create the conditions necessary for the systematic devel-
opment of international forces and at the same time would have the 
effect of reducing the duration of individual operations, which should 
be the eventual goal of crisis management as far as the nations con-
tributing troops are concerned. 
The list of areas contributing to civilian crisis management pre-
sented here on the basis of existing operations is a long one and 
represents only in part the areas of focus defined by the EU. The staff 
of a military detachment engaged in preparing for an operation 
should be capable of determining in advance the particular areas 
which are likely to be involved in each case, whereupon it should be 
possible to list the types of professional that will be needed in order 
for the military organization to accomplish its objectives. A good 
example of this arose in Kosovo, where the military had to take re-
sponsibility for civilian policing work in the initial stages. 
The military organization needs to follow closely what is hap-
pening in the sphere of civilian crisis management, and needs to 
have sufficient grounds when proposing CIMIC collaboration, e.g. 
an adequate knowledge of the other party's mode of organization 
and ways of working. Mutual awareness of this kind can be promot- 
IU1 
ed by means of courses in which representatives of the military and 
civilian components explain their activities to each other. This should 
also make it possible to plan join actions that take the needs and 
ways of working of both sides into account. Courses of this kind 
should be planned on the case study principle, which would require 
the creation of a realistic practice situation. This would enable real 
planning to take place in which the areas of responsibility would be 
clearly delimited. Sufficiently broad-based descriptions of the ob-
jectives and ways of working of the various actors involved would 
need to be produced for these teaching situations, and such back-
ground information would need to be distributed to all the partici-
pants beforehand. 
Where a military organization is capable of moving into a crisis 
area quickly, experience suggests that the units available for civilian 
crisis management purposes do not usually have this capacity. Con-
sequently, the possibility should be explored at the national level of 
delegating certain experts to the military organization in fields re-
garded as important as far as the whole operation is concerned. If 
the area of operation lacks a functional administration, for example, 
positions for experts in this field could be opened up in the military 
detachment, the occupants of which would be responsible for the 
initial planning and perhaps for setting the measures that they re-
gard as most important in motion. Once the civilian component was 
drafted into the area the same persons could be freely recruited into 
the appropriate organizations to continue their work. Such an ar-
rangement could confer significant advantages both on the military 
organization, which would have experts at its disposal, and on the 
civilian organization, which would gain an intelligence and prepara-
tory unit. 
3 FUNDAMENTALS OF CIMIC 
3.1 NATO 
NATO is best known as a military organization dedicated to main-
taining the freedom and security of its member countries in accord-
ance with the principles of the UN Charter. It is intended to serve as 
a deterrent and means of defence against aggression shown towards 
member countries, and is regarded by its members primarily as a 
political entity, and at the same time as the world's most effective 
multinational military organization.91  
NATO has a significant role in security within Europe, and has 
adapted to the changes that have taken place within the continent 
by developing its strategic doctrine and military defence systems. 
The principal perceived threat during the Cold War era was a mas-
sive Soviet and Warsaw Pact offensive, and now that such a threat 
no longer exists and the new dangers are likely to arise from ethnic, 
religious and regional crises, uncontrolled migratory flows and envi-
ronmental disasters, the alliance itself has regrouped its forces into 
more mobile units.9 '- 
The new outline strategy, or mission, for NATO, approved in 
April 1999, has caused it to be committed more firmly than ever to 
crisis management. The guidelines are the transatlantic link and a 
broad concept of security. Maintenance of the freedom and security 
of member countries is still one of its basic tasks,J3 but it is now rec-
ognised that the probability of a wide-scale conventional war has 
diminished, although it has not been eliminated entirely." 
The attempts to define crisis management objectives more pre-
cisely on the part of NATO are quite easy to understand in view of 
the operating environment for which the new strategy was drawn 
up, since the NATO commitment to the Ballans area, in both Bosnia 
and Kosovo, was a concrete issue of the day, but in any case the 
alliance's leading role in the implementation of crisis management 
operations has been undeniable in recent times, as it is the only or-
ganization with the potential for mounting peacekeeping operations 
of this new type. By accepting responsibility for operations of the 
kind that are taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has at the 
same time strengthened its own position in Europe and above all 
underlined its utility in the eyes of member countries.95 
The new Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (AJP-
9) published by NATO in August 2000 is based on document MC 
411 (Civil Military Relations), which is concerned with cooperation 
largely on the strategic level, while itself dealing with the operation-
al level. AJP-9 has gained its present form mostly as a consequence 
of experiences gained in the Bosnia operation, four earlier drafts hav-
ing been published between 1997 and 2000 before the ratified ver-
sion came out. The most recent version, published in the regulations 
of June 2001, scarcely differs in content in any way from the 2000 
version. The doctrine has been drawn up to detail measures that can 
be taken both in operations provided for under Article 5 and ones 
that do not belong under this article, and thus the main emphasis is 
on CIMIC support for military operations, which is regarded as vital 
for the alliance's troops when operating outside their own geograph-
ical area.°6 
It has transpired in practice that the focus of CIMIC activities at 
an early stage in an operation will inevitably be on support for its 
own troops, but that the focus may change as the operation advanc-
es, more attention being devoted to tasks that are necessary for 
achieving the overall objectives of the mission. This transfer of em-
phasis may also be a function of the conditions that prevailed at the 
beginning of the operation. In Kosovo, for example, the CIMIC per-
sonnel had to direct a substantial proportion of their resources ini-
tially towards maintaining the basic functions of the local communi-
ties. Such shifts in the focus of activities are not allowed for in the 
existing NATO CIMIC doctrine, however, partly because the ques-
tion of recognising phases in an operation has not been explored in 
sufficient detail.97 
The new doctrine also considers cooperation with other inter-
national organizations and with the local population. Mention is sim-
ilarly made of community reconstruction needs, but the significance 
of this aspect for reducing the duration of a military presence is not 
noted.98 
A frame of reference for CIMIC activity on the part of NATO is 
provided by the assumption that the commander of the military forces 
in an operation, whether subject to Article 5 or not, will need to take 
account of broader social, political, cultural, religious, economic, en-
vironmental and humanitarian considerations when planning and 
implementing his strategies. CIMIC is not a new phenomenon in 
NATO circles, however. It is simply that it was looked on previously 
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as more of a logistic challenge for an operation, e.g. as a matter of 
making use of the resources of the area in support of the operation's 
own troops."y 
CIMIC is now understood specifically as an attempt to strength-
en measures that can make it possible to create conditions in the 
crisis area that are conducive to peaceful development. In order to 
achieve this, the doctrine maintains that personnel in this field should: 
— organize platforms for cooperation with civilian components at 
all levels (local, regional and national) 
— participate in joint planning at both the strategic and operative 
level together with the principal civilian organizations before and 
during the operation 
— monitor the local community constantly in order to identify de-
ficiencies and plan how to remedy them 
— supervise those of the operation's own functions that are inti-
mately bound up with the local community, e.g. the use of local 
labour 
— work in such a manner that actors in the international communi-
ty can pass over responsibility for the maintenance of social func-
tions smoothly to the local authorities 
— represent the viewpoint of their own field of activity in the plan-
ning of military activities 
— advise the commander of the operation's own troops on all the 
above matters.10° 
The regulations divide CIMIC into the follow sub-areas: Civil-Mili-
tary Liason (CML), Support to the Civil Envionment (SCE), and Sup-
port to the Force (STF).101 These three sub-areas share the common 
feature of emphasising the legitimacy of the military operations and 
committing civil society to participation in a process aimed at the 
normalization of conditions. The main measures available for achiev-
ing this are active dissemination of information and close coopera-
tion with the local authorities and leaders in society.102 Properly timed, 
active dissemination of information can do much to improve the 
impact of measures on the group at which they are aimed. 
The implementation of CIMIC measures calls for three compo-
nents: 
— acceptance of a principle of action and a policy, or doctrine, which 
can also be understood as implying the existence of adequate doc-
umentation to back up the operation 
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— ability to act in accordance with the principles of action and pol- 
icy or doctrine, which calls for appropriate trained personnel 
— units formed on a functional basis and supported with adequate 
resources.103 
A CIMIC organization should comprise trained personnel, special-
ists in particular fields and actual resources. Although the NATO 
organization has a specialization element, this does not have the 
necessary staffing capacity for such a purpose, and organizations have 
been assembled in practice from the personnel resources that hap-
pen to have been available. There are also differences between mem-
ber states in the composition of their military organizations, mostly 
on account of differences of opinion over the activities to be pursued 
arising from experiences with earlier UN peacekeeping missions, for 
instance. In some cases forces that base their composition on the 
use of reserves are likely to look on CIMIC differently from those 
that use professional soldiers, as an army of reserves tends to have 
more experientially based knowledge and skills relevant to coopera-
tion with civilians.704 
CIMIC staff are required to work predominantly in an environ-
ment in which their collaboration partners are local civilians and rep-
resentatives of international organizations working in the area, which 
calls for a knowledge of local conditions and the history of the area. 
Working with the representatives of civilian organizations also re-
quires an adequate knowledge of these bodies'methods and ways of 
working, and also adequate language skills, as the ability to commu-
nicate without an interpreter is a distinct advantage in liaison situa-
tions.105 
The principles of CIMIC are in effect guidelines that remain in 
force for the duration of an operation, and can be divided into two 
categories: 1) regulations governing activities within the military or-
ganization, and 2) principles governing collaboration between the 
military and civilians.106 The former apply to planning processes 
among the troops, and should ideally be determined on an opera-
tion-centred and commander-centred basis, as is typical of United 
States military operations.1 ' 
CIMIC activities also include tasks at the operational and tacti-
cal levels, which are the same regardless of whether the operation 
falls under Article 5 or not. These can be grouped temporally into 
those applying to the time preceding the operation, those to be exe- 
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cuted during the operation and those connected with withdrawal 
from the operation."' According to NATO's CIMIC doctrine, one 
major aspect of the tasks to be performed prior to an operation con-
cerns training of the troops, i.e. their preparation for taking maxi-
mally effective action in the area of the future operation. Closely con-
nected with this is the provision of support for the commander of 
the troops, e.g. ensuring that he is aware of the possible influence of 
civil society on his own actions. The CIMIC personnel will be ex-
pected to draw up a section on CIMIC activity for the operational 
order (usually appendix W), which should contain a detailed account 
of social conditions in the area, itemized as follows: 
— political and cultural history, 
— functioning of the national and regional administration, 
— public administration and the services that it provides, 
— economics 
— problems among the civilian population (employment, incomes 
etc.) 
— migration among the population (refugees, displaced persons etc.) 
— purpose and functional capacity of organizations and other civil-
ian bodies with a mandate to be in the area 
— the media.109 
It may be noted from experience that the above list usually forms 
only part of the CIMIC appendix attached to the operation order. 
These items are concerned mostly with environmental conditions 
and their impact on the operation, whereas the most important parts 
of the appendix, those concerned with the requirements set for the 
operation by the supreme command and the principles for imple-
menting them, are omitted from the list in the CIMIC doctrine. Thus 
the list serves more as an outline for a report on local conditions 
than as a basis for the CIMIC section of the operation orderJ1° 
Cooperation between a military organization and civilian ac-
tors is regarded in the NATO doctrine as being grounded in five 
functional entities: 
— regular meetings 
— a two-way flow of information 
— coordination of activities 
— implementation of practical CIMIC measures 
— continuous appraisal of the situation."' 
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The most demanding of the above entities is the implementa-
tion of practical CIMIC measures, a reference to situations in which 
a branch of an operation may have to accept responsibility for some 
aspect of society because the civilian organization lacks the capabil-
ity to take charge of it immediately. Instructions should be drawn up 
at the planning stage regarding the role that the military organiza-
tion can adopt with respect to civilian areas of responsibility in a 
situation in which the civilian organization possessing the mandate 
has not yet arrived in the area or cannot accept the tasks designated 
to it. This would enable implementation to take place on the same 
principles throughout the area covered by the operation.112  
When the military organization is beginning its withdrawal from 
the area CIMIC activity is required to transfer the non-military func-
tions for which it has been responsible to separately designated ci-
vilian organizations and authorities. In fact, NATO policy is to pro-
vide continuous encouragement and support for the transfer of func-
tions in society to the local authorities.1' 
The duties of the CIMIC branch should be defined separately 
for each operation, and flexibility is required in the formation of the 
necessary organizations. The staff should nevertheless be capable of 
participating in headquarters planning work at all levels regardless 
of the operation in question,"' and should possess above all a good 
knowledge of the operational patterns followed by international or-
ganizations. The need for this has become particularly evident in the 
context of training sessions arranged for the purpose of studying 
different actors'special characteristics and modes of operation. NATO 
member countries are also expected to possess a national capacity 
for forming CIMIC organizations, and partner countries an ability to 
form units or parts of these in particular branches of activity. The 
CIMIC groups formed for a particular operation are regarded in the 
doctrine as the hard core of all activity.115  
The principal duty of a CIMIC group, which can comprise a 
headquarters group, a headquarters company and a variable number 
of CIMIC companies, is to support the operation's own organization 
by implementing practical tasks in its own branch of activity. Such a 
group will normally possess experts in civilian administration, in-
dustry, humanitarian aid, economics, commerce and social affairs, 
and can also be part of one country's national contingent. The group 
will be trained to take responsibility for the tasks detailed above, and 
may be assigned to function over the whole area of the operation or 
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a region controlled by a particular brigade or division.'"' 
From a national point of view it is important in the initial stages 
of an operation to establish a working relationship with the opera-
tion's CIMIC group, and it is useful to involve the experts in various 
branches in providing support for the planning of one's own activi-
ties. 
The purpose of the CIMIC centres, which are usually set up 
outside the military bases, is to provide places that are easily accessi-
ble to the local people and which can supply them with the infor-
mation they need on the work of the international community. The 
same centres also setve as meeting places for the various organiza-
tions engaged in the operation, enabling a flexible exchange of in-
formation between actors. The doctrine maintains that if NATO forces 
are moved into the area of operation after the international civilian 
organizations, it should be possible for the CIMIC staff to begin work 
at civilian sites that have already been set up."' 
The concept of a CIMIC centre is interpreted in NATO's CIMIC 
doctrine as referring to a place outside the military bases where the 
staff are able to work and to meet their cooperation partners. In the 
SFOR operation, the activities of which maybe regarded as relative-
ly well developed, a CIMIC centre is a part of a company and has an 
area of responsibility of its own. Likewise, a CIMIC building is a phys-
ical site set up by a centre, the same as is referred to in the NATO 
doctrine as a CIMIC centre.' 18  
3.2 CIMIC activities in the EU 
The preparations made within the EU for the development of a crisis 
management capability have included the creation of the following 
documents of relevance to CIMIC activities: Standard Operating Pro-
cedures (SOP) for the headquarters of an EU-led operation, the Civ-
il Military Co-operation Concept, which is comparable to NATO's 
document AJP-09, and a Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Func-
tional Planning Guide for EU-led Crisis Management Operations. 
The SOP document for an EU-led operation headquarters defines 
CIMIC as a function involving both a military and a civilian compo-
nent that is intended to support the operation, the civilian compo-
nent being regarded as comprising actors that are both internal and 
external to the EU.119 
At the operational level, CIMIC activities provide a convenient 
means of exchanging information between the civilian and military 
components. In order to provide favourable circumstances for this, 
the SOP proposes that at least the following functions aimed at pro-
moting cooperation should be implemented: 
— participation in cooperation meetings between the Command 
Group and other components 
— creation of conditions for cooperation with actors external to the 
EU at a sufficiently early juncture and in accordance with the needs 
of the operation 
— creation of conditions for cooperation with local administrative 
bodies and representatives of international organizations work-
ing with these. 
Since the SOP document maintains that CIMIC should contribute 
to the achievement of the goals of the operation, CIMIC activities 
need to be taken into account in these goals, as this will ensure con-
sistent working within a branch of activity that covers the whole 
operation.120 
The SOP defines the tasks and areas of responsibility of the 
CIMIC staff as follows: 
— production of CIMIC aspects of the orders for the operation 
— distribution of CIMIC resources 
— cooperation between the civilian and military components at the 
operational level 
— advising the commander on matters concerned with the civilian 
component 
— monitoring of developments in areas of particular importance to 
CIMIC activities and distribution of information on these to both 
military and civilian actors 
— support for the commander's information campaigns 
— support for lower-level headquarters through dissemination of 
the necessary information 
— creation of suitable conditions for cooperation with actors exter-
nal'to the EU 
— establishment of a CIMIC centre at the operational level if neces-
saiy. 
The purpose of the EU's CIMIC concept is to define on a general 
level what is meant by CIMIC activities and how these should be 
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implemented in an EU-led crisis management operation. Detailed 
objectives and ways of working should be defined separately for each 
crisis management operation by the European Council.121 
The concept sets out from the notion that cooperation between 
the military organization and representatives of the civilian compo-
nent may form one of the principal functions within a crisis man-
agement operation, and it also allows for changes in emphasis with-
in CIMIC activity as the operation develops. The list of functional 
entities presented above is an excellent example of how it was pos-
sible to draw on experiences gained from previous operations when 
drawing up guidelines for the EU's CIMIC activities.122  
Another factor taken into account in these guidelines is the cri-
sis management capacity of each organization. It is possible to in-
clude support for EU civilian organizations within the tasks of the 
CEV IC branch, which will in turn enable coordination to be enhanced 
between the military and civilian organizations.123  
One of the purposes of CIMIC activities in an EU-led crisis 
management operation is to create and maintain suitable conditions 
for cooperation between the military component and both civilian 
actors external to the EU and the population and administration of 
the area concerned in order to achieve the objectives laid down for 
the operation, given that the emphasis in the CIMIC activities is on 
the achievement of these goals.'24 
The main mission of the military organization is to carry out 
military operations in accordance with the Petersberg Obligations, 
while missions that are obviously bound up with civil society and/or 
the civilian component can be undertaken if it is impossible for civil-
ian organizations to operate in the area and if the measures to be 
taken are defined in the mandate. 
The clearest difference between the EU's CIMIC concept and 
the corresponding NATO document lies in the fact that the former 
makes a clear distinction between civilian actors that are internal 
and external to the EU, the focus of emphasis for CIMIC activities 
being on the latter. Another difference is the EU document's accept-
ance of the notion of development within an operation and the con-
sequent need for changes in emphasis in CIMIC activities. 
The document that lays down guidelines for planning CIMIC 
activities emphasizes the need for a joint planning process for the 
military and civilian components, which should be implemented at 
the preparatory stage of the operation and continued throughout. It 
should be possible to combine the planning bodies at all levels, both 
within the area of operation and outside.125  
As a result of this planning, it should be possible to fit CIMIC 
in as one part of the operational action and to define the conditions 
prevailing in the area of operation, the influence of civil society on 
the functioning of the organization, future points of emphasis and 
the aims of the CIMIC branch.126  
3.3 Fundamentals of Finnish CIMIC activity 
The fundamentals of CIMIC activity comprise national modes of op-
eration, regulations applying to the CIMIC branch itself, orders and 
instructions belonging to a particular operation, observations made 
concerning analogous activity in the past and the staff training sys-
tem. This section will be concerned with the main principles that have 
influenced Finnish CIMIC activity to date, which are largely matters 
of directives regarding this branch in particular operations, and the 
training sessions that have been arranged. Attention will be paid to 
the reciprocal influence between these principles and practical con-
siderations at points where this is of importance for explanatory pur-
poses. Actual CIMIC experiences are discussed in Chapter 4. 
hz a total defence system such as that in which the Finnish De-
fence Forces are involved, a close relation between the military and 
the civil society occurs naturally, while troops possessing the kind of 
background that the Finnish forces have are apt to command a good 
image among the local people without much difficulty. They are also 
well aware that CIMIC activity is a means of improving their own 
security. All this means that the CIMIC idea has been well received 
by the Finnish peacekeeping forces and has aroused great interest 
among administrators at home in Finland as well, especially those 
whose own work is connected with international cooperation. 127  
In the case of troops belonging to the major powers, the only 
mode of action and means of acquiring protection is a deterrent, the 
creation of which automatically has the effect of alienating the local 
people and other actors in the area.121 
The SFOR operation 
The CIMIC sector in the SFOR operation is referred to at the opera- 
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tive level as CJ9 (Combined Joint), as is customary, and it has its own 
CIMIC department at the strategic level within the SFOR Headquar-
ters. The corresponding designation at the operative level in a bri-
gade or division headquarters is G5 (Group), and that in a battalion 
headquarters at the tactical level S5 (Section). In everyday speech 
G5 and S5 are also used to refer to the chief of the respective depart-
ment or office. It should be noted, however, that the strategic, oper-
ative and tactical levels do not mean the same things in NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations as they do in the normal NATO command 
structure, for instance.129 
The CIMIC organization in the headquarters of the Nordic Polish 
Brigade (NPB), which served as a command headquarters for the 
Finnish Battalion (FinBn), comprised three elements: personnel, spe-
cial advisors and resources. Crucial among these elements were the 
trained CIMIC personnel, while the special advisors in different fields 
who were attached to the brigade, lawyers, physicians, logistics ex-
perts and others, supported the CIMIC activities in their own partic-
ular ways.13' 
The majority of the financial resources available for CIMIC pur-
poses at the brigade level in the SFOR operation consisted of funds 
assigned by the EU, which were used to provide humanitarian aid in 
the NPB's area of responsibility. Part of the resources available at the 
brigade level comprised troops and equipment belonging to lower 
levels in the command structure, e.g. engineer units.13' 
The G5/CIMIC group at NPB Headquarters was under the com-
mand of an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS/G5) and had a target 
manpower of 20 men representing all the nations of the brigade. 
The group was divided into five sectors: democratization, projects, 
regional monitoring, resettlement and repatriation, and CIMIC cen-
tres. The main duties of these sectors and the opposite numbers with 
which they cooperated are set out in Appendix 3.132 
The first and most important CIMIC task for the NPB was to 
minimize the impact of the civil society on the division's military 
operations. This was done by establishing close relations with the 
local'authorities. The second task was to gain the confidence of the 
local people by implementing measures to improve human rights 
and living conditions in the area.133 
The end state at which the activity was directed was the achieve-
ment of freedom of movement and action for the inhabitants of the 
area by means of cooperation between actors and the combining of 
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resources. This freedom was regarded as a basic requirement for the 
construction of a society without corruption, in which the security of 
all citizens could be guaranteed and economic growth would be pos-
sible.13' 
The NPB guidelines also placed emphasis on cooperation with 
other branches at the same level of command, in order to be able to 
bring the possible effects of factors involved in the operating envi- 
ronment to the attention of those persons taking part in the plan-
ning processes, a function entirely consistent with the CIMIC objec- 
tives set out above and having a clearly visible connection with the 
contemporary NATO doctrine that emphasized support for one's own 
troops.135  
There is a certain American-style emphasis on freedom of ac-
tion and security for one's own troops perceivable in these tasks and 
objectives, and also an emphasis on operative measures, as is typical 
of the early stages of a crisis management operation. One important 
observation as far as all actors are concerned is the action taken to 
ensure the safety and human rights of the local inhabitants, which is 
regarded as crucial to all other aspects of development. 
Having previously been a part of the operative branch, the CIM-
IC function of the FINBN was formed into an independent unit in 
summer 1998, in response to the receipt of a new operative area of 
responsibility and the resulting new duties.136  
The purpose of its activities was to achieve the most effective 
support possible for the battalion's mission and activities proper by 
means of cooperation with civilians, the main points of emphasis in 
this externally oriented activity being repatriation and the promo-
tion of democracy, although considerable attention was also paid to 
humanitarian projects.13' 
The CIMIC activities of the FinBn were divided into two parts: 
direct and indirect support for the battalion's operations, as shown 
in Table 1. Direct support referred to measures expected to have a 
direct impact on the carrying out of operations, the objective being 
to improve the protection available to the troops and to increase 
knowledge about the area of responsibility by means other than in-
telligence,'"b while indirect support referred to measures intended 
to have an indirect effect in improving the conditions under which 
the battalion was to operate, although without interfering in imple-
mentation of its military mission.13' 
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Table 1. Division and aims of CIMIC activity in the Finnish Battalion, 
1998-1999. 
DIRECT SUPPORT 
Measures — contacts with local 
people and officials 
— contacts with civilian 
organizations working 
in the area 
Aims 	— improved protection for 
the battalion's own 
troops 
— improved local knowl 
edge 
— achievement of an ad 
equate early warning 
capacity 
INDIRECT SUPPORT 
— contribution to work of 
other actors 
— material support for 
other actors 
— financial support for 
other actors 
— humanitarian projects 
— familiarization of the peo 
pie with the troops and 
their country of origin 
— fostering of favourable at 
titudes among certain tar 
get groups 
— improvement of living 
conditions for the local 
population 
Target 	— that the actions of the local administration should sup- 
situation 	port the Finfin effort 
— that the local population should not pose a threat to 
FinBn personnel 
— that confidence should be built up between the local 
population and Finfin, enabling real-time information 
to be obtained on possible threats 
— that FinBn should come to know the special features 
of its own area of responsibility and be able to take 
them into account when planning its own activities 
— that FinBn cooperation with international organizations 
should be possible in the area of responsibility 
The instructions issued to the FinBn mention a possible increase in 
the importance of CIMIC if circumstances should develop in accord-
ance with existing agreements and plans, which constituted a sig-
nificant difference relative to the corresponding document as received 
by the brigade, which made no allowance for possible changes in 
the nature of the mission.140 
In the opinion of Colonel Juhani Kääriäinen, who served as com- 
mander of the Finfin, greater efficiency should have been sought by 
increasing staffing resources, but this was not possible, as the target 
strength laid down for the organization in the original order had 
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been achieved. Thus it was necessary to react to the situation as was 
most appropriate in each case, by combining duties or forming units 
as required. Kääriäinen also emphasized use of the media as an ele-
ment for improving the resources available for achieving CIMIC 
goals.l"' 
Another of the CIMIC principles may be said to have been the 
monthly branch meetings held in the brigade's area of responsibili-
ty, which were attended by the office chiefs. These provided an op-
portunity for exchanging ideas with other representatives of the bat-
talion, although they did not lead to any new decisions on courses of 
action or other means of increasing the available resources.'42 
Of all the factors governing CIMIC, national customs and ways 
of working are decisive. Thus the fact that the FinBn belonged to the 
American division was immediately reflected in the guidelines laid 
down for its activities. Correspondingly, the decisive factor in practi-
cal action was the Finns'view of the completion of their duties. Al-
though a mission might appear the same in terms of the documen-
tation issued, clear discrepancies could easily arise at the practical 
level, particularly in matters of jurisdiction and restrictions on move-
ment, for the Finnish military code of conduct allows the command-
er to issue certain authorizations at his own discretion, an aspect 
that might be called flexibility, whereas experiences in Bosnia sug-
gested that this was not possible in the army of a major power. Flex-
ibility and sensitivity proved to be very much more important assets 
in the SFOR operation than preparedness on paper.113  
The main CIMIC principles when the SFOR operation was just 
getting under way were the national peacekeeping tradition, the basic 
training received by the men and the broad-based pool of experi-
ence obtained through recruiting men from the reserves. These fac-
tors combined with a flexible spirit of joint action within the troops 
can more than make up for deficiencies in preparedness on paper. 
The activities of the FinBin in autumn 1998 were concerned more 
with return migration and associated problems, largely as a conse-
quence of the initiation of RRTF activities in the battalion's area, and 
this meant that practically everything that was done at the later stages 
was linked to the return of minority groups. The documentation gov-
erning the branch nevertheless contained statements to the effect 
that the focus of attention continued to be on support for the battal-
ion's own troops. The work was directed in practice in accordance 
with guidelines laid down by the commander. At the same time plan- 
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ving was going on within the battalion for strengthening the CIMIC 
sector.'' 
It is always the orders and instructions that are given that create 
the basis for action, while the real result emerges through the troops' 
completion of their daily duties. On the other hand, constant evalua-
tiori of the situation and the new instructions that are given as a con-
sequence of this enable steady development to take place. In other 
words, existing orders and instructions can be used to train new per-
sonnel and evaluate a unit's own actions, and this in turn stimulates 
constant development towards attaining the principal objectives. It is 
also possible to minimize disturbances arising from staff changes by 
means of up-to-the-minute guidelines and archiving. 
Early in the year 2000 the Nordic Polish Brigade was formed 
into a Nordic-Polish Battle Group (NPBG), still with a CIMIC com-
pany, based on the structures remaining from the FinBn.These chang-
es also meant that Finland became the leading country for CIMIC in 
the area covered by this battle group.145 
The most significant change to take place in group G5 at the Battle 
Group Headquarters was the replacement of the previous five sec-
tors of its organization with three broader cells: 
— return and repatriation 
— planning and executive 
— projects.141  
Where the group had been organized previously in terms of func-
tional entities (Appendix 3), it was now composed of two main areas 
of activity, return and repatriation, and projects, together with a cell 
responsible for the planning and execution of the measures taken. 
The functional entities nevertheless remained as themes that guid-
ed the activities of the battle group, although these, too, underwent 
some development, for where they had earlier provided clear, direct 
support for the troops' operative action, in the new division they 
served in a broader manner to take account of the needs of the civil-
ian component.147 
The functional entities and their sub-entities are presented in 
Appendix 4. The change in documentation (cf. Appendix 3) is a clear 
indication of an advance in CIMIC consciousness and skills, and also 
a sign of development in the area of responsibility towards the ob-
jectives laid down for the operation. 
In May 2001 the CIMIC company that formed the Finnish con- 
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tingent was transferred to become part of the American CIMIC bat-
talion, a change that did not affect its principles of action even though 
it did mean a change of command.l"y 
New instructions for CIMIC activity in the MND(N) were ob-
tained in 2002 in connection with the division's a new CIMIC oper-
ation order. Its principal activity continued to be support for the re-
housing of returning minority groups, and its principal means medi-
ation between the various actors involved, together with mainte-
nance of the CIMIC centres, which have proved extremely useful for 
both the acquisition and dissemination of information.'' 
The KFOR operation 
The CIMIC branch for the KFOR operation was located in the oper-
ative branch at the brigade level, on the grounds of its extreme im-
portance from the point of view of the whole operation and because 
it was essential for it to be able to influence troop actions directly. 
Almost all operations were regarded as being connected with the 
local population and administration in one way or another, and by 
being located with the operative branch the CIMIC personnel would 
be able to participate better in operative planning. The CIMIC branch 
was divided into two sectors: plans and projects, and operations.15° 
The main duties of the plans and projects sector involved intel-
ligence and monitoring in connection with projects, and also the 
arranging of funding for the projects,""' while the operations sector 
was responsible for arranging cooperation at the regional level. The 
liaison officers placed in these sectors had the task of maintaining 
contacts with the four main civilian organizations, the UNHCR, 
OSCE, EU and United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK).152 
The Kosovo operation proved from the outset to be more ad-
vanced in terms of cooperation than that in Bosnia, where it had 
taken almost two years to achieve a system whereby representatives 
of all the main actors could meet on a weekly basis.153 
In spring 2000 the MNB(C) published new orders for its own 
troops, the CIMIC aspects of which covered mainly projects and their 
implementation. Projects were regarded as occupying a significant 
position in the CIMIC activities of the lower levels of command, and 
it was noted that full advantage should be taken of those that had 
already been completed. Especially important in this respect was 
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exploitation of the media in all possible ways. It was also noted that 
each project should be such that it could be carried through from 
beginning to end, and that the commencement of a new project 
should not prevent a previous one from being brought to the desired 
conclusion." ' 
This document also provided instructions on the steps to be 
taken by units further down the hierarchy if they were to observe 
conditions in their area to be such that immediate action needed to 
be taken. The most important message was that such information 
was to be communicated to Brigade Headquarters immediately, and 
the word would be passed on from there to the civilian organization 
in whose area of responsibility the matter lay. The instructions made 
it quite clear that the MNB(C) is not responsible for providing hu-
manitarian aid, but commanders at lower levels were allowed to in-
tervene where necessary, within the bounds of their own resources 
and provided that this did not detract from their actual duties.15' 
The instructions contained clear guidelines on military actions 
in support of civilian society. Efforts were made to underline the dis-
tribution of responsibilities between international actors, which is 
understandable at the initial stage in a crisis management opera-
tion. An unflinching refusal to be drawn into matters that are the 
responsibility of some other organization can rebound against the 
interests of a military force, however, for it may be obliged to come 
face to face with the local population on a daily basis, and if the 
people feel that the troops are indifferent to their plight, this may 
interfere with accomplishment of the primary mission. The above 
instructions in fact place commanders at lower levels in a difficult 
intermediary position, for they are required to have a good knowl-
edge of conditions in their own area and the mood of the people 
and at the same time to execute commands coming from above. 
The headquarters of the Finnish Battalion possesses a G5 of-
fice, the strength of which at the beginning of the operation was a 
chief of staff and two staff officers, although it was increased later by 
the addition of another staff officer and a clerk, because its resources 
were inadequate to deal with the amount of work. Each unit of the 
Finnish Battalion has a part-time CIMIC officer who is subordinate 
to the chief of staff of the Finnish Battalion's CIMIC office for the 
branch of the armed services in question (G5).156  
It may be said from experiences with the Finnish Battalion that 
CIMIC officers should not be assigned to units on a part-time ba- 
sis,''' but that the position should be employed as a means of ex-
tending the battalion's cooperation network to cover the whole area 
of responsibility. Such an arrangement would allow the CIMIC branch 
to react to events in its area without undue delays. 
The new document published in sununer 2000 governing CIMIC 
activity in the Finnish Battalion defined an official and an unofficial 
dimension for it. The official dimension concerns contacts with the 
representatives of international organizations and local authorities, 
and the unofficial dimension refers to the humanitarian aid sup-
ported by the battalion and its efforts to complement the work of 
the aid organizations. The aim of this activity is to gather the neces-
sary information on the situation in the area of responsibility, main-
tain constant contact with the local authorities and foster as good 
relations as possible with the local inhabitants.''' The above division 
forms part of the definition of CIMIC activity, and it may be under-
stood as synonymous with that described for the FinBn in the SFOR 
headquarters, where the same two aspects were referred to as direct 
and indirect support for the battalion's operations. 
The ISAT operation 
The UN Security Council approved the Bonn Agreement and resolu-
tion 1383(2001) allowing for its implementation on 6th December 
2001. In an appendix to this agreement the signatories requested the 
Security Council to authorize the dispatch of what came to be known 
as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan 
as soon as possible. Approval for this was granted in resolution 
1386(2001) of the Security Council, passed on 20th December.''' 
The mission of the ISAF, initially under British leadership, was 
to assist the interim government of Afghanistan is establishing sta-
bility and security in and around the capital, Kabul. The organization 
at the initial stage consisted of a divisional-level Operation Head-
quarters, the Kabul Multi National Brigade (KMNB) and a number 
of units directly subordinate to the ISAF headquarters, including the 
Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan (FDTA).11n 
The key functions of the CIMIC branch are defined in the ISAF 
operation order as beingthe implementation of rapid impact projects 
aimed at promoting the reconstitution of civil society, while at the 
same time the intention was to use this branch to create good work-
ing relationships with the surrounding community and with civilian 
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organizations operating there, as these were regarded as serving the 
purposes of enhanced force protection. The operation order also as-
signed the CIMIC branch the tasks of supporting an information 
campaign and arranging an interpreter service for the operation's 
own organization.'61  
The CIMIC organization within the ISAF operation was formed 
initially by staff belonging to the ISAF Headquarters, the KMNB 
headquarters and the KMNB Battle Groups. At this point the CIMIC 
unit of the FDIA formed the largest element in this branch of the 
ISAF operation. The weakness of these initial arrangements lay in 
the small numbers of staff located in each headquarters, which pre-
vented planning on a broad scale.16' 
The Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan (FDIA) was responsi-
ble for the implementation of CIMIC activities throughout the area 
covered by the operation, planning of this activity being directed pri- 
marily by orders from the ISAF commander and orders and instruc-
tions from the FDIA commander. The latter defined the objective of 
Finnish CIMIC activity as follows: "to acquire the intelligence with 
respect to the international civilian community in the area, the local 
authorities and the local population necessary to enable us to per- 
form the tasks assigned to us. It is possible to arrange CIMIC sup-
port for the ISAF troops in such a way that this activity promotes the 
achievement of the overall goals of the operation."763  
The Finnish detachment was provided with written instructions 
on how to begin the operation, with separate goals defined for the 
preparatory stage (the first 14 days) and subsequent activities. The 
goal for the preparatory stage was that "the CIMIC teams should 
obtain a realistic picture of the area in which they are to be working, 
such as will enable them to create the relations essential for proper 
cooperation. They must also be ready at this stage to implement sep-
arately assigned CIMIC projects."The groups were also ordered to 
lay the foundations for cooperation at least with the ISAF force re-
sponsible for their area, the mayors of towns in the area, the chief of 
police and the heads of the sub-areas within the districts controlled 
by the mayors.l« 
Four main objectives were laid down as a mechanism for di-
recting the activities of the CIMIC teams at the preparatory stage, in 
that they were to be regarded as having succeeded in this stage if 
— they had managed to form a realistic picture of the situation in 
their area 
— they had managed to create a working relationship with the ISAF 
troops responsible for their area 
— they had managed to create the relations with the authorites in 
their area that were required for completion of their mission 
— they had managed to identify the national and international ci- 
vilian organizations operating in their area.165 
The FDIA advance detachment had noticed certain very considera-
ble barriers to successful CIMIC activities even before the main force 
had arrived, most notably the weak coordination of CIMIC assign-
ments within ISAF, the small volume of cooperation with civilian 
actors, the indeterminacy of the areas of responsibility and deficien-
cies in the available information on the operating environment, and 
this led the commander of the FDIA and his closest subordinates to 
draw up a plan for the development of CIMIC activities within the 
ISAF operation. This plan had the support of the ISAF command, 
which was partly instrumental in setting the work in motion. The 
plan consisted of the following points: 
1) Formation of a body to coordinate CIMIC activity, in order to har-
monize internal and external activity and ensure the acquisition 
and distribution of the necessary intelligence 
2) Commencement of a programme by the CIMIC teams of the FDIA 
to survey the operating environment, together with formation and 
updating of the necessary databases. This work led to the crea-
tion of a CIMIC database. 
3) Initiation of cooperation with representatives of the civilian com-
ponent 
4) Determination of the CIMIC plans and resources of the various 
nationalities represented 
5) Preparations for the execution of small-scale CIMIC projects in 
support of improvements in conditions in the area of responsibil- 
ity.166 
One consequence of the above was that the CIMIC staff of the ISAF 
operation adopted working methods that laid emphasis on appro-
priate documentation of all measures taken and the paying of due 
attention to the operating environment in all outward-oriented ac-
tivities. In the end one of the distinctive characteristics of these CIMIC 
activities was the strong desire for cooperation visible both within 
the ISAF and on the part of civilian actors.161  
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One of the most significant sets of instructions to affect the Finn-
ish detachment was the order regarding the construction of a CIM-
IC database. This was planned in order to facilitate CIIv1IC work within 
the FDIA, and later within ISAF as a whole. The database came to 
cover virtually all matters that had a major impact on CIMIC activi-
ties and included data on schools, hospitals, contractors, projects, 
organizations of various kinds, the local administration, the refugee 
and displaced persons situation and other relevant factors.'' 
The core of the database consisted of a set of area files (AF), 
which each CIMIC team was responsible for maintaining with re-
spect to its own area of responsibility, so that its updating formed 
part of their everyday routine. The area files were used for providing 
introductions to the area, introductions to their own activities, sup-
port for the work of partner organizations and training of the ISAF 
troops.'"' 
Raining of Finnish CIMIC personnel 
In the light of experiences with CIMIC activities, a working group 
was set up in Finland in 1998 to plan leadership training for cooper-
ation in the field of crisis management. 170 The first course in civilian-
military cooperation in international crisis management operations 
to be based on the recommendations of this working group was held 
in winter 1999, its aims being: 
— to provide an introduction to the conditions prevailing in crisis 
situation from a CIMIC viewpoint 
— to train Finnish military and civilian personnel for command, man-
agement and advisory duties in crisis situations 
— to improve cooperation between the civilian authorities, non-gov-
ernmental organizations and the military 
— to create a national CIMIC policy.'71  
This course was an obvious outcome of the deliberations of the work-
ing group set up by the Ministry of Defence on 15th January 1998, 
since the working group stated in its report that courses of this kind 
could play an important role in the maintenance and development 
of international crisis management facilities in Finland. It had also 
recommended that the venue for such a course could be alternated 
between training establishments belonging to the police force, res-
cue services and defence forces."2 
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It can nevertheless be seen fairly clearly from the statements 
made by the working group and the aims of the course as detailed 
above that the idea of CIMIC activity was not necessarily appreciat-
ed correctly. CIMIC is a purely military term, implying that when a 
military organization collaborates with a civilian organization in the 
framework of a crisis management operation, the persons responsi-
ble for this will belong to the CIMIC branch of the troops concerned. 
When civilian organizations pursue similar collaboration with each 
other, on the other hand, this is not CIMIC activity. In other words, 
the term always requires that one party should be a person belong-
ing to a military organization and trained and assigned specifically 
to this branch of activity, i.e. with the implication that he will act 
according to orders from the military organization. 
The course dealt with general themes related to CIMIC activity, 
the main barriers to a more detailed treatment being the paucity of 
research in this field and the lack of experience on the part of the 
personnel.173 
A second CIMIC course, this time commissioned by the inter-
national section of the General Staff and run by the National De-
fence College, was held in summer 2000. The outline for the course 
emphasized this time that it was to deal specifically with civilian-
military collaboration, and a clear distinction was made between ci-
vilian crisis management and rescue services.'' It was partly because 
of the ignoring of this distinction that the character of the previous 
course had deviated from that intended. 
Finland's announcement that it was prepared to place a CIMIC 
company at the disposal of the EU crisis management troops was 
regarded as far as the organizers were concerned as being crucial to 
the need for such a course, as also was the multidimensional nature 
of crisis management operations. The following themes were laid 
down as aims for the course: 
— to introduce personnel to matters connected with crisis manage-
ment operations from a CIMIC viewpoint 
— to provide an impression of the activities pursued by actors en-
gaged in crisis management 
— to gather together data on current operations obtained at various 
levels 
— to gather experiences as a basis for future training and recom-
mendations 
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— to train the participants to act in a CIMIC command, managerial 
or advisory capacity in international crises."s 
The teaching aims of this second course were thus consistent with 
those of the first, and it was naturally these aims that governed the 
content of the teaching. On the other hand, if one of the aims was to 
train personnel for CIMIC command, managerial or advisory func-
tions, it must be admitted on the basis of the information provided 
in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work that the time available was simply 
not sufficient to allow this to be achieved. 
The most efficient and relevant training provided for Finnish 
CIMIC personnel to date has been that obtained mainly through the 
Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NOR-
DCAPS) course in Denmark and the Finnish Defence Forces Inter-
national Centre (FINCENT) courses in Finland. The content of these 
courses has been such that they have provided participants with an 
adequate theoretical background for working in a CIMIC capacity in 
crisis management operations. 76 
There are at present about 150 Finnish soldiers (in active serv-
ice or in the reserves) who have participated in CIMIC courses, and 
about 300 who have been involved in CIMIC work in various opera-
tions, about a half of whom gained their experience in the CIMIC 
company attached to the SFOR operation.17  
The aim of the CIMIC courses arranged twice a year in Den-
mark in the context of NORDCAPS is to provide a basic knowledge 
of the field, covering terminology, the operating environment, the 
most frequent collaboration partners and basic operative models, all 
in connection with the most frequently encountered tasks. The lec-
turers are highly experienced military and civilian experts, and this 
contributes substantially to the quality of the courses. The partici-
pants have been mainly from the Nordic countries, but a few places 
on each course have been reserved for people from outside the Nor-
dic region. The international nature of the participants also means 
that,the language of communication is English, providing further 
preparation for active service in this field."' 
The Finns who have taken part in the NORDCAPS course have 
mostly been due for assignment to an ongoing crisis management 
operation the following year, and this has meant a high degree of 
motivation and has thereby promoted achievement of the aims of 
the course. The feedback received from participants has also been 
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extremely good.79  
The syllabus for the FINCENT training designed for CIMIC staff 
has been the same as for the NORDCAPS course. The participants 
to date have all been Finns, but the lecturers have introduced an 
international element, and again the language of instruction has been 
English. 
From a national viewpoint, the FINCENT course has excellent 
chances of developing into a real introduction to the work of CIMIC 
personnel. Those in charge have attempted to keep it as practical as 
possible, and this has helped to maintain interest. It has consisted of 
lectures, group work and practical exercises.' 
3.4 CIMIC collaborators 
This section will be based on observations concerning collaboration 
between the military and civilian components, the purpose being not 
to describe the backgrounds or juridical status of the various organi-
zations but to point out certain things that have to be taken into ac-
count when planning cooperation with certain actors. For this pur-
pose it is necessary to divide the civilian component into two main 
groups, which can then be further subdivided. The first comprises 
local civilians, among which one can distinguish the administrative 
authorities, local inhabitants and representatives of national non-
governmental organizations, while the second comprises the inter-
national civilian community, which can be divided into representa-
tives of international organizations and representatives of interna-
tional non-governmental organizations.""' There may also be some 
civilians who are representatives of international non-governmental 
organizations that work independently, so that they cannot be said 
to be part of the international community. The external collaborators 
encountered in a CIMIC context are presented in Figure 5.182 
It was seen in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations that condi-
tions for civilian life develop slowly relative to the military demands 
laid down in peace treaties. It proved possible in both operations to 
fulfil the objectives with regard to the armed forces of the parties to 
the crisis practically in accordance with the agreed timetable, but the 
repatriation of ethnic minorities and the formation of local adminis-
trative bodies have proceeded very much more slowly than was 
plan ned.'"3  
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In the case of the Bosnia crisis it may be said that the improve-
ment of civilian conditions was left entirely to the international com-
munity, since the local administration was utterly unable to bear the 
responsibility for the development of civilian society, largely on ac-
count of the changes in political power relations and the lack of eco-
nomic resources.184 
In the Kosovo operation the KFOR troops found themselves in 
the initial stage having to take responsibility for tasks that had orig-
inally been delegated to other organizations, e.g. policing duties and 
the administration of towns and rural areas, in addition to the distri-
bution of humanitarian aid. The principal reason for this was that 
the civilian organizations were unable to niove into the area with 
the same speed as the KFOR troops."' 
It is thus evident that on entering a crisis area, a peacekeeping 
force'must be prepared to undertake all the major functions, hu-
manitarian, administrative and others, in addition to its military mis-
sion. The main problem, however, is the almost inevitable imbalance 
between duties and resources that will arise if the leading organiza-
tions are not able to take charge of their areas of responsibility at the 
initial stage. This means that the peacekeeping troops must be capa- 
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ble of acting in collaboration with the international civilian organi-
zations at the stage when these are ready to take over the duties 
assigned to them."' 
A peacekeeping force is an instrument of the international com-
munity which is available for use, by the UN, for instance, in accord- 
ance with existing agreements, to enable certain defined objectives 
to be achieved. It is thus involved in a military mission, the success 
of which requires that account should be taken of the civilian popu-
lation and other actors in the area in all the operations required."' 
The local population can have a considerable influence on the 
actions of a military force engaged in a crisis management opera- 
tion, and this fact needs to be recognised at the planning stage. An 
understanding attitude towards the civilian population can improve 
the conditions for operating in the area, and it is thus necessary to 
learn about local customs and habits at the training stage and take 
these into account in the field. 
It is possible to obtain information from the local population 
which may not be available from any other source, e.g. on areas in 
which it is safe to move, earlier events in the region, internal ten-
sions within a population and even the attitude of the population 
towards the troops themselves. 
CIMIC interaction with the local population and civilian organ-
izations working in an area occurs on a daily basis at the battalion or 
brigade level, and this cooperation should be systematic and be in 
the hands of personnel who are trained for the purpose and observe 
generally defined guidelines. Care has to be taken to maintain and 
develop conditions that will allow this cooperation to take place in 
accordance with the needs at any given time. In an area where meas-
ures have been planned for supporting the repatriation of minority 
groups, for instance, it must be possible to create conditions that 
enable negotiations to be held between all the parties involved. 
Cooperation with civilian organizations can be examined from 
the point of view of peacekeeping forces by reference to the follow-
ing questions: 
1. With what organizations are working relations to be established? 
2. How are these relations to be established and maintained? 
3. What demands does such cooperation place on peacekeeping 
forces? 
4. What limitations exist with regard to this cooperation as far as 
the peacekeeping forces are concerned?'"s 
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The possibilities open to peacekeeping forces are to a great extent 
dependent on the existence of good working relations with the local 
administration, and in this sense a peace-keeping force can do a lot 
to influence the environment in which it is expected to carry out its 
mission. Mutual trust can go a long way towards improving the 
chances of normalising and developing conditions in a crisis area. 
One characteristic feature of CIMIC as implemented in the ISAF 
operation has been close collaboration with representatives of the 
local administration. The responsibility of the local people for devel-
opment in their own area was stressed in all aspects of the operation 
from the outset, and consequently the CIMIC teams were given in-
structions to include in their planning the question of taking these 
representatives into account and ensuring their commitment to the 
measures adopted."' 
One of the tasks of the peacekeeping force has been to support 
the legally constituted local administration in the measures that it 
takes in accordance with existing agreements. This provides the force 
with an opportunity to demonstrate to the local people the impor-
tance of honouring such agreements, but it also obliges it to display 
a capacity to react suitably to any breach of the agreements. Thus 
CIMIC activities at the battalion level have to be directed as required 
towards guiding the local administration to comply with its agree-
ments, and the crucial factor in this is undoubtedly good personal 
working relations with the administrative representatives.19' 
It is useful to establish suitable conditions for cooperation with 
the local administration immediately and to maintain them by means 
of proper sharing of information and regular meetings. From the 
viewpoint of the peacekeeping force, this cooperation is grounded 
in two clearly distinguishable objectives: 1) maintenance and im-
provement of its own capacity for action, and 2) improvement of 
conditions in the area."' 
As part of the international community, the military force is 
obliged to intervene when it detects any deficiencies or injustices, 
and in this way to improve living conditions for the civilian staff in 
the area. Correctly focused assistance can do much to promote pos-
itive development, although it is also true that all actions should be 
directed towards stimulating local development initiatives that pur-
sue the agreed objectives. 
There are many aspects of the work carried out in crisis areas 
that are the responsibility of civilian organizations, e.g. humanitari- 
an aid, questions of human rights, protection of minorities, refugees, 
assistance in judicial matters, health care, reconstruction, agricul-
ture, education and the financing of projects. Civilian organizations 
are in general highly independent, to the extent that most of them 
regard autonomous action and independence of power structures as 
essential characteristics of their work. Indeed, experiences have 
shown that neutrality can be a decisive factor in the work of a civil-
ian organization to restore an environment ravaged by a crisis.7' 
There can be several hundred civilian organizations working in 
a crisis area at the same time, however, and it is essential for the 
responsible military force to be able to distinguish the various types 
involved. They may be divided into two main groups: 
1. International organizations (IOs), i.e. organizations that are rec-
ognised internationally and which have the capacity to operate at 
an international level, e.g. UN organizations 
2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), i.e. organizations that 
function on a voluntary basis and typically in an independent man-
ner. It is possible to speak of both national and international 
NGOs.793  
Other significant actors in crisis areas in addition to the above or-
ganizations are Governmental Organizations (GOs), such as the 
American USAID mentioned above, as it is largely through these 
that governmental development aid is channelled. 194 
When examining cooperation between a peacekeeping force 
and civilian organizations operating in the area it is important to 
bear in mind the role of the latter in the operation. In this respect, 
too, they can be divided into two groups, Lead Agencies, as named 
in the contracts for particular operations, and those that function 
simply according to their own ideology. 115 The lead agencies are nor-
mally IOs, but it is possible that an NGO may be assigned responsi-
bility for a particular sector in some cases.'96 
NGOs have performed tasks in crisis areas that others have not 
been able or willing to perform, and they are frequently the first or-
ganizations to enter such an area and the last ones to leave. Against 
this background, a peacekeeping force should not underestimate the 
effect that such organizations can have on the attaining of the com-
mon objective of a mission, especially at the early stages.'97 
A considerable number of new organizations are likely to ap-
pear in an area once conditions become more stable, and it is neces- 
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sary for the peacekeeping force to be aware of these, to identify them 
and to keep informed of what they are doing. If the activities of a 
certain organization are devoted to improving civilian conditions, 
the force may consider cooperation with it, but each case must be 
evaluated separately.1 ' 
Many civilian organizations are of the opinion that the military 
do not understand the individuals and communities that they are 
trying to protect, while the military may regard civilian organiza-
tions as a disturbing factor that distracts from the fulfilment of their 
own mission."y Both views may be attributed in part to earlier bad 
experiences and in part to unfounded prejudices.2 ' 
Smooth cooperation within the international community can 
create favourable circumstances for presenting a united front, which 
eases the tasks of individual actors. Overlapping of functions can be 
avoided by means of exchanges of information, and by taking ad-
vantage of its own organization, the peacekeeping force can help to 
establish efficient flows of information between organizations.201 Also, 
as the most visible element in the international community, the mil-
itary component can do much to strengthen the position of that com-
munity in its area by its own observance of the agreed policies. 
Coordination between international organizations is problem-
atic, and the problems increase at the regional level as the various 
organizations concentrate narrowly on their own particular areas and 
functions.202 This is partly due to the number of people engaged in 
the actual work in the field. Many instances in Bosnia and Kosovo 
have also demonstrated that the possibilities for cooperation are 
dependent above all on the skills of the people working in the vari-
ous organizations and their attitudes towards other organizations. 203  
Thus in the last resort, the conditions for cooperation are based 
on personal relations. This means that the military organization must 
be prepared to change its CIMIC representative if it has proved im-
possible to achieve the desired objectives, especially since civilian 
organizations are not always able to do this on account of the small 
staff involved at the local level. 
3.5 Conclusions 
From a CIMIC viewpoint, a crisis management operation is a multi-
dimensional international undertaking that has both a military and 
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a civilian component, the latter comprising both national and inter-
national actors. The purpose of such an operation is to eliminate the 
factors that have caused instability in the area concerned. 
It is important that a multidimensional crisis management op-
eration should have clearly defined objectives from which the aims 
of both the military and the civilian component can be derived. It is 
also important to be able to derive partial goals to be achieved at 
different stages in the operation, as these provide a clear frame of 
reference for the assignment of resources and can be used to indi-
cate to the local population a time by which they should be prepared 
to assume control of given aspects of the running of their own coun-
try. 
NATO's CIMIC doctrine has obvious deficiencies with regard 
to the definition of stages, measures and tasks within the imple- 
mentation of an operation, and it fails to allow for the possibility of 
changes in the nature of the action required as the operation pro-
ceeds towards its overall objective. The corresponding EU document 
makes allowance for this dynamic aspect of an operation. 
Since the stages in an operation determine the focus of atten-
tion in CIMIC activities, it is important when drawing up instruc- 
tions or setting targets to understand which stage in the operation is 
concerned and what tasks are uppermost at this stage as far as the 
progress of the whole operation is concerned. The system now avail- 
able for documenting CIMIC activities makes it easy to create ade-
quate conditions for taking changes in the area of operation into 
account. 
The sets of recommendations available for CIMIC activities lead 
us to observe that this should be regarded as a functional entity in 
which the military organization attempts to integrate itself into the 
conditions prevailing in the area of operation, the emphasis being 
on taking due account of local customs and habits. At the same time 
this whole branch of activity may be seen as a clear attempt by the 
military organization to enhance the combined effectiveness of the 
efforts made by all the actors involved in order to support achieve-
ment of the objectives of the mission and possibly to reduce its du-
ration. 
One common deficiency in the sets of regulations examined 
here is inexplicit definition of the objectives. It is essential here to 
take the temporal dimension into account. Certain goals are to be 
achieved at once, while others may apply to the whole duration of 
71 
the operation and may be achieved only after several years of work, 
e.g. transfer of responsibility for the repatriation of minority groups 
to the local authorities. 
It is possible to use one's CIMIC personnel to train troops to 
function in future operative environments. In fact this can be under- 
stood as one of the aims of the activity. The intention is that troops 
undergoing such training should be able to take conditions in the 
area of operation into account in the best possible manner in the 
planning and implementation of their activities. It is also clear that 
such training will contribute to the security of the troops. 
The first tasks of the CIMIC branch when entering its area of 
operation are to produce an overall picture of the prevailing situa- 
tion and to construct the infrastructure required for successful com- 
bined action. It is these measures that will provide the backbone for 
CIMIC activity at later stages in the operation. If the persons re- 
sponsible for planning this activity do not have exact information on 
conditions and actors in the area, this may lead to inefficient use of 
resources and possibly a failure to develop forms of activity that will 
correspond best to the challenges of the environment. 
The aim of CIMIC activities at the second stage in the opera-
tion, the maintenance stage, will be dependent on the objectives of 
the operation as such, i.e. what needs to be done in order to allow 
the troops to withdraw from the area. Activities should be consistent 
at all levels, e.g. where the repatriation of minority groups is con- 
cerned, the aim at the local level will be to identify places to which 
these people could be repatriated and that at a higher level the cre-
ation of an atmosphere conducive to repatriation. It is only in this 
way that a realistic picture of the whole situation can be formed. This 
can be done by encouraging representatives of the various levels in 
the administration to support repatriation, or some other aspect of 
social policy, by giving them the necessary instructions and recom-
mendations. 
Although the NATO doctrine stresses transfer of functions to 
the local authorities as soon as they have achieved the necessary 
capabilities for discharging them, the premature handing over of func-
tions can prove detrimental to the achievement of the overall objec-
tives of the operation. 
When initiating CIMIC activity it is necessary to pay attention 
to the role of the local administration in the development of its area, 
so that as conditions there improve, the matters to be addressed and 
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the order of importance in which they are placed can be determined 
locally. If this is not done, there is a danger that the local administra-
tion will not be committed to the development work at all. An active 
approach in these matters can also serve to demonstrate to the local 
people that their administration works, which will further support 
peaceful development. 
Cooperation with representatives of the civilian component 
occupies a prominent position when planning to hand duties over 
to local authorities and organizations. It is also necessary upon trans-
ferring responsibility to the international community to create a su-
pervision organization which will ensure positive development in 
the future. 
Examination of CIMIC doctrines can also lead to the identifica-
tion of a set of means by which such activity can be implemented: 
— troop training 
— influence on troop planning by raising the CIMIC aspect in this 
connection 
— creation of suitable conditions for cooperation with various ac-
tors 
— supervision of troop activities when these are bound up with or 
performed jointly with the local population 
— guidance of the military command in CIMIC matters 
— provision of humanitarian aid 
— implementation of CIMIC projects. 
Evaluation of the situation occupies an important position among 
the methods employed in CIMIC, where the personnel should be 
capable of providing their own command with forecasts of how con-
ditions and tasks are likely to alter and what are the principal factors 
likely to be involved in such changes. Appended to these forecasts 
should be a set of alternatives for further troop action aimed at re-
sponding in the most appropriate ways to possible changes in the 
situation. The time-scale for this should be from one to two years. 
A CIMIC organization should consist of three levels: policy, plan-
ning and implementation. Each level should have its own coopera-
tion obligations, and these should be clear to everyone. This will en-
able efficient internal coordination and an adequate flow of infor-
mation within the military organization. 
The task of the level controlling the activity is to determine the 
focal points and reach agreement with the principal representatives 
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of the civilian component on the forms of cooperation to be pur-
sued. It should also be responsible for defining the goals of the var-
ious stages in the operation. 
The planning level will issue orders regarding duties and aims 
to the CIMIC elements working at the practical level, presupposing 
that the aims of the activity have been properly defined for use by 
the planning level and that it has also received adequate informa-
tion from the practical level regarding the prevailing situation. It is 
important that the staff at the planning and implementation levels 
should form a smoothly functioning entity, a feature that can be en-
sured by the use of a precisely planned and enforced reporting sys-
tem. 
All CIMIC activity calls for a correctly proportioned field organ-
ization that is capable of producing the background information re-
quired at the planning level and of executing the tasks assigned to it. 
The basic elements in this field organization are the liaison officers 
and the detachments responsible for individual projects. Efforts 
should be made when forming the field organization to achieve re-
gional divisions that enable clearly-defined ways of working to be 
adopted. This will also be of assistance to the civilian component in 
its dealings with the military component. 
Ideas of CIMIC activity and patterns of working within it vary 
greatly between actors. From a national perspective, it is important 
to be able to recognise factors that may influence practical imple-
mentation, e.g. the quality of the staff. When operating in an inter-
national environment every attempt must be made to ensure that all 
levels are working in the same direction. National differences in 
working methods have to be recognised and account has to be tak-
en of them in one's own activities, as these differences can other-
wise lead to confusion both among the local population and within 
other collaborating bodies. 
The Finnish CIMIC activity in the Balkans operations can be 
described as having been carried out very largely on an ad hoc basis, 
typically with little or no foundation or long-term planning. The 
working instructions were always devised to respond to the situa-
tion as it was at that moment. And yet, in spite of this, it achieved the 
targets set for the CIMIC branch exceptionally well. One basis for 
this would appear to have lain in the relatively broad freedom of 
action granted to it and in the personal knowledge and skills of its 
staff, derived in turn from their broad experience as reservists re- 
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cruited from many spheres of life. 
Experiences from previous operations can always be drawn on 
for the benefit of a new one, and thus experiences in the Balkans 
occupied an important position in the planning of CIMIC aspects of 
the ISAF operation. Considerable emphasis was placed on a knowl-
edge of conditions in the area of operation and on the creation of a 
collaborative infrastructure together with representatives of the ci-
vilian component. 
The CIMIC database available for use in the ISAF operation 
made a major contribution to planning, giving the operation its mem-
ory, enabling earlier measures to be verified and providing an ex-
tremely useful means of supporting the work of civilian organiza-
tions, especially those whose own field organization was inadequate 
for gathering the information necessary for targeting their activities 
correctly. 
75 
4 EXPERIENCES OF CIMIC 
4.1 The SFOR operation 
The Finnish Battalion (FinBn) took charge of an operative area of its 
own on 15th September 1999, tinder the command of a battalion 
officer, with the leaders of the various branches responsible for their 
own intelligence arrangements. The whole takeover process lasted 
about three weeks, the area concerned having been previously locat-
ed partly within that of the Norwegian battalion and partly that of 
the United States Armoured Infantry Regiment. The CIMIC branch 
was responsible for exchanges of information with the correspond-
ing branches of the withdrawing forces.2 ' 
The takeover was complicated to some extent by the fact that 
the Norwegian battalion was at the same time taking over a new 
area of responsibility, while the US regiment was preparing to with-
draw one battalion from the region entirely. The process could there-
fore be described as a kind of chain-reaction in which the interest of 
each actor was in its area of future responsibility, so that there was 
little opportunity for the cooperation with the withdrawing force that 
would really have been required for the mission, other than through 
a few official functions. The fundamental reasons for this were a short-
age of time and pronounced differences in interests between the 
withdrawing forces and their successors, and the effect was com-
pounded further in the Finnish case by the lack of any formal CIMIC 
plan.205 
The main CIMIC objective initially was to provide the battal-
ion's command with a clear picture of conditions in the area of re-
sponsibility, the groups exercising influence there and the interna-
tional organizations working there. This information was used for 
operative planning purposes and for defining the tasks of the vari-
otis units. This could have been done at the stage of taking over the 
area, but was prevented by the lack of planning and shortage of time 
available.206 
An OHR-led Reconstruction and ReturnTask Force (RRTF) had 
commenced operations in autumn 1998 over a territory that includ-
ed the FinBn area of responsibility. The principal purpose of this force 
was, and still is, to support repatriation of the former population, 
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and its functions include coordination of the work of a number of 
organizations. The RRTF can therefore be regarded as a kind of dis-
cussion and information forum dedicated to making more efficient 
use of existing resources.207 
According to the findings of the American Carnegie Commis-
sion, suitable conditions for repatriation can be created only through 
measures taken by the state itself that are acceptable at all levels. It is 
only in this way that long-term progress can be achieved.208 In the 
case of Bosnia, however, the local administration was not especially 
willing to support the repatriation of former minorities, and its par-
ticipation in the activities of the RRTF was far from satisfactory, al-
though there were, and are, some local exceptions. Eventually, how-
ever, the efforts of the RRTF did cause preparations for repatriation 
to be made in many villages in the FinBn area of responsibility, and 
as a result support for repatriation did become an important area of 
CIMIC activity.209 
In the light of the above circumstances, it may be said that a 
clear alteration in the nature of CIMIC activity took place in the FinBn, 
for at the initial stage it was mainly devoted to supporting the func-
tioning of its own troops, consisting largely of the compiling of data 
on the area of responsibility and the maintaining of contacts with 
other actors there, with the aim of pre-empting situations and events 
that might otherwise have detracted from the battalion's work in the 
area. Information was obtained, for instance, on visits made by dis-
placed persons to their former places of residence and on religious 
festivals and other events arranged by different groups within the 
population.210 
The repatriation of minorities, and with it the whole develop-
ment of a certain area, can be upset on account of a single misde-
meanour. One example of this was the village of Bocinja Donja in 
the district of Maglaj in Northern Bosnia, where a group of funda-
mentalists had arrived towards the end of the war and had occupied 
houses that had been abandoned by people who had been driven 
away by the war and ethnic oppression. The occupation of aban-
doned, houses constituted a barrier to repatriation and was therefore 
in contravention of the peace treaty. The fundamentalists called them - 
selves Mujahedin warriors and claimed that their mission was to 
help their religious brethren in a holy war against the Serbs. It was 
also suspected that one of their purposes was to convert the local 
people to Islam. The group had about 30 members, from Palestine, 
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Afghanistan, Syria, Jordan and Pakistan, and they were joined at first 
by about 90 Bosnian Muslims, mainly illiterate men and women who 
had been living under fairly primitive conditions in the more remote 
villages, and by the end of 1998 the community had grown to about 
300 persons. Through their own hostile behaviour and by cutting 
themselves off from the rest of society they had succeeded in spread-
ing an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the area.21' 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) addressed the Bocinja 
Donja situation in its autumn 1999 report, where it admitted that 
this was a problem and that the SFOR had been inefficient in deal-
ing with it. The force was not even patrolling the area adequately, 
because it was anxious to avoid falling victim to the group's violence. 
This was regarded as one barrier to any solution.212 
The situation altered radically in April 2000, however, when the 
new chief administrator of the Maglaj district openly advocated driv-
ing the Islamic fundamentalists out of Bocinja Donja in order to re-
turn the houses to their rightful owners. At the same time the SFOR 
troops intensified their activities in the area and set up a patrol base 
in the village in order to place it under constant surveillance. 213  
This change was brought about most of all by the fact that the 
local people had had enough of the situation. The international com-
munity had cut off all aid from the district for almost three years 
because of its previous administration's connivance in activities that 
contravened the peace treaty and its efforts to prevent repatriation.'1" 
The above example illustrates the fact that the eventual respon-
sibility for peaceful development in an area rests with the local peo-
ple, and that the international community can influence this devel-
opment by working in the same direction, in this case by cutting off 
aid. In terms of time, however, the solving of the problem in the 
above case took too long, for when development comes to a halt in a 
certain area there is always a danger that new barriers to its recom-
mencement may emerge, e.g. organized crime may become estab-
lished there. 
The plan was that the Bosnian Peace Treaty was to be put into 
effect through the efforts of both components, the military compo-
nent being based on the NATO planning and decision-making sys-
tem and the civilian component on activity directed by the OHR. No 
clearly defined body had been planned for initially to coordinate ac-
tivities between these two elements, however, a deficiency that was 
felt most of all at the operative and tactical levels.21' 
The coordination of activities at the strategic level had been 
entrusted to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)216, and the 
OHR-led Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), set up in 
1997, enabled coordination on a practical level, although delays in 
setting up the latter had greatly detracted from the enforcement of 
the peace treaty. This was reflected most of all in the international 
community's lack of a clear policy towards those guilty of infringing 
the agreement. Incidents like that at Bocinja Donja could have been 
avoided by immediate concerted action.217 
In accordance with its role as the lead organization, the UNH-
CR has attempted to coordinate the repatriation measures in Bos-
nia. Its Consultative Working Group is a national-level coordination 
body aimed at producing ideas on the subject, while its Repatriation 
Working Group is of a more practical nature, also functioning at the 
national level, chiefly in questions concerned with those returning 
from overseas. At the ministerial level there is the UNHCR-led Joint 
Civilian Commission Working Group on Refugees and Displaced 
Persons, which is intended primarily to resolve questions that may 
prove to be barriers to repatriation. This body also received support 
from local and regional working groups.2 ' The UNHCR working 
groups reflect well the efforts made by this body to influence deci-
sions taken at the national level. The problem lies in practical imple-
mentation, however, frequently on account of a shortage of staff at 
the lower levels in the hierarchy. 
Even though organizations may not have the proper facilities 
for cooperation when they are created, it is inevitable that repre-
sentatives of the military and civilian components will come face to 
face sooner or later, as for the most part their interests coincide in 
the same spheres of activity. This means that collaboration is even 
possible at the tactical level. If it does not exist at the operative and 
strategic levels, this can very well be reflected in differences of inter-
est at the tactical level. It is possible, for example, for a situation to 
arise in which the civilian component is placing emphasis on the 
return of certain minority groups to their home districts at the same 
time as the military component is providing humanitarian aid for 
the communities that have to be moved away in order to permit 
these groups to return. 
As far as the Finns were concerned, a sharp change in CIMIC 
activity in Bosnia took place with the restructuring of the Nordic-
Polish Brigade in 2000,211 when a CIMIC company was formed to 
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work in the area covered by the combat detachment. This company 
was divided among three CIMIC centres, each with its own area of 
responsibility.220 
According to reports by the staff of this CIMIC company, its 
principal task was the elimination of factors preventing repatriation, 
which meant in practice the conducting of negotiations and recon-
ciliations, the acquisition of resources and the carrying out of vari-
ous projects. Another important aspect was the communication of 
information to the responsible civilian organizations and close col-
laboration with these.22' 
Two significant observations may be made regarding the for-
mation and functioning of the Finnish CIMIC company. Firstly, an 
operation may differ from one area to another with regard to devel-
opment, and secondly, a military force can take measures of its own 
to promote regional action for the achievement of the overall goals 
by adapting its own organization to respond to the challenges of a 
changing environment. 
Conditions in the area of responsibility of the Nordic-Polish 
Brigade eventually developed to the point that there was no longer 
any need for the CIMIC company, which led to it and the whole 
Finnish contingent being subordinated directly to the division head-
quarters and attached to the American CIMIC battalion. This move 
was clearly motivated by the good results achieved in the NPB area, 
which had been duly noted by the divisional command. The aim 
now was to increase the CIMIC input in other areas where develop-
ment to date had been somewhat slower.2'-'- 
Two crucial observations connected with the Finnish CIMIC 
company's assumption of its new duties have been made to date. 
The first of these concerns the archiving of information in such a 
way as to make it easy to recover and use at a later stage. The com-
pany began work in its new area of responsibility by surveying con-
ditions there, and as the area partly coincided with the operative 
area of responsibility of the FinBn, detailed files were already availa-
ble on its towns and villages, but these could not be made available 
to the CIMIC company because no one knew where they had been 
stored. A second significant observation concerns the unsuitability 
of troops from a major power for practical CIMIC work. This is not a 
matter of personnel but of organization, i.e. troop protection and 
security is emphasized to such a decisive degree that it creates a 
barrier to any contact with the local population, e.g. in terms of di- 
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rectives regarding the wearing of protective clothing, carrying of arms 
and the complement of a detachment.223  
4.2 The KFOR operation 
The operative environment for the Finnish Battalion in the KFOR 
operation in autumn 1999 differed greatly from the situation in Bos-
nia, as the towns and villages of the area had no official administra-
tion of any kind, only some"self-appointed local councils". Also, the 
battalion's CIMIC staff were obliged at the beginning of the opera-
tion to take on tasks that were assigned to the UN and OSCE under 
the existing agreements, one of which was participation in the ad-
ministrative bodies formed for the town and villages. Such a com-
mitment to local administrative structures was not a desirable fea-
ture, however, as it made it difficult to maintain an objective view of 
the total situation. In any case, these additional functions tended to 
overload the CIMIC staff, especially at the early stages of the opera-
tion.224 
The aims of the collaboration between the Finnish Battalion 
and the local administration at first were normalization of the situa-
tion, reorganization and activation of the local administration and 
improvement of general security, the main means employed for at-
taining them being a constant presence over the whole area of re-
sponsibility, the arranging of village meetings and the inviting of rep-
resentatives of minority groups to meetings in the area.225  
The village leaders and others who represented the local popu-
lation at the various meetings were well aware of the content of the 
agreements that had been drawn up, and were therefore in a good 
position to pursue their own interests, and if the people were dissat-
isfied with their representatives' actions, they had their own way of 
finding new ones. This complicated the battalion's attempts at 
planned cooperation and systematic development of local conditions, 
as also did the hostile attitudes that prevailed between the popula-
tion groups. Thus the plans laid down by the international commu-
nity did not by any means correspond to reality, and the only way of 
achieving some sort of progress was alternating applications of the 
whip and the carrot."26 
When the international civilian organizations arrived in the 
area the Finnish Battalion handed over some of the above duties to 
them and directed the resources released in this way more towards 
coordination of events in the area and the provision of assistance for 
the population. The CIMIC staff also supported their own organiza-
tion by producing intelligence and evaluating the general situation 
in the area and the progress that was being achieved.227 
The CIMIC branch continued its supervision of the local ad-
ministration, thus providing support for UNMIK, and a special char-
acter was introduced into its activities by cooperation with the OSCE 
in connection with the elections in autumn 2000. Major projects car-
ried out with various organizations also tend to set guidelines for 
future cooperation, and a military organization can exploit its CIM-
IC activities to bind the main civilian organizations together into a 
more homogeneous unit. It should be remembered, however, that 
the military organization must be a generator of cooperation and 
not merely a consumer of it, as is also the case with other participat-
ing organizations.228 
Looked at in retrospect, it should have been possible, in the opin-
ion of Lt.-Col. Kari Sainio, the first commander of the Finnish Battal-
ion, to commit the CIMIC activity more firmly to the service of the 
battalion's other operative functions. The most important functions, 
he claimed, were operative planning and cooperation in the field of 
intelligence, as this would have improved the conditions under which 
the troops were operating and would have increased security.229 This 
view on the part of the commander serves well to describe the nature 
of CIMIC at the initial stage of the operation, and it is also a clear 
indication that methods can easily be transformed into goals in the 
context of practical operations. If the objective at the initial stage is to 
create suitable conditions under which the troops can function and 
to provide them with sufficient information about conditions in the 
area, the task of the CIMIC branch should be to generate information 
and its methods for achieving this should be the creation of contacts 
with the local people and other organizations functioning in the area. 
It is only after this that it will be possible to commence activities that 
may promote long-term positive development. 
The CIMIC aspect of the KFOR operation took shape very much 
in accordance with the UNMIK column philosophy, which is com-
posed of four elements: 1) UN responsibility for the temporary civil-
ian government, civilian police force and prison system, 2) LTNHCR 
responsibility for humanitarian aid, 3) OSCE responsibility for the 
restoration of institutions and the training of judges, and 4) EU re- 
sponsibility for reconstruction. The main functional entity in all this 
is support for the actions of the civilian organizations, while identi-
fication of needs for humanitarian aid was also an integral part of 
the CIMIC activity of the Finnish Battalion in its own area.230 
The SFOR and KFOR operations differed markedly in the con-
ditions for cooperation that existed in their areas. In the first place, 
the duties and measures to be carried out by the civilian branches 
were not so clearly planned in advance in Bosnia as they were in 
Kosovo, the latter situation probably being a consequence of the in-
ternational community's experiences in Bosnia. Thus Kosovo may 
be regarded as an evolutionary version of a multidimensional crisis 
management operation. There were still major deficiencies in the 
readiness of the various actors for entering the area, however, which 
had the direct effect of complicating the range of duties facing the 
KFOR troops. Once the international organizations entered the area, 
the main ones among them were in practically daily contact with the 
Finnish Battalion, for instance, perhaps partly on account of the in-
volvement of the military in so many fields of activity in the initial 
stages.231  
The Kosovo CIMIC staff were of the opinion that the main as-
pects of CIMIC activity are the communication of information, the 
maintaining of contacts, collaboration and support for the work of 
international organizations.232 This is an interesting view, because it 
implies that fundamentally, the only function of CIMIC is to create 
resources for the use of others, and the statement bears witness to a 
deficiency arising from the organization's inability to assign itself 
clearly defined tasks and modes of action for the fulfilment of such 
tasks. It should be remembered, however, that the theory provides 
only the principles for action and it is practical conditions that direct 
everyday activities. Even in this case the focus of practical attention 
was on support for the activities of the various organizations, and it 
was this that partly influenced the statement. One danger here is 
that the real objectives may be obscured, and in this sense the view 
of the commander of the Finnish Battalion regarding CIMIC activi-
ties at'the beginning of the operation differs markedly from the ide-
as of those who carried the work out. 
When representatives of the Finnish contingent in Kosovo vis-
ited Bosnia in autumn 2000 to acquaint themselves with the situa-
tion there and with the activities of SFOR, the most concrete of all 
the results to emerge from their visit were observations on the work 
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of the CIMIC centres. These led the commander of the Finnish Bat-
talion to order his own staff to assess the need for corresponding 
centres in Kosovo and the chances of setting them up. Preparations 
for doing so began in spring 2001. The main conclusion to emerge 
from the visit as far as CIMIC activities were concerned was that if 
the situation in Kosovo could be resolved in a manner which satis-
fied both sides, the focus of attention in the KFOR operation as well 
could be shifted towards a CIMIC orientation. This would greatly 
alter the mission of the CIMIC branch, of course, for the main aspect 
of its mission at that time, according to the commander, was to pro-
vide support at the operative level.233  
Experiences in Kosovo nevertheless suggest that the coordina-
tion of CIMIC activity between nationalities may prove a problem, 
largely because the Finnish Battalion has a considerable amount of 
national finance available for implementing its projects, which are 
thereby bound by national regulations, so that the planning of activ-
ity at the brigade level, for instance, would not be successful in all 
respects.234 
According to representatives of the civilian component in Kos-
ovo, CIMIC organizations should not be attached to extensive 
projects, as their staff frequently lack the expertise for directing 
projects and the success of a project cannot be guaranteed by finan-
cial resources and an adequate size of staff alone. In addition to pro-
fessional skills, extensive projects call for longer periods of service in 
the area, so that spells of about six months are inadequate. These 
representatives of the civilian component were of the opinion that 
the CIMIC staff should concentrate above all on communication 
between actors.235 
The CIMIC activity taking place in Kosovo can be divided into 
two forms. For some of the KFOR battalions the accent is on project 
work, while the other group consists of battalions in which the work 
is predominantly a matter of communication between actors, sup-
plemented with small-scale projects. One striking observation is that 
all the battalions where the CIMIC staff have received specific train-
ing, e.g. through a NORDCAPS course, have appreciated the signif-
icance of CIMIC in providing operational support by assisting in the 
adaptation of the military organization to the crisis management 
environment and that project work is looked on as only one part of 
this. 236 
4.3 The ISAF operation 
Later exploitation of the experiences gained from the ISAF opera-
tion will above all support organization of the CIMIC branch, the 
commencement of its operations and the creation of suitable condi-
tions for cooperation. The ISAF operation set up in Kabul, capital of 
Afghanistan, differs considerably from the others examined here, the 
SFOR and KLOR operations. 
In the ISAF case the initial strength of the CIMIC branch at 
both the division and brigade levels was too small to be effective, so 
that in practice almost every branch carried out its own CIMIC 
projects without any kind of coordination either within the organi-
zation or between the branches. 
The ISAF intention had been to implement rapidly effective 
CIMIC projects all over Kabul at the initial stage in the operation,237 
but the danger in a policy of this kind is that the results will not be of 
a lasting nature, so that cost-effectiveness will be minimal. Activities 
aimed at providing support for civil society can easily turn into al-
most imaginary projects which are noticed only within the organi-
zations responsible for carrying them out. Similarly, the commitment 
of the local population and administration to development is likely 
to remain dubious, so that the only purpose behind the efforts made 
by external actors is to do something concrete. 
Many of the liaison officers were responsible for cooperation 
between the ISAF troops and the local administration in the early 
stage of the operation, but this responsibility was transferred to the 
Finns in a subsequent reorganization.238 
As responsibility for contacts and responsibility for projects lay 
with several different branches initially, this led to overlapping of 
functions, breaks in communication and mild confusion within the 
local administration. Although these actors were located in the same 
unit at the brigade level, their ways of working were not conducive 
to efficient collaboration.239 
When the Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan arrived in the 
area about three weeks after the advance party, CIMIC activities had 
been commenced in the manner described above. Their later arrival 
did mean, however, that they were able to evaluate the whole situa-
tion and plan their own actions better, as the FDIA staff already had 
at their disposal clear observations on actions taken so far.24° 
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It may be said on the basis of experiences with the ISAF opera-
tion that it is essential that persons engaged in the CIMIC branch or 
working in close conjunction with it should internalize their own 
role in the activity and the principal objectives of that activity com-
pletely, and they must also know at what level in the organization 
they should be working. Another requirement for clarity of action is 
that there should be sufficient staffing resources available at each 
level. The reorganization of CIMIC activities within the ISAF opera-
tion led to a heightened emphasis on the command level, planning 
level and practical level, although all levels were assigned their par-
ticular responsibilities for contacts with civilian actors. The clear di-
vision into areas of responsibility helped to develop this CIMIC ac-
tivity, and also served as an indication to collaboration partners of 
the professional skills to be found in the ISAF.241  
The strength of a military organization lies in the manpower 
that it can mobilize in the field by comparison with an ordinary civil-
ian organization, for instance, and it is essential to make use of this 
advantage, e.g. to obtain full documentation of the measures taken 
and observations made. This should also allow maximally flexible 
use to be made of this information on a later occasion. In the context 
of the ISAF operation the FDIA developed a database of day-by-day 
observations on conditions in its area of responsibility, and material 
from this was made available to representatives of the civilian coin-
ponent in an attempt to support their activities and to assist repre-
sentatives of the local administration in their efforts at developing 
their own areas.242. 
Two different views of CIMIC activity existed in the early stages 
of the ISAF operation, the British view and the Finnish view. The 
British view was that efforts should be concentrated entirely on the 
rapid execution of projects designed to support development in so-
ciety, while the Finnish view was that it was important to create suit-
able operative conditions by acquiring an adequate knowledge of 
the area of responsibility and by constructing a network of collabo-
ration relations, partly in order to be able to carry out projects. There 
would seem to have been obvious reasons for these differences in 
outlook, the British view being determined by their position as lead-
ers of the operation for a terms of six months, whereas the Finnish 
view was based on the principles of sustainable development, in 
which it was important that the local population should be commit-
ted to the development that was taking place. One of the strengths 
of the ISAF operation was that it managed to accommodate both of 
the above views.243  
4.4 Concrete support from the military organization for 
representatives of the civilian component 
This section will concentrate on concrete measures by which the 
military organization has supported representatives of the civilian 
component working in different fields. Practical experiences have 
shown that results can be obtained in operative environments such 
as those discussed here only when those engaged in the practical 
implementation of the various functions meet on the site, although 
even then it calls for clearly expressed policies laid down at a higher 
level and accepted by all parties. 
This section will be based mostly on experiences gained in the 
SFOR operation, but mention will be made of KFOR measures in as 
far as they differed significantly from experiences in Bosnia. The sup-
port for the civilian component that was involved in the ISAF oper-
ation will be examined from the perspective of project work in sec-
tion 4.5, because the operation was by nature strongly oriented to-
wards this. 
In the opinion of Lt.-Col. Erik Erroll, head of department G-5 
in the headquarters of the Nordic-Polish Brigade, with responsibili-
ty of civilian-military cooperation, in 1999, troops sent to a crisis area 
have the chance of providing support for civilian crisis management 
alongside their own military role, by: 
— supplying the international community with information on the 
crisis area, its conditions and its special characteristics. Such in-
formation could concern the viability of the road network, mine-
fields, the structure of the local population, its attitudes and the 
formation of public opinion, for instance. 
— complementing the international community's contacts with the 
local community by maintaining close contacts with the local 
armed forces 
— making rational use of the available resources, e.g. transport ca-
pacity, minesweeping capacity and reconstruction capacity, ac-
cording to the situation in each case, in order to support the or-
ganizations engaged in civilian crisis management and functions 
connected with the reconstruction of society 
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— supporting other international organizations by carrying out small 
infrastructure projects designed to improve credibility and trust 
in combination with other international actors 
— representing the most visible part of the international communi-
ty, since military forces have good opportunities to project an 
image of the unity of the international community and to func-
tion as a communicator of information 
— offering international staff, and local auxiliary staff if necessary, 
the same level of protection in their base as is afforded to their 
own men in the event of a worsening in the situation, and by 
planning, preparing for and implementing their evacuation from 
the crisis area if the need should arise.244 
Erroll's experientially-based view emphasizes working towards har-
mony within the international community, which may be regarded 
as comprising military, political and humanitarian elements. Such a 
striving towards synergy is not necessarily apparent amongst all ac-
tors, however, as noted in section 3.5 above. 
Why have the military been anxious to support the work of the 
civilian component? This is a question that is inevitably raised when 
speaking in CIMIC terms. The answer is a complex one, but the 
present work has helped to identify at least the following reasons: 1) 
by creating close relations with other actors a military organization 
can improve its own operating conditions and increase the advance 
warning time for any disturbance, 2) practically all incidents arising 
in crisis management operations stein from factors belonging to the 
sphere of the civilian component, 3) by supporting the work of other 
actors it is possible to reduce the chances of having to use one's own 
troops, 4) compulsion should be used only as a last resort, and 5) the 
military organization has to work by all means available towards 
achievement of the common overall objective of the mission, and 
thereby towards a situation in which its own troops can be with-
drawn. 
The support provided by the military for representatives of the 
civilian component may be: 1) information on the area of responsi-
bility, 2) an action carried out by its own forces which is design to 
support a certain actor, 3) material support, such as temporary pro-
vision of equipment, or 4) part of its own normal activities, e.g. en-
suring security by patrolling a certain area. The object of such sup- 
port may be a particular person, a given organization or some indi-
vidual form of activity. Assistance involving materials or practical 
actions is characteristically of a one-off nature.24' The types of sup-
port provided by military forces and the objects of this support are 
set out in Figure 5. 
The nature of the collaboration that takes place and support 
that is provided will be different at the local, regional and national 
levels. The accent at a lower level will tend to be on concrete meas-
ures that are usually bound to a particular time and place, whereas 
collaboration at the national level may be of a broader kind, usually 
involving joint planning work, actions affecting the whole opera-
tion, the creation of systems or the regional allocation of resourc-
es.246 
Stopport for the restoration of the social order 
The measures for the restoration of the social order taken within the 
SFOR operation were connected mostly with support for IPTF activ-
ity. This was based on a bilaterial collaborative system.247 
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Figure 5. Types of support provided hy military forces and the objects of 
this support. 
On account of the nature of the early stage in the operation, the 
support provided by the military component within the scope of 
KFOR was extremely significant, for the troops were also initially 
responsible for police functions in their own areas, especially for the 
maintenance of law and order, and close cooperation continued in 
the form of protection, material assistance and the provision of in-
telligence for various search operations. The military component in 
Kosovo was engaged in very much closer practical cooperation with 
the international civilian police organization than in Bosnia, largely 
on account of the obvious differences between the two areas as far 
as the physical structure of their police systems and the tasks of the 
international police force were concerned.248 
The military organizations have supported the civilian police 
organization by providing it with information gleaned as a result of 
their own activities and through practical measures. Such support 
has take at least the following forms: 
— information arising from a geographical knowledge of the area of 
responsibility 
— information arising from a knowledge of social conditions in the 
area of responsibility 
— information concerning the population of the area 
— key persons in the area 
— security factors, e.g. 
— safe areas and roads 
— persons representing a possible threat to security 
— tensions between population groups 
— plans for evacuating persons enjoying special status249 
— supervision of local police activities alongside the troops'own work 
— communication of information on local police activities.'-so 
The concrete support for the international civilian police organiza- 
tions has consisted of: 
— protection for operations 
— loan of equipment25' 
— supervision of local police activities at agreed points and in spe- 
cific areas 
— joint patrols 
— plans for staff evacuation 
— assistance with training.252 
Considerable differences have emerged between nationalities in the 
amount of material support offered by their armed forces. Limita-
tions on such loans have affected only a very small proportion of the 
Finnish troops' equipment, for instance, largely command, intelli-
gence and weapons systems, the decision in each case being taken 
by the troops' commander. The Americans, on the other hand, have 
very much tighter regulations governing the loan of equipment to 
outsiders.253  
The above points were mostly outcomes of operative functions, 
while CIMIC methods were used to support IPTF activities in the 
SFOR operation by improving the working conditions of the local 
police through the loan of equipment such as computers and office 
requisites. This has also had direct effects on IPTF activities.254 
It may be said from experience that since collaboration between 
the SFOR troops and the IPTF was based on the work of liaison 
officers responsible to the operative branch, it is quite understanda-
ble that the support provided should have been bound to operative 
functions 
The KFOR troops provided considerable support for the train-
ing of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) by assisting in this training 
and lending equipment. In addition, about 1000 soldiers were en-
gaged in border guard duties for the purposes of preventing armed 
bands of men from operating across the frontiers and engaging in 
smuggling. "' 
Support for the development of deinocrrac j and adinini.stration 
The measures undertaken in support of democracy and administra- 
tion at the local and regional levels consisted mainly of supporting 
the work of the OSCE in the arranging of elections, and also super- 
vision of the implementation of the results of the election.257 
The support took the following concrete forms: 
— communication of information 
— location and inspection of the polling stations 
— training of staff, including: 
— training connected with the area of responsibility 
— security training 
— communications training 
— anti-mine training 
— training in map-reading 
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— medical training 
— supervision of the elections themselves 
— transportation and storage of the voting slips 
— maintenance of evacuation plans and related training."' 
The implementation of this was planned jointly by the operative and 
CIMIC branches of the FinBn, with practical liaison with the OSCE 
in the hands of the CIMIC branch.259 
The OSCE is not ready to hand over responsibility for the ar-
ranging of future elections to the local authorities, as it is shifting its 
own focus of interest towards support for democracy, largely through 
day-to-day political life, and the reorganization of the armed forces 
through a reduction in their size. At the national and regional levels 
the OSCE and SFOR are engaged in close collaboration above all in 
the reorganization of the local armed forces.26o 
Particular emphasis was placed in the early stage of the opera-
tion on monitoring and maintenance of the citizens' freedom of 
movement, which called for close cooperation with the IPTF. The 
main measures taken by the FinBn were: 
— supervision of the police patrols maintained by various entities in 
the Zone of Separation (ZoS) 
— escorting of minority groups through areas controlled by other 
entities 
— ensuring the safety of minority groups attending various meet-
ings and functions.261  
It was mainly the operative branch that was responsible for these 
measures, although visits and occasions attended by minority groups 
were the responsibility of the CIMIC branch in close cooperation 
with other branches within the battalion.262 
It was the soldiers of the KFOR operation who initiated the 
development of democracy and administration in Kosovo. By taking 
charge of the administration of the towns and villages they were 
able,to prevent the remaining elements of democracy from collaps-
ing entirely, and when the UN took responsibility for these duties, 
the KFOR troops acted to ensure citizens'freedom of movement and 
basic rights, by providing military escorts where necessary, supervis-
ing key points and facilities and assisting in the renovation of phys-
ical constructions on a project basis.263  
By supporting the local administration once this was function- 
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ing in the manner laid down in the peace treaty, the military organ-
ization was able to convey to the local population the beneficial ef-
fects that its presence could have on the whole area.264 One good 
example of this was the case of the village of Bocinja Donja men-
tioned in section 4.1 above, where the international community was 
able to direct aid to the area immediately the administration of the 
Maglaj district conformed to the provisions of the peace treaty. 
Promotion of economic recovery 
Economic recovery is a field in which influence has to be applied at 
all levels in the structure of the country in question. The possibilities 
that a military organization has for affecting this process are extremely 
limited, and a lasting outcome can be achieved only through long-
term efforts that usually include the provision of loans to the nation-
al government.265 
The military force engaged in the SFOR operation was able to 
support and activate the local economy in the following ways: 
— by creating jobs 
— by arranging training aimed at employment 
— by using the services of local companies 
— by carrying out projects in conjunction with local companies 
— by arranging small-scale loans.266 
SFOR arranged seminars for the training of persons representing 
local companies in the techniques of applying for loans, western in-
dustrial standards, foreign trade and bookkeeping. This was done 
mostly in conjunction with the Combined Joint Civil Military Co-
operation Task Force (CJCMTF), a unit to which a number of profes-
sionals in these fields had been drafted. The purpose of the involve-
ment of the task force was to evaluate the possibilities in these fields 
and draw up plans for action. It was also possible for the lower level 
of command to make use of CJMTF expertise for the planning of its 
own projects.26' 
The military organization of the SFOR operation supported eco-
nomic recovery at the local and regional levels mainly through the 
CIMIC branch, which determined the resources available in the area 
and set a large number of projects in motion that made use of local 
contractors."' 
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Support for the revival of social and health services 
The measures open to the military component with regard to the 
restoration of social welfare and health services are of two kinds. The 
priority in the initial stage is to ensure that emergency and first aid 
services reach their target, and in some cases the assuming of re-
sponsibility for such services. Later the accent will be on the acquisi-
tion of resources and their distribution to the correct areas.269 
It had been decided at the beginning of the operation that local 
people would not be attended to at the SFOR bases. Only those in 
immediate danger would be given direct medical help by the mili-
tary organization. The same policy was then adopted by the Finnish 
Battalion in Kosovo. On the other hand, both the KFOR and SFOR 
medical personnel supported the local systems by arranging surger-
ies in areas where local resources were inadequate.270 
The CJMTF has begun measures for reviving the state health 
service in Bosnia. It has gathered data on facilities all over the coun-
try and is attempting to arrange finance for creating a nation-wide 
health system. One aim in this is to break down the existing barriers 
to the provision of first aid and other forms of treatment across eth-
nic boundaries, as health services at present are based on institu-
tions maintained by the various entities within the population, so 
that it is not always possible for a person to attend the nearest facil-
ity that is available. This has led in some cases to the deaths of acci-
dent patients because of the long transport distances.'-" 
The CJMTF is also working to set up smaller first aid stations, by 
locating sites where these are necessary, reporting on the prevailing 
situation and attempting to direct the activities of non-governmental 
organizations to the most problematic areas. The CJMTF looks on 
this as the quickest way of addressing problems at the local level.272 
The operations have supported the revival of social and health 
services at the local and regional levels by: 
— directing aid from non-governmental organizations to the cor-
rect areas 
— repairing local ambulances 
— commissioning the building of hospitals and health centres 
— delivering medical supplies to hospitals in the area.273  
The above measures have been carried out by the CIMIC branch. 
One essential in all cases, however, has been location of the appro-
priate sites, and in this the whole organization has participated. Sim- 
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ilarly cooperation with local administrators and various organiza-
tions has been of importance for optimal allocation of the limited 
resources available. 
Support for the improvement of the general infrastructure 
Reconstitution of the infrastructure of a country is principally a na-
tional-level undertaking, but it can be supplemented with actions at 
the local and regional levels. The projects involved in this field tend to 
be of considerable size, and it is usually only states or the larger inter-
national organizations with state backing that can take them on.274 
CIMIC methods have been used to support civilians engaged 
in such projects: 
— by determining the conditions prevailing in an area 
— by determining the resources available in an area 
— by making the organization's services available to support practi-
cal measures."' 
The SFOR organization was involved in CJMTF projects to repair an 
oil refinery, the waste water system in Sarajevo and part of the area's 
railway network, and also in the reconstruction of airports. These 
projects always included planning, applications for finance, choice 
of contractors and supervision of the actual work.276 
The practical support provided by the troops at the local and 
regional levels included: 
— ensuring security 
— making proposals 
— arranging finance 
— supervising sites 
— mapping local resources 
— distributing information."' 
Refugees and displaced persons 
Military support for refugees and displaced persons is usually pro-
vided through the respective organization, in all cases the UNHCR, 
mostly in connection with repatriation or placement in a temporary 
camp.278 It is also possible, however, for the troops to take direct ac-
tion, usually in the form of providing humanitarian aid, either from 
their own sources or mediating that available from other sources."" 
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The practical support provided by the SFOR troops took the 
form of: 
— distribution of information on the current situation 
— surveying of potential resettlement areas 
— protection for transport and detachments 
— transport of equipment 
— material assistance 
— monitoring of repatriation 
— protection during reconstruction 
— coordination and support for the work of assistance agencies 
— mediation in disputes between the parties to the conflict.2S' 
Finnish support for refugees and displaced persons in the context of 
the SFOR operation was implemented mainly by the CIMIC branch, 
with the pioneer troops, especially the mechanics, also occupying a 
key position.28' 
The alteration in the character of CIMIC activity as the SFOR 
operation advanced is perhaps best illustrated by the measures tak-
en with regard to refugees and displaced persons.The main approach 
adopted at the beginning of the operation was the acquisition of 
sufficiently extensive information to enable a realistic picture to be 
formed of the existing situation, in order to provide a basis for the 
correct targeting of future measures. Also characteristic of the initial 
stage was the implementation of small CIMIC projects, typically road 
construction and maintenance projects, aimed at improving living 
conditions for the local population and the troops' own operating 
conditions. These created the conditions necessary for the return of 
refugees and displaced persons and improved the troops' own skills 
at patrolling the area. Emphasis was also placed at this stage on build-
ing up relations with the local people and administration.282 
As the situation developed, CIMIC activity began increasingly 
to consist of practical measures aimed at repatriation as such, in-
cluding the planning, implementation and security aspects of visits 
by minority groups to their former home districts. Later still, the work 
extended to include support for reconstruction, entailing material 
and transport support, the arranging of small-scale loans and medi-
ation in disputes between factions. Emphasis at all stages was placed 
on coordination of the functions of the aid organizations and the 
communicating of information on new potential areas of activity to 
representatives of the responsible organizations. 283  
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4.5 CIMIC projects and humanitarian aid 
The CIMIC projects that have been carried out may be regarded as 
the concrete results of successful collaborative activity, and ones 
means by which the military organization has been able to support 
achievement of the overall objectives of the operation. But these 
projects have also had an indirect impact on the troops themselves, 
as they are a source of good publicity and help to promote security. It 
is therefore important that all CIMIC activity should be accompa-
nied by the active dissemination of information. A military organi-
zation has only limited possibilities for carrying out projects of the 
CIMIC kind, and the implementation of these must be carefully 
planned. A key aspect in this is description of the nature of a pro-
posed project, together with an analysis of who will benefit from it, 
whether it will arouse conflicts between the factions in the dispute 
and whether it will endanger the neutrality of the troops with re-
spect to these factions. The criteria for the choice of CIMIC projects 
by the Finnish contingent in the SFOR operation were: 
1. The project should be of the greatest possible benefit for the pro-
tection of the contingent's own troops and should not be at vari-
ance with the FinBn's military operation. 
2. The project should have an optimum input-output ratio, and 
should provide help for the largest possible number of people in 
a matter which is of the greatest possible importance. 
3. The project must be politically correct. It should help to dispel 
tensions between the parties to the crisis and improve freedom 
of movement for civilians. 
4. It should support the battalion's intelligence wing. 
5. It should be easily delimitable in terms of time, labour input, fi-
nance and responsibilities. 
6. It should be maximally visible among the local population and 
receive sufficient publicity in the media.284 
The projects carried out following the reorganization of the Finnish 
contingent were mostly the work of the CIMIC company. The ma-
jority of the funds available were directed towards actions that would 
support repatriation, and some also to projects aimed at improving 
living conditions for the majority population, mostly involving the 
renovation of schools and improvements to the road network.'-s' 
When the Finnish contingent was placed under the command 
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of the American division the main criterion for projects became the 
support that they provided for repatriation. All new projects were to 
promote the return of minority groups to their home areas in the 
eastern parts of the Republic of Serbia.286 
It is possible to arrange finance for such projects from a number 
of sources, the main ones in the case of projects carried out by the 
Finns being the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European 
Union, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) or the contingent's own budget.287 
The USAID-financed projects were among the largest to be car-
ried out in the Finnish area of responsibility, usually with the CIMIC 
branch participating in the preliminary surveys and preparations. The 
CIMIC branch was also responsible for supervision at the sites and 
for reporting to USAID on the progress of the work at 10-day inter-
vals.288 
EU-funded projects proved more difficult to implement in Bos-
nia than those based on other sources of finance, on account of the 
bureaucratic nature of the EU funding mechanism. One consequence 
of this was that payments to local contractors were often delayed for 
many months, which gave SFOR the stigna of an unreliable partner 
in the eyes of local companies.289 
Under an agreement made by the Finnish Foreign Ministry with 
the EU Commission in spring 2002 regarding the financing of CIM-
IC projects, these projects can be approved by the Commission's of-
fice in the area of responsibility, which should allow for close coop-
eration between the body financing the project and the contractors 
engaged to carry it out, and extremely favourable results have been 
reported by CIMIC personnel attached to the ISAF operation, where 
the system has been described as fast, practical and flexible.2J6 
Experiences with financing arrangements suggest that, in order 
to avoid friction in their execution, projects should not be of a dura-
tion that covers several rotations of staff. They should also be de-
signed in such a way that they can be restricted to a certain length of 
time or a certain number of phases. This may be of importance if the 
organization responsible for a project has to be changed, for instance, 
possibly on account of geographical or functional changes in the ar-
eas of responsibility of certain nationalities.'-8' 
The instructions for the implementation of projects by the Finn-
ish Battalion in Kosovo were the similar to those for the Finnish Batal-
lion (Finan) in Bosnia, the main differences being connected with 
the use of local labour, which was not provided for in the FinBn in-
structions, although it took place in practice.292 The projects carried 
out in Kosovo in 2000 were in any case somewhat different in char-
acter and scope from those undertaken in Bosnia, being aimed at 
improving living conditions for the local people, e.g. by supplying 
them with firewood, water filters and heating stoves.2J3  
Project work occupied a highly significant position in the ISAF 
operation, with some 90 projects completed in the first eight months, 
involving a total investment of around USD 3.8 million. The targets 
were schools, hospitals, children's homes, police stations, fire sta-
tions, administration and basic infrastructure. One common denom-
inator in all of them was a broad-based effect in improving basic 
security for the local population. The principal sources of finance 
were the British Department for International Development (DfID), 
the EU Commission, the British Embassy in Afghanistan and the 
German and Finnish governments.294 
One typical feature of the initial stage in the operation was that 
all branches expressed an interest in carrying through CIMIC projects 
"quickly and visibly". Little coordination was possible, and thus the 
resources devoted to this work could not be exploited to the utmost. 
Problems also arose because projects had been agreed upon by per-
sons who did not have a clear picture of the prevailing situation, so 
that some of those belonging to the initial phase would never have 
fulfilled the project criteria if the CIMIC groups working in the field 
had looked into their background. Eventually the creation of a CIM-
IC Coordination Centre (CCC), with an ISAF internal component 
and a civilian component, enabled the coordination of such projects 
to be placed on a firm footing.29' 
The most concrete form of support provided by the ISAF oper-
ation for the civilian component at the initial stage was connected 
with UNICEF's"Back to School"campaign, the aim of which was to 
encourage the commencement of teaching at every place of elemen-
tary schooling at the beginning of the new school year on 21st March 
2002. The direct support provided by UNICEF consisted of the nec-
essaty teaching materials. One problem, however, was that no one 
knew how many schools there were in Kabul, where they were or 
how many pupils they had. The last data available concerned the 
situation in 1996, and even the information on the location of schools 
held good in only about 30% of cases any longer.296 
As UNICEF did not have the field organization necessary for 
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such a project, it had no chances of coping with the school question 
on its own. It was thus the Finnish CIMIC teams that located all the 
schools in Kabul, almost 200 of them, and produced a basic descrip-
tion of each, including contact information, numbers of pupils and 
an estimate of the condition of the school building and the costs of 
repairing it. This was achieved by virtue of the detachment's good 
relations with the local administration, representatives of which ac-
companied the CIMIC teams on their investigation missions. The 
distribution of teaching materials was then accomplished jointly by 
the Finnish CIMIC teams and the British logistics regiment. The lo-
cal authorities were nevertheless committed to the project, in that 
the chiefs of police in the various areas were responsible for security 
at the distribution centres, and the school authorities were responsi-
ble for taking delivery of the material and passing it on to the schools 
under the supervision of the CIMIC teams. This successful project 
was a good demonstration to both UNICEF and the local authorities 
of the potential that the ISAF operation had for supporting develop-
ment initiatives.297 
The multinational engineering unit made a major contribution 
to the ISAF projects, as it had access to tools that were otherwise 
unavailable in Kabul and its leaders were extremely favourably dis-
posed to this project work. The close collaboration that developed 
between those responsible for CIMIC planning and the representa-
tives of the engineers' units was vital in enabling the vacant resourc-
es at the disposal of the latter to be mobilized for use in the CIMIC 
projects.2J8  
The focal points in this project work were determined almost 
entirely internally within the ISAF operation, with little attempt at 
seeking compatibility or any impact in common with the plans made 
by representatives of the civilian component. This was due to the 
fact that at the beginning of the operation the systems maintained 
by the lead organizations did not allow for day-to-day working in 
the field. Thus the CIMIC branch was restricted to trying to increase 
the overall impact of its projects through collaboration with a few 
isolated organizations.299 
Experiences point to certain changes in the targets of CIMIC 
projects as the operations have proceeded. In the Kosovo operation 
project support was directed mainly at individual people and fami-
lies, as is typical at the beginning of an operation, when severe up-
heavals are still visible in society, so that it is impossible to maintain 
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normal living conditions. As circumstances improve, however, part-
ly as a result of the appearance of international relief organizations 
in the area, the nature of CIMIC projects also alters, typically focus-
ing on the construction of public buildings, e.g. schools, the road 
network and other aspects of the general infrastructure. Experiences 
in Bosnia also suggest that military projects have to be directed at 
some stage exclusively at the principal focus of the whole operation, 
in this case the repatriation of displaced persons. 
It is essential at the outset to be aware of the directions in which 
project work is likely to develop, as this will enable the correct and 
maximally efficient use to be made of the available resources. In Bos-
nia, for example, funds were channelled at the initial stage into the 
renovation of some schools that did not support the force's activities 
at later stages. Errors of this kind can be avoided by close coopera-
tion with other actors, as they may have the opportunity to evaluate 
which areas are likely to experience positive development in the near 
future so that it would be profitable to invest resources in them.30° 
Similarly, humanitarian aid distributed at the initial stage in an 
operation may have the effect of supporting the troops' future mis-
sion, as it is a good means of winning the confidence of the people 
and encouraging them to look favourably on the troops' activities. It 
is important to avoid measures that may take on a more permanent 
character, however, and to plan assistance that will be more of a one-
off kind, so that the troops will not be committed in the long term to 
activities for which their resources were not designed.30' 
The humanitarian aid that can be delivered by a military organ-
ization consists mainly of equipment of its own, e.g. blankets and 
foodstuffs, together with materials received as donations, possible 
from non-governmental organizations in their own country. Organ-
izations can be activated to participate in this by means of suitable 
information and good personal contacts.302 
4.6 Conclusions 
Experiences of recent operations clearly point to a change in the na-
ture of CIMIC activities as they proceed, the focus of attention at the 
initial stage being on support for the operation's own troops, while 
once the situation has been stabilized it becomes possible to devote 
resources to supporting the civilian component. 
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As they work to increase cooperation between military and ci-
vilian organizations, the CIMIC personnel must be careful to avoid 
drifting too far apart from their own organization and from their real 
mission, which can be ensured by setting clearly defined aims and 
issuing precise instructions. Close collaboration between the CIMIC 
and operative branches at all stages in an operation is also of ex-
treme importance for efficiency of action. 
The planning and execution of activities in the area of the oper-
ation can be affected by a lack of coordination mechanisms, a prob-
lem that was particularly prevalent in the SFOR operation. The rep-
resentatives of the civilian component have not been in the same 
state of readiness to move into the area of operation as the military 
organization has, and this has affected practical activities at the be-
ginning of the KFOR and ISAF operations, for instance. Individuals 
working at the grass-roots level have nevertheless been able to in-
stigate unofficial forms of activity that have enabled more efficient 
targeting of regional development and resources. 
When planning future actions the CIMIC staff need to take ac-
count of the coordination bodies already functioning at various lev-
els, and if there are none, the military organization must be capable 
of creating a suitable platform for their formation. For this purpose it 
may be necessary to reserve premises on which representatives of 
the international community working in an area can meet together. 
Such activity must, of course, have the approval of the main organi-
zations concerned, which is the foundation for all joint efforts at in-
creasing impact. 
It is clear that the measures taken at the beginning of an oper-
ation should support those to be taken later, which is quite possible 
if the overall objectives are used to define partial objectives for the 
various stages. These latter can then be used to name areas of focus 
on which the military organization should concentrate the majority 
of the CIMIC resources available to it. 
While working together closely with representatives of the ci-
vilian component, the CIMIC staff should make the background to 
the activities of the military organization clear in the early stages, 
and should avoid giving the impression that its intention is to direct 
or lead the work of the organization or person responsible. The ra-
tionale for all action should lie in efficient use of the available re-
sources and achievement of the overall objectives, while a further 
important aspect is supplementation of the actions taken by the ci- 
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viljan component. 
The support given by the military organization to the repre-
sentatives of the civilian component is the outcome of cooperation 
and can be either continuous or of a one-off nature, although one 
should always be wary of commitments to continuous support. CIM-
IC activity should be concentrated on the focal points defined for 
the operation, but it must be remembered that these may vary from 
one stage in the operation to the next. This is something that has to 
be taken into account when developing organizations, as the size of 
the staff and its areas of expertise will have to conform separately to 
the objectives at each stage. 
The concrete support that a military organization can provide 
for representatives of the civilian component is outlined in Appen-
dix 5, where it is divided into support arising as part of normal activ-
ities and that channelled through CIMIC activities. The table also 
enables the focus of activity to be defined. When doing this it is im-
portant to note that the main part of the support for democracy and 
administration should be dependent on the holding of elections, 
which will mean a concentration in the timing of the allocation of 
resources on support for the activity of the OSCE. This implies in 
turn that momentary changes in the focus of attention can occur 
even in the course of individual stages in an operation. 
The information contained in Appendix 5 suggests that duties 
connected with refugees and displaced persons have occupied a cm-
cial position in CIMIC activities. This can be argued on two scores: 1) 
resettlement has been a major factor in the operations considered 
here, and 2) it is possible to respond to resettlement problems through 
actions conducted by CIMIC units. It emerged very clearly from the 
interviews, especially those with persons who had served in Bosnia, 
that the solution of problems connected with the status and rights 
of minorities can go a long way towards achieving development in 
other spheres. Also, the resettlement problems frequently called for 
rapid reactions and also required the maintenance of constant con-
tacts with the inhabitants of the problem areas. The implementation 
of appropriate measures called for good public relations skills and in 
many cases a firm presence on the scene. Combining viewpoints 
one and two, we reach the conclusion that the existing instruments, 
in this case the CIMIC units, were applied to the problem to which 
they were best suited. The planning of CIMIC activity calls for due 
attention to be paid to one's own capacities for action and recogni- 
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tior of those areas in which the expertise of one's own troops is 
insufficient. 
The military organization naturally supports the civilian com-
ponent merely by virtue of its own presence.Viewed in a straightfor-
ward manner, the guarantee of a safe operating environment should 
be sufficient support in itself. Extending this view, however, and tak-
ing the political aims and limited resources of the various groups 
into account, it may be said that joint action is an essential prerequi-
site for achieving the desired objectives. On the other hand, the ac-
tivities of the civilian component provide support for the military 
component, for it would be impossible to resolve a crisis through 
military means alone in such a way that peaceful development would 
ensue. 
It is essential to take the civilian component into account when 
planning CIMIC projects that support social development. Such 
projects should have the approval of the local administration and 
should support its activities. Thus information on them should be 
made available in advance to the civilian organizations operating in 
the area, as this will help avoid the overlapping use of resources and 
create suitable circumstances for the implementation of joint mili-
tary-civilian projects. 
The implementation of projects is governed by the available fi-
nancing mechanisms and the criteria that these lay down. Financing 
mechanisms can also be divided into those through with finance is 
available rapidly and those in which it is available more slowly. The 
above observations on financing mechanisms can also serve as tools 
in the planning of projects. 
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5 CIMIC PLANNING AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Planning 
Once the planning stage is complete the CIMIC staff should be fully 
aware not only of the mission ahead of them but also of the distinc-
tive features of the area of operation, external factors likely to affect 
their work and factors connected with the operation itself, i.e. its 
background and history, its current state and the objectives set for it. 
Two alternatives may be envisaged as the starting point for the plan-
ning stage: 1) the military force is deploying itself in any area where 
no part of its organization has been in action previously, or 2) the 
force is entering an area where other troops from its own organiza-
tion have been in action previously. The tasks facing the CIMIC branch 
are nevertheless the same in both cases, but in the second alterna-
tive existing documentation may be available, although it will still 
need to be verified by the force itself during the preparation stage. 
The preparation stage is the same for all threat situations de-
fined under the Petersberg Obligations, with individual differences 
emerging only at the stage of practical implementation. The main 
factors in this are the operating environment and differences in it 
between the threat situations. 
The following groups of factors need to be taken into account 
at the planning stage: 1) the operating environment, 2) the tasks 
assigned to the CIMIC branch, 3) the resources available, and 4) co-
ordination of functions. 
The operating environment for the CIMIC branch consists of 
geographical factors associated with the area of responsibility, the 
local population and administrative representatives and the repre-
sentatives of the various civilian organizations working in the com-
munity. Consideration also has to be given to actors in the unit's 
own organization, and similarly to the history of the area, the pre-
vailing political situation and the background to the crisis itself. 
The state of the operating environment may also be assessed in 
accordance with the various aspects, or functional entities of crisis 
management as defined in Chapter 2 of this work: 
— restoration of the social order 
— development of democracy and administration 
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— promotion of economic recovery 
— revival of social and health services 
— improvement of the general infrastructure 
— stimulation of culture and education 
— establishment of external relations 
— civil defence 
— boundary patrolling and customs 
— civil protection 
— refugees and displaced persons 
The principal geographical factors from a CIMIC point of view are 
concentrations of population, seasonal characteristics and conditions 
for transport and travel in the area, especially factors tending to re-
strict movement. These geographical factors may be defined in ad-
vance from both internal sources, such as the engineering, operative 
and intelligence branches of the force's own organization, and ex-
ternal ones, the commonest of which are reports and memoranda 
from civilian organizations that have already begun operations in 
the area, although valuable further information may be obtained from 
earlier reports and research findings. 
Representatives of the local population and its administration 
constitute major factors affecting the work of the CIMIC branch. As 
far as the population is concerned, it is useful to find out its ethnic 
distribution over the whole area of responsibility, living conditions 
and attitudes towards the peacekeeping force. In the case of the lo-
cal administration, it may be of significance to determine the struc-
ture of the whole administrative system, from the smallest unofficial 
community through the entire machinery of the state up to the na-
tional level. Attention must also be paid, of course, to the current 
functionality of these various levels. Regarding individual represent-
atives of the administration, it is important to ascertain who are the 
principal actors and what resources they have for discharging their 
duties. Allowance should also be made for influential persons or 
groups operating in the"grey area"of society and their possible im-
pact dn the force's activities. 
CIMIC activities are a means by which the military organiza-
tion is able to adapt itself into a functional element of the whole 
crisis management operation, for the nature of the mission is such 
that the working environment of the CIMIC personnel will be virtu-
ally congruent with that of the principal representatives of the civil- 
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ian component. Working with representatives of civilian organiza-
tions can in some cases prove extremely difficult. It can be said on 
the basis of experiences gathered from several operations that the 
most powerful factor detracting from such cooperation concerns the 
attitudes adopted by both the military and civilian personnel. From a 
CIMIC perspective, success in one's own tasks calls for the active 
dissemination of information among those working in other branches 
of one's own organization and among the main civilian actors, and 
in some cases the provision of training for these instances. The ques-
tion of civilian organizations within the operating environment, the 
types of organization concerned and the ways in which they must 
be taken into account in the planning of one's own activities have 
been discussed above in section 3.4. 
It is essential at the planning stage to define the objectives of 
the CIMIC activity and the end state to be aimed at. It is then possi-
ble to derive from these a set of goals to be attained in the various 
stages of the operation.303 The principal aims for the CIMIC branch 
are the provision of direct and indirect support for its own troops, 
support for the local administration, improvements in living condi-
tions for the local population, reconstitution of the local society and 
support for a separately defined set of civilian organizations, although 
each stage in the operation as it advances towards its declared ob-
jectives will have its characteristic focus of emphasis. The accent in 
the initial stage will be on support for the peacekeeping force itself, 
but as the situation begins to normalize the main mission will lie in 
the reconstitution of civilian society, although it will always be nec-
essary to consider the connection between CIMIC activity and the 
activities of the troops themselves. 
Experiences in the ISAF and KFOR operations suggest that the 
tasks of the CIMIC branch at the beginning of an operation consist 
of support for the force itself and to a pronounced extent for the 
functioning of the local administrative system, and that these func-
tions must be properly coordinated. Such observations need to be 
taken into account at the planning stage, above all when defining 
the task of the CIMIC branch. 
It is the commander of the military force who will define the 
ultimate objective of CIMIC activity, which will be phrased in such 
as way as to indicate the desired end state." Definitions arrived at 
for lower levels must be compatible with these goals for the opera-
tion as a whole. 
107 
The commander of the military force, in conjunction with rep-
resentatives of the operative branch, will define the CIMIC tasks, 
which must likewise be consistent with the aims laid down for the 
international community. This means that the chief of the CIMIC 
branch will inevitably have to take part in the planning. The tasks 
will also have to be defined so as to correspond to the human re-
sources available and the overall objectives of the operation.305 
The resources available for CIMIC activity consist of staff, equip-
ment and financing mechanisms. Some of the resources, such as 
machinery and excavators, are of a"Dual Use"kind, in that their use 
depends on the prevailing situation. This means that no long-term 
planning can be entered into that entails the use of equipment be-
longing to the military organization for supporting the projects of 
civilian actors. 
The human resources may be regarded as comprising the CIM-
IC personnel working at various levels in the military organization, 
i.e. 1) at the command level in the operation, 2) at the planning level, 
and 3) at the implementation level. 
Efficiency in CIMIC activity can be achieved by creating CIMIC 
teams and detachments that are as strong as possible and capable of 
carrying out CIMIC work on a daily basis, i.e. maintaining contacts 
with the civilian component, coordinating activities and in some cases 
implementing joint projects. All CIMIC activity nevertheless calls for 
support from the command and planning levels. 
Attention must be paid at the planning stage to the capabilities 
of the personnel for discharging the duties planned for them. If the 
personnel do not have the necessary knowledge and skills for doing 
this, particular attention will have to be paid to basic CIMIC training 
in the preparations for the operation. 
Professionals in related fields who are attached to the military 
organization, e.g. engineers and medical personnel, may be regard-
ed as human resources that can be drawn on to a limited extent. 
They, too, come into the"Dual Use"category. 
The human resources available for CIMIC purposes may also 
be taken to include the local workers who are cooperating closely 
with the CIMIC personnel proper, the main group of which com-
prises those employed as interpreters. Other temporary staff may be 
taken on in some cases, mostly professionals in various fields as re-
quired for project work, e.g. constructional engineers with a knowl-
edge of local standards and working practices. 
The smooth initiation of CIMIC activities calls for proper defi-
nition of the coordination requirements, which will at the same time 
be a prerequisite for the planning of joint actions between the CIM-
IC branch and other actors. These coordination requirements can be 
divided into two types, internally and externally oriented, of which 
the former may apply to coordination between 1) elements working 
at different levels within the same branch of the military organiza-
tion, and 2) elements working at the same level in different branch-
es. 
Attention should also be paid during the planning stage, and 
similarly during the implementation of the activities, to other plan-
ning going on in the military organization at the same time. The aim 
of this internal coordination should be to speed up the military ac-
tions as a whole and save on resources. In other words, the CIMIC 
branch should not waste its limited human resources on work which 
overlaps with that of another branch or another actor, e.g. with that 
of the UNCHR, which is responsible for the refugee situation in a 
crisis area and for recording changes in this. 
For CIMIC training purposes it is possible to take advantage of 
nationally and internationally arranged courses and exercises. If the 
CIMIC personnel have not had prior training, specialized topics rel-
evant to their tasks should be included in the training provided for 
the force in general. This presupposes, of course, that the chief of the 
CIMIC branch has received training for his coming duties and has 
the knowledge and skills necessary for arranging training for his staff. 
If the chief can himself be responsible for the training of his group, 
there is every chance that a team spirit will develop even during the 
training stage, which will create good conditions for the smooth in-
itiation of activities in the field.306 
The training should make full use of the knowledge available in 
different branches, and those responsible should also be prepared to 
engage professionals from the local administration where appropri-
ate, although this naturally requires a prior survey to be made of 
probable future areas of activity. In addition, care should be taken to 
chose training staff with practical experience and the necessary teach-
ing ability. Since the preparation time is usually strictly limited, eve-
ry training session should be planned and prepared for as carefully 
as possible, and training staff coining from outside the military or-
ganization should be given clear instructions as to the aims and pur-
poses of the course. 
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Since CIMIC activity usually involves the implementation of 
small-scale community reconstruction projects, the contribution of 
the civilian component to these should be taken into account in their 
planning. Projects carried out by the military organization should 
always be aimed at supporting the goals of the civilian component, 
and operative models should be created at the planning stage that 
will ensure that the CIMIC projects complement the developmental 
work being done by the civilian component in the area. 
Successful projects call for efficient financing mechanisms, and 
the mechanisms available for each operation should be categorized 
according to their accessibility. Usually the providers of the finance 
will dictate the sectors of society for which the mechanisms in ques-
tion are intended, and this will form the first criterion for such a 
categorization. A further consideration will be the speed with which 
the finance can be obtained. Mechanisms in which the decision-
making process has been brought as close as possible to the user 
will be appropriate for cases in which a rapid response is required, 
while slower mechanisms may be planned for in sectors of society 
where projects are carried out over longer periods of time, e.g. ac-
tions to ensure the reliability of electricity supplies. 
The duties of a military organization do not usually include the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, but experiences from various opera-
tions suggest that one must be prepared for this. Planning and pre-
paratory work in the humanitarian sphere is governed by the man-
date, conditions in the area of operation and the resources and fi-
nancing mechanisms available. It is in any case important to bear in 
mind at the planning stage that the military organization may be 
forced to take part in the provision of humanitarian aid in the initial 
stages. It is therefore necessary to monitor developments in the area 
of operation and to identify the organizations with responsibility for 
humanitarian aid. The true function of the CIMIC branch should be 
to inform the appropriate organizations of the prevailing situation 
and to cooperate with them and with the operative branch of the 
military force to secure delivery of the supplies. 
All externally directed activity should be accompanied by prop-
er dissemination of information to the local population, the princi-
pal partner organizations at home and in the area of operation and 
the military organization itself, as active CIMIC work combined with 
mastery of the media can help to create a positive public image among 
all external groups. Active publicity can be of assistance in the exe- 
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cution of sma11-scale projects, and it can also be a means of activat-
ing non-governmental organizations, whose contributions may as-
sume significant proportions during the maintenance stage in the 
operation, when the aim is to encourage the people to take control 
of their own affairs and form a properly functioning society once 
again.307 
Suitable publicity methods can also be used to explain the pur-
poses and principles of CIMIC activity to the local people, and thus 
to avoid practical complications of the kind that are apt to arise from 
misunderstandings. Similarly the CIMIC staff and their vehicles 
should be clearly recognisable, although it should be remembered 
that the use of distinguishing marks is only feasible at the stage when 
the local population have come to accept the CIMIC troops and their 
activities. The used of distinctive markings for CIMIC personnel 
should also help to minimize efforts by local people to make contact 
with the patrols belonging to the operative branch."0' 
Special attention should be paid to documentation and report-
ing during the planning stage, as it must be possible later to ascer-
tain at least the following: 
— What is or was regarded as the objective of the activity? 
— By what means was it intended that the objective should be 
achieved? 
— What factors led to the choice of this objective? 
— Under what conditions were the tasks carried out? 
— What was the outcome achieved? 
— What observations were made in the course of events that might 
be useful for the further development of CIMIC activities? 
The nature of CIMIC activity requires that an internal system must 
be created for controlling it and for directing the personnel in all 
their principal areas of activity. This in turn calls for the prior defini-
tion of a task and objective for the CIMIC branch and of the key 
actions to be taken for implementation of this task. Definition of the 
objective should take account of the aims of both the military and 
the chilian component, while the key actions, which usually consist 
of mediation, the maintaining of contacts with the civilian compo-
nent, support for coordination of the work of other actors and exe-
cution of social reconstruction projects, may vary in the weight as-
signed to them and may be supplemented by other functions ac-
cording to the nature of the operation. 
111 
Part of the control system entails an obligation for the chief of 
the CIMIC branch to report to his own superior at predefined inter-
vals on the actions that have been carried out. This should be done 
from the viewpoint of the overall objective and employing statistics 
indicative of the performance of key actions. Mention should also be 
made of any barriers to achievement of the objective, and the factors 
entailed in these should be placed in perspective relative to the above 
performance indicators. This will enable adjustments to be made to 
the future tasks of the CIMIC branch and resources to be assigned to 
areas that need to be more effective. The quality of the activity 
achieved may also be assessed in this way, by comparing the per-
formance figures as proportions of overall activity. 
5.2 Commencement of CIMIC activity 
The CIMIC branch may be looked on as an agency by which the 
military organization adjusts itself to the operating environment of 
the crisis management operation, and the commencement of its ac-
tivities should thus take the form of a review of the processes carried 
out at the planning stage. A properly executed commencement stage 
can create favourable conditions for carrying out the task assigned, 
which requires from a CIMIC point of view: 
— coordination of the externally directed activity of the military or-
ganization 
— formation of a picture of the prevailing situation 
— creation and maintenance of suitable conditions for cooperation 
with respect to 
— international organizations 
— national and international non -governmental organizations 
— the local authorities 
— the local population 
— planning of support for social reconstruction together with rep-
resentatives of the civilian component. 
From a CIMIC perspective, externally directed activity implies coop-
eration between representatives of the military and civilian compo-
nents and the aim of its coordination is to support achievement of 
the overall objective, to avoid overlapping use of human resources 
and to control and exploit the flow of information.The result of such 
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coordination may be expressed in terms of a set of areas of respon-
sibility for externally directed activity. 
The coordination of activity is based on the definition of tasks 
at each level in the organization. It is the responsibility of those 
working at the highest level in the organization to cooperate with 
representatives of the civilian organizations at the same level in or-
der to create policies and instructions to guide the work of the per-
sons and detachments engaged at the planning and operative lev-
els. The task of those at the planning level is to plan the activity itself 
following the commands and directions coming from the upper level, 
while the operative level will be responsible for carrying out the 
planned activity and for reporting back to the planning level on the 
measures taken and observations made. 
Failure to observe the above division of functions may lead to a 
waste of resources and unnecessary confusion at the practical level. 
This can be avoided if all the people working at the various levels in 
the organization are aware of how the flow of information is in-
tended to take place within it, and above all what their own areas of 
responsibility are. 
Since the same branches of a military organization at the local 
and regional levels should be working in close cooperation with each 
other as soon as the operation begins, clear definitions of common 
policies and divisions of responsibility are required from the outset, 
and for this the higher command must be capable of making use of 
the lower levels of command and the human resources represented 
by them. Thus the generation of information within the organiza-
tion will take place in a"bottom up"manner. Then, by creating good 
contacts with their opposite numbers in civilian organizations, the 
higher command can support its subordinates by distributing the 
results of their own collaboration in order to formulate principles 
for action and to define policies that will be consistent with those of 
the main representatives of the civilian component working within 
the same area.309 
The factor regulating externally directed activity in the military 
organization should be the cooperation list drawn up for it, contain-
ing notes of 1) the person, task or organization which is to be the 
object of cooperation, 2) the responsible person or unit in the mili-
tary organization, 3) the manner and timing of contacts, and 4) if 
possible, the product of the cooperation. This product could be a set 
of data on the refugee situation in an area, for example. The drawing 
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up and use of a cooperation list of this kind may be looked on as 
supporting the formation and maintenance of a picture of the situa-
tion in the area of operation, which in turn forms the basis for the 
activities of the military organization. 
Experiences gained from several operations suggest that from 
a CIMIC point of view a picture of the situation should comprise the 
following elements: 1) security factors, 2) population of the area of 
operation, 3) social structures, 4) other actors present in the area, 
and 5) the terrain. The main factors affecting security will be local 
military organizations, paramilitary organizations, crime, other groups 
opposed to the peacekeeping force and areas suspected of being 
mined. It is not the responsibility of the CIMIC branch to investigate 
such matters, as this should be done elsewhere in the organization, 
but it may be noted in the light of experience in various operations 
that CIMIC methods, employing groups working in the field, can be 
useful for filling out the evaluation of the security situation in an 
area. 
Thus cooperation between the branches within the organiza-
tion emerges as a crucial element in obtaining an accurate picture of 
the prevailing situation. Since the CIMIC staff should actively at-
tempt to ensure that they have a correct evaluation available, the 
best way of doing this is to take part in the planning process for it 
within their own organization. 
The formation of a picture of the situation is a matter in which 
cooperation with the local population and a knowledge of its partic- 
ular features is needed. The population data obtained during the 
planning stage have to be checked and open questions concerning 
the population of the area resolved, and the two most efficient means 
of doing this are cooperation with civilian organizations active in 
the area and fieldwork carried out by the CIMIC teams themselves. 
The CIMIC teams must be provided with precise instructions 
for this, as their first contacts with the local population will set a prec- 
edent for that population's impression of the peacekeeping force. 
Thus,the groups have to be used in such a way that their deployment 
will serve the purpose of making the force known to the people and 
creating a favourable public image. Employed correctly, the CIMIC 
teams operating in the field can constitute one of the most important 
and most efficient instruments for the gathering of intelligence. 
A realistic picture of the prevailing situation should also include 
an estimate of the functionality of social structures, which should be 
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performed separately at least for the administrative system, judicial 
system, health and social welfare system, education systern and gen-
eral infrastructure. 
The state of the administrative system in the area of responsi-
bility can have a profound effect on the tasks facing the CIMIC 
branch, as every effort must be made through CIMIC activity to sup-
port the representatives of the local administration in their efforts to 
improve conditions. Such support will at the same time serve indi-
rectly to increase the population's confidence in the administration, 
which will in turn be likely to lead to peaceful development. Thus, if 
the situation permits, efforts should be made when planning the 
measures to be taken by the military organization in support of so-
cial reconstruction to seek ways of including the local authorities in 
these plans. If there is no local administration, or if it is scarcely 
functioning, the military organization will have to involve itself in 
the development of the area and the creation of an administrative 
system in collaboration with the main civilian organizations. All the 
above measures represent ways of supporting the development of 
the area towards the desired end state, and may at the same time be 
regarded as having the effect of shortening the duration of the oper-
ation. 
The other social structures mentioned above in connection with 
the formation of a picture of the situation are ones that are closely 
connected with the guaranteeing of basic security for the popula-
tion of the area. The military organization can take steps to deter-
mine the existing state of the basic structures, but the general out-
lines of the action to be taken and the actual development work will 
nevertheless be in the hands of the civilian organizations to which 
this is entrusted in each operation separately.310 
When surveying the situation with regard to civilian actors 
working in the area, the CIMIC branch should also be able to make 
use of other branches of the military organization. Experiences gained 
in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan suggest, for instance, that the 
patrols on surveillance duty, if furnished with correctly defined in-
structions, can provide real-time information on new actors appear-
ing in the area. This is also the most efficient means of maintaining 
up-to-date data on the work of individual actors.311  
The basic data for application to conditions regarding the ter-
rain as far as CIMIC work is concerned are those produced by the 
operative branch, i.e. the organization's own patrols are able to fill 
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in the details of the terrain, including information on seasonal vari-
ations, which it is always necessary to take into account. 
As far as the initiation and later implementation of CIMIC ac-
tivity is concerned, the necessary conditions for efficient operation 
are created through cooperation with the main representatives of 
the civilian component, while from the viewpoint of the military or-
ganization the conditions for cooperation are created by means of 
the internal coordination and maintenance of a realistic picture of 
the situation discussed above. This cooperation must be planned in 
such a way that it is implemented consistently at all levels of activity. 
The coordination mechanisms and divisions of responsibility 
applying between actors should be defined in the documents on 
which individual operations are based, and if this is not done the 
initiative for bringing about such coordination in their geographical 
and operative areas and at the appropriate levels must rest with the 
representatives of the military organization. This can be done in prac-
tice by inviting representatives of the civilian component to meet at 
a prearranged place in each area of responsibility at regular intervals 
to discuss the coordination question, although admittedly one bar-
rier to this initiative may well be the reluctance of representatives of 
the civilian component to collaborate with the military. 
The CIMIC personnel can do much to demonstrate to repre-
sentatives of civilian organizations how useful mutual cooperation 
can be. Experiences with earlier operations suggest that the most 
effective catalyst for such activity is the military organization's abili-
ty to produce information on conditions in the area, for representa-
tives of the civilian component are well aware that such information 
is vital to their own activities. 
The task of maintaining close contact with the population of 
the area of responsibility can be carried out best by CIMIC teams 
operating in the field, and by the creation of CIMIC houses or cen-
tres wherever this is possible. A CIMIC house is a place where rep-
resentatives of the local people can contact representatives of the 
military organization and of civilian organizations working in the 
area.'The decision to create such a building should nevertheless al-
ways be dependent on security, the real need for such a facility and 
the availability of personnel, and it should always be located outside 
the military base. For this reason means also have to be devised by 
which representatives of the civilian component can contact the CIM-
IC staff other than through the CIMIC house. 
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It is always possible that during the time required for forming a 
picture of the situation in the area and creating the conditions nec-
essary for cooperation, the peacekeeping force may notice things in 
the area that call for the immediate provision of aid or the talting of 
other measures, in which case the force can intervene in the situa-
tion in as far as its own resources permit, although the preferable 
course of action at an early stage in the operation would be to pass 
the information on to the responsible organization.312 
Although any aid provided by the troops or projects undertak-
en by the CIMIC team should serve the overall objective of the mis-
sion, it should also be possible at the initial stage to use these projects 
as a means of improving the security of the troops and their scope 
for action. Thus improvements to the road network, for instance, 
should be of benefit to both the local population and the operative 
branch of the military organization. 
Absolute neutrality should be aimed at in the distribution of 
humanitarian aid and in the planning and implementation of projects, 
and care should be taken to ensure that the aid reaches its target and 
that the projects serve the real purposes for which they are intended. 
All deliveries of aid should be made on a one-off basis if at all possi-
ble, in order to prevent the local population from becoming depend-
ent on the military organization.311  
5.3 CIMIC activities during the stabilization stage 
A crisis management operation is deemed to have reached the sta-
bilization stage when: 
— the tasks of the military organization take on a routine nature314 
— the focus of attention has moved over to implementing the civil-
ian clauses in the agreements 
— the country's administration at all levels is under international 
supervision 
— the local authorities are able to maintain general law and order 
under international supervision.315 
As the operation advances towards its overall objectives, it should be 
possible to adjust the composition of the military organizations to 
respond to the demands of the operating environment. Suitable con-
ditions for this can be created by drawing up several alternative plans 
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and defining factors that require changes for their achievement or 
make changes possible. The control system set out in section 5.2 
above will support development of the organization in response to 
challenges in the operating environment. 
The changes in the operating environment envisaged here arise 
partly on account of the replacement of international organizations 
by local officials, the defining of new tasks and duties, and in some 
case reductions in the funding available to the international com-
m nity. 
The development of the military organization in the course of 
an operation frequently implies in practice a reduction in the troops 
engaged in actual operative duties, although in such a way that they 
continue to constitute a sufficient deterrent and to guarantee an ad-
equate level of security under all conditions. At the same time it may 
well imply an increase in troops capable of CIMIC activities.316 
Increased efficiency will call not only for organizational chang-
es but also for the creation of CIMIC houses to enable more effec-
tive contacts to be maintained with the surrounding community. The 
facilitation of contacts between the local population or representa-
tives of various civilian organizations and the military organization 
will often have the effect of creating two-way communication be-
tween the components, which is one prerequisite for an increase in 
the volume of activity. 
CIMIC activity at the stabilization stage is mainly a matter of 
functioning as a catalyst for actions leading to the accomplishment 
of the objectives of the international community, and in this respect 
it is possible by exploiting the large manpower resources available 
to the CIMIC branch by comparison with other organizations to 
maintain an active watch over the development talting place in var-
ious areas and at various levels in society, and also to react rapidly to 
any problems that arise. Measures devolving on the CIMIC troops 
in connection with repatriation, for instance, may include the loca-
tion of potential resettlement areas, monitoring of the day-by-day 
situation, the exercising of influence on the political climate, the ob-
taining of resources and the implementation of projects."' 
It is quite possible to begin the work of identifying potential 
resettlement areas during the peace enforcement stage, document-
ing the results in such a way that they will be available for use at a 
later juncture. Attention should naturally be focused on areas where 
groups opposed to the repatriation of minorities are not in the ma- 
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jority and where a basic infrastructure exists, e.g. an adequate road 
network, availability of water and possibilities for arranging electric-
ity supplies. The most important thing, however, is the psychologi-
cal atmosphere. At the same time steps should be taken towards 
supporting the commencement of comparable activities in more dif-
ficult areas, e.g. creation of contacts with the local people, consulta-
tions with local decision-makers and exploitation of the media-"' 
It is possible by CIMIC methods to exercise influence simulta-
neously at the places where decisions are taken, where the practical 
work is done and where the resources are allocated, which implies 
that those working at the upper levels should be capable of influ-
encing the local administration and the system for apportioning re-
sources, while the CIMIC patrols responsible for the fieldwork should 
be able to influence people's attitudes and play their own part in 
minimizing interference factors. It also means that real-time com-
munications must exist between the detachments working at these 
levels where necessary. The activities of those working in the field 
are dependent on the possession of resources that enable them to 
intervene wherever problems arise.319 
The CIMIC units should receive background support from a 
sufficiently powerful operative foprce, to provide a deterrent that 
will enable activity to be commenced in areas where the atmosphere 
is hostile. This may have the effect of preventing development from 
stagnating in certain areas. 
Although it is characteristic of the maintenance stage that the 
CIMIC activity comes to be focused more on supporting develop-
ment in civilian society, attention must be paid in all situations to 
acquiring the information required for the military organization's 
operative planning. The importance of the CIMIC branch for opera-
tive planning in fact increases at this stage, as it is frequently the 
largest producer of information, by virtue of its continuous contacts 
with the surrounding community.32' 
The CIMIC branch should also take it upon itself to identify 
those services available in the local community that are already suf-
ficientl'y well developed that the troops can make use of them, as 
this will enable some functions such as food production, construc-
tion work and supplies of various materials and other daily com-
modities to be outsourced. 
The opportunity should be taken during the maintenance stage 
to activate local non-governmental organizations, possibly by arrang- 
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ing contacts and joint activities with the corresponding organization 
in the CIMIC unit's home country. Such measures in support of civil 
society can work well towards the achievement of the overall objec-
tives of the operation .32 
The CIMIC projects implemented should for the most part be 
aimed directly at supporting the focal points of the operation, as this 
will help to convince the local people of the usefulness of collabora-
tion. Use should be made of local contractors and suppliers wherev-
er possible.322 
It can happen that by this stage in the operation the CIMIC 
personnel will, as it were, have drifted into a position in which they 
are working in very close proximity to the civilian component, for-
getting the true objectives of the operation. It may be said from ex-
perience, however, that in very many cases the CIMIC branch will 
have come to act as a catalyst for social reconstruction and an ex-
tremely significant implementer of practical measures, and that this 
will mean that the representatives of the military organization are 
inevitably extremely closely involved in the processes of reconstruc-
tion within the local society. Practical commitment to this recon-
struction work can nevertheless detract from the role of a neutral 
monitor of the overall situation, and in this sense it should be avoid-
ed, e.g. through recourse to the internal control system. 
5.4 CIMIC activity at the withdrawal stage 
A crisis management operation will have progressed to the with-
drawal stage when: 
— the national authorities are able to take responsibility for law and 
order without international intervention 
— the area has a properly functioning judicial system 
— the local armed forces do not constitute a regional threat but are 
capable of defending their own territory 
— the foundations have be laid for economic growth 
— the local administration is able to ensure smooth functioning and 
development in all sectors of society.323 
The main CIMIC measures to be carried out at this stage are con-
nected with the transfer of responsibility in all fields to the local au-
thorities or international civilian organizations, while at the same 
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time attempting to minimize the impact of this additional burden 
on the local community and its development.324 
It is important to note when planning activities at the with-
drawal stage whether or not the military organization will retain rep-
resentatives in the area. In any case it is necessary to inform previ-
ous collaborators how they can contact representatives of the mili-
tary organization later, and above all, who are the correct people to 
contact. It is also necessary to explain the reasons for the withdrawal 
of the troops. These measures are essential in order to ensure that 
all changes in accustomed ways of working in a given organization 
or some part of it will proceed in a smooth manner. 
One additional consideration, of course, is that all ongoing 
projects should be completed, so as to avoid the situation in which a 
partially executed project has to be turned over to another actor to 
be finished off. It is also necessary to emphasize in the planning that 
a project can be regarded as completed only when all the related 
reports and statements have been submitted and approved. Com-
pletion of the work on site is only one aspect of carrying the project 
through to the end. 
The CIMIC branch is also required to provide support for its 
own troops by assessing the possibilities for malting use of local re-
sources during the withdrawal operation. This may take the form of 
employing local labour for demolishing bases and using ports and 
railway facilities for transporting equipment out of the country.325 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Performance of the research 
The process of answering the main question posed in this research 
entailed definition of the principal fields of civilian crisis manage-
ment, which is done in Chapter 2, and description of the measures 
taken in the context of various operations, experiences from which 
are recounted in Chapter 4 and summarized in Appendix 5. In addi-
tion, it required an examination to be made of doctrines and instruc-
tions in which guidelines are laid down for military cooperation with 
the civilian component. 
Since the focus of attention in this work was on CIMIC activity, 
the intention in the discussion of civilian crisis management was to 
create a frame of reference for describing this activity. 
Given that practically no written documentation on CIMIC ac-
tivity was available during the period when this work was carried 
out, the principal published material on which it could be based con-
sisted of instructions and regulations. A number of articles and oth-
er publications had indeed been produced on the Bosnia and Kos-
ovo operations, but these concerned mostly the reasons for the cri-
ses and the consequences of them, so that no extensive treatment of 
military-civilian cooperation in these contexts had previously been 
published. A number of NATO internal reports have been produced 
on the subject, but their perspective does not allow for an objective 
discussion. 
The present research was based mainly on interviews and on 
reports arising from the operations concerned. The results of an in-
terview are usually one individual's subjective view based on experi-
ences gathered in a particular place and at a particular time, and it 
was necessary to combine these in order to build up a consistent 
picture of the object of study.The reports available were mostly broad 
outlines of the situation at given moments in time, and although 
their veracity cannot be questioned, their value for the present pur-
poses undoubtedly can. 
The content of this work has been influenced by the author's 
own experiences in the SFOR operation in 1997-1999 and again in 
2002 and in connection with the commencement of CIMIC activi-
ties in the ISAF operation in 2002. The most important factor affect-
ing the discussion of CIMIC activities was nevertheless the author's 
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fact-finding visit to Bosnia in autumn 2000, as a result of which the 
whole existence of stages or phases in CIMIC activity and in an op-
eration as a whole became evident. Thus the principal accent in this 
work is on the SFOR operation. 
The author has received considerable support in his work from 
personnel engaged in the SFOR and KFOR operations, partly through 
statements and expressions of opinion that have carried the work 
forward. The chief drawback has been the fact that the topic is a 
relatively little-known one, so that extensive discussion of it was more 
or less impossible. 
6.2 Results 
The first question to be answered in this work was: What does civil-
ian crisis management consist of? Civilian crisis management is the 
involvement of a third party in the development of civilian society 
following a crisis, and as such it always entails an element of politi-
cal intervention, which controls the resources assigned to it. The work 
is normally carried out by international organizations, and non-gov-
ernment organizations also play a significant role, although their 
collaboration with other actors can sometimes cause problems, mostly 
on account of their desire to remain independent and neutral. 
Civilian crisis management always has a closely related tem-
poral aspect. Activity must be commenced as soon as the situation 
permits, and only a finite time is available for the reconstitution of 
society. The definition of the actual time available maybe complicat-
ed, however, by the political climate, the availability of adequate re-
sources and the results achieved. These facts are also interconnect-
ed, in that an operation in which the desired results are not achieved 
may gradually lose the best part of its resources. 
Civilian crisis management can cover all aspects of civilian so-
ciety, the areas concerned in a particular case being determined by 
the nature of the crisis and its consequences. The following fields, at 
least, fall within its scope: 
— restoration of the social order 
— development of administration and democracy 
— promotion of economic recovery 
— revival of social and health services 
— improvement of the whole infrastructure 
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safe environment. Support that does not form part of normal mili-
tary activities should be provided only on a one-off basis, however. 
Experiences with the SFOR and KFOR operations suggest that 
troops functioning at the local or regional level cannot afford to corn-
mit their human or material resources to one single task, in addition 
to which the support provided by a military organization must be 
clearly connected with the main objectives of the military mission. 
National differences also exist in the forms of assistance the troops 
are willing to provide. 
At a local or regional level a military organization can provide 
its most effective support for civilian crisis management in fields of 
activity where large amounts of manpower are needed rather than 
specialized expertise. One example of this is the active participation 
by CIMIC units in repatriation measures within the SFOR opera-
tion. It is possible at the operative level, however, to involve the troops 
in activity that requires more specialized skills, although it is always 
a question of the human resources available at the time and their 
prioritization. 
The significance of military support can be determined on the 
basis of the activities pursued by CIMIC units, the fundamental task 
of which is to link the military and civilian components together in 
order to achieve greater impact through the coordination of their 
efforts. Thus the area of operation of the CIMIC personnel as such 
should be at the interface between these two elements. If activity is 
directed too deeply within the civilian component the chances of 
working in support of the military organization's objectives will be 
jeopardized. It is thus important that the benefits emerging from CIM-
IC activity should be at least three-dimensional: 1) benefits to civil-
ian crisis management, 2) benefits to the military organization, and 
3) benefits in terms of local development. 
The concrete support that the military component can provide 
for representatives of the civilian component at the local and region-
al levels are set out in Appendix 5, the content of which is derived 
from, observations made in connection with the SFOR and KFOR 
operations. These are all forms of support that have been repeated 
more than once, and thus the list may be regarded as being fairly 
generally applicable. It should be noted, however, that in practice 
each measure should be carefully assessed and planned in relation 
to the case in question, and that the assessment should include its 
benefit in relation to the overall military objective, which should never 
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— stimulation of culture and education 
— establishment of external relations 
— civil defence. 
— boundary patrolling and customs 
— civil protection 
— refugees and displaced persons 
The European Union has attempted to prepare itself for future crises 
by concentrating on certain areas of focus defined in accordance with 
earlier experiences and problems. It is not evident from the planning 
processes, however, what functions it should be able to perform with 
the troops reserved for this purpose. It is only in the case of the po-
lice force that it is specifically laid down that it should be capable of 
carrying out the most demanding tasks normally expected of this 
branch. 
One feature that the above fields of activity in the scope of civil-
ian crisis management and the areas of focus defined by the EU have 
in common is the indeterminacy of the boundaries between them. 
They are not independent, enclosed units, but rather each is capable 
of influencing the others. Thus successful civilian crisis management 
calls for organizations that are capable of a high degree of coordina-
tion, have the potential for working at all levels in an operation and 
are able to carry on cooperation between levels. 
A successful civilian crisis management operation requires that 
the correct priorities should be defined between the measures tak-
en, as this will save on resources. Similarly, there should be clear 
definitions of the objectives that take account of the standards at-
tained in the various aspects of society in the country concerned pri-
or to the crisis. 
The second question that this work set out to answer was: What 
factors have influenced CIMIC as implemented by the Finns? 
The CIMIC activity implemented by the Finns as been influ-
enced especially markedly by the freedom of action that is typical of 
our military culture and the high level of personal knowledge and 
skills that the troops have been able to contribute in different areas 
of activity. Decisive in this respect has been the body of skills con-
tributed by members of the reserves. 
A frame of reference for the activity has been provided by the 
commands and instructions issued by the higher command levels, 
but these have served only as general guidelines. One of the prob- 
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fact-finding visit to Bosnia in autumn 2000, as a result of which the 
whole existence of stages or phases in CIMIC activity and in an op-
cration as a whole became evident. Thus the principal accent in this 
work is on the SFOR operation. 
The author has received considerable support in his work from 
personnel engaged in the SFOR and KFOR operations, partly through 
statements and expressions of opinion that have carried the work 
forward. The chief drawback has been the fact that the topic is a 
relatively little-known one, so that extensive discussion of it was more 
or less impossible. 
6.2 Results 
The first question to be answered in this work was: What does civil-
ian crisis management consist of? Civilian crisis management is the 
involvement of a third party in the development of civilian society 
following a crisis, and as such it always entails an element of politi-
cal intervention, which controls the resources assigned to it. The work 
is normally carried out by international organizations, and non-gov-
ernment organizations also play a significant role, although their 
collaboration with other actors can sometimes cause problems, mostly 
on account of their desire to remain independent and neutral. 
Civilian crisis management always has a closely related tem-
poral aspect. Activity must be commenced as soon as the situation 
permits, and only a finite time is available for the reconstitution of 
society. The definition of the actual time available may be complicat-
ed, however, by the political climate, the availability of adequate re-
sources and the results achieved. These facts are also interconnect-
ed, in that an operation in which the desired results are not achieved 
may gradually lose the best part of its resources. 
Civilian crisis management can cover all aspects of civilian so-
ciety, the areas concerned in a particular case being determined by 
the nature of the crisis and its consequences. The following fields, at 
least, fall within its scope: 
— restoration of the social order 
— development of administration and democracy 
— promotion of economic recovery 
— revival of social and health services 
— improvement of the whole infrastructure 
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— stimulation of culture and education 
— establishment of external relations 
— civil defence. 
— boundary patrolling and customs 
— civil protection 
— refugees and displaced persons 
The European Union has attempted to prepare itself for future crises 
by concentrating on certain areas of focus defined in accordance with 
earlier experiences and problems. It is not evident from the planning 
processes, however, what functions it should be able to perform with 
the troops reserved for this purpose. It is only in the case of the po-
lice force that it is specifically laid down that it should be capable of 
carrying out the most demanding tasks normally expected of this 
branch. 
One feature that the above fields of activity in the scope of civil-
ian crisis management and the areas of focus defined by the EU have 
in common is the indeterminacy of the boundaries between them. 
They are not independent, enclosed units, but rather each is capable 
of influencing the others. Thus successful civilian crisis management 
calls for organizations that are capable of a high degree of coordina-
tion, have the potential for working at all levels in an operation and 
are able to carry on cooperation between levels. 
A successful civilian crisis management operation requires that 
the correct priorities should be defined between the measures tak-
en, as this will save on resources. Similarly, there should be clear 
definitions of the objectives that take account of the standards at-
tained in the various aspects of society in the country concerned pri-
or to the crisis. 
The second question that this work set out to answer was: What 
factors have influenced CIMIC as implemented by the Finns? 
The CIMIC activity implemented by the Finns as been influ-
enced especially markedly by the freedom of action that is typical of 
our military culture and the high level of personal knowledge and 
skills that the troops have been able to contribute in different areas 
of activity. Decisive in this respect has been the body of skills con-
tributed by members of the reserves. 
A frame of reference for the activity has been provided by the 
commands and instructions issued by the higher command levels, 
but these have served only as general guidelines. One of the prob- 
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be endangered at any stage. 
The main barriers to cooperation between military and civilian 
organizations lie in the attitudes of the staff on both sides and the 
lack of coordination mechanisms. A CIMIC unit can do much to 
overcome these barriers, most especially through the dissemination 
of information on its own activities. 
6.3 Reliability and usefulness of the results 
Civilian crisis management is a broad topic of research and one in 
which precise delimitation of the scope of the work is somewhat 
problematic. The delimitation was made here at the organization 
level, by concentrating mainly on EU civilian crisis management 
measures. It could have been done equally well in terms of the areas 
covered by civilian crisis management, of course, and it must be ad-
mitted that the present solution led to a somewhat narrow scope in 
the results as far as the civilian component was concerned. On the 
other hand, this approach did allow observations to be made on 
overlapping between the areas of civilian crisis management and 
the need for coordination between them which can well be made 
use of in future planning. Similarly the observations on the duration 
of civilian crisis management may help to add precision to the cur-
rent relatively indeterminate form of this activity. All in all the con-
tent of Chapter 2 is slightly fragmentary, although this was to be 
expected, as the intention was to define the fields of civilian crisis 
management with sufficient accuracy that the findings could be made 
use of later. 
From the military perspective, the discussion of civilian crisis 
management and the conclusions based on this support the plan-
ning of CIMIC activities. It should be noted, however, that the con-
ditions in each area of operation determine in the last resort what 
fields of civilian crisis management it is reasonable for the military 
organization to involve itself in. 
Ohe of the key notions in this research has been that of the 
combined influence of the military and civilian elements. From the 
viewpoint of a military organization it is important to monitor the 
development of civilian crisis management at least to the extent de-
scribed here, as this will allow the military planning process to take 
the civilian component into account. 
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The results obtained in the research into CIMIC activity may be 
regarded as good, to say the least.The nature of this activity is brought 
out in a very concrete form, although the value of the findings is 
reduced by the narrowness of the treatment of practical measures in 
section 4.3. These matters are unfortunately frequently referred to 
only in the form of lists, so that it is not possible to provide any broader 
description of the activity concerned. The fault lay partly in the poor 
content of the available reports and other documents, although it 
must be remembered, too, that up to now such activity at the local 
and regional levels has been in the hands of only a small number of 
military representatives. 
The presentation of CIMIC planning and implementation in 
Chapter 5 should enable preparations to be made for future opera-
tions, although it should be remembered that the present descrip-
tion is based only on experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, so that the 
same elements will not necessarily be to the fore in a future opera-
tion. If this operation were to be of the kind carried out by the UN in 
Macedonia, for instance, the focus of CIMIC activity might well be 
on the promotion of relations between the troops and the host na-
tion, possibly partly with a view to utilizing local resources in the 
military activities. No activity of this kind was necessary in Bosnia, 
for example. 
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Appendix 1. 
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CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 	
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CIMIC ACTIVITY 	 ~ 	 ADVISORS &REPORTS 
FRAME OF REFERENCE 
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OBSERVATIONS 
RESULTS 
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Appendix 2. 
FRAME OF REFERENCE FORTHE RESEARCH 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATION 
MILITARY COMPONENT 	 CIVILIAN COMPONENT 
WHERE 
CAN THE 
How to act? 	MILITARY 	Areas in which troops should 
PROVIDE be prepared to act? 
How have 	 SUPPORT? 
troops acted 
before? 
Content of civilian 
crisis management? 
Instructions for 
CIMIC activity? 	 Development of 
civilian crisis 
management? 
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Appendix 3. 
FUNCTIONAL ENTITIES IN DETACHMENT G5 OF THE 
NORDIC-POLISH BRIGADE (SFOR) AND THEIR DUTIES 
IN 1998-1999 
SECTOR AREAS OFY COOPERATION 
RESPONSIBILITY PARTNERS 
— human rights monitoring — IPTF, UNCA, 
Democratization — liaison with authorities OSCE, UNHCR, 
— support for elections ECMM, OHR, 
local authorities 
— coordination of project — EU 
planning and implementation — UNSAID 
in own area of responsibility — UNSAID 
— organization and coordination — UNHCR 
of project finance at lower — NGOs (for projects 
levels of command — internalcooperation 
Projects — project collaboration between 
organizations and local 
contractors 
— cooperation with sector res- 
ponsible for regional monito- 
ring to define potentialprojects 
— cooperation with repatriation 
and resettlement sector in 
supporting projects 
— monitoring of political and — local authorities 
Regional economic situation — ECMM 
monitoring — formation and maintenance of — interna cooperations 
village and town databases 
— displaced persons and refugees — UNHCR 
Repatriation and — citizens'freedom of movement — NGOs 
resettlement — monitoring of local property — internal cooperation 
legislation and its implemen- 
tation 
— liaison with other action in the — local population 
area andthe local population — lOs and NGOs 
— cooperation in matters arising — responsible 
CIMIC centres with battalion responsible for 
the area battalions — intema l cooperations 
— action as an information cooperations 
channel from the 
brigade to civilian society 
Source: NORDPOL BED/SFOR SOP 5011G-5ICIvEC, October 1998 
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Appendix 4. 
FUNCTIONAL ENTITIES AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS IN 
THE CIMIC BRANCH OF THE NORDIC-POLISH BATTLE 
GROUP (SFOR) IN 2000-2001 
PUBLIC ECONOMY AND CIVILIAN HUMANITARIAN CULTURE 
FUNCTIONS TRADE INFRA- AID 
STRUCTURE 
Administration Economic Telecommuni- Displaced persons Historical build- 
development cations and refugees nings and monu- 
ments 
Elections Agriculture and food Transport Medical assistance Art and archives 
Judicial system Industry Employment Essential supplies Religious Sinc- 
tions 
Health Commerce Electricity, Supervision of 
water etc. human rights Language- 
services 
Education Rescue services 
(citizens,  
security etc.) 
General security 
Environment 
Source: Nordic-Polish Battle Group, Standing Operating Procedures. SFOR restricted, May 2000. 
151 
N Appendix 5. 
CONCRETE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION FOR 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT 
AREA 	 SUPPORT THROUGH 
	
SUPPORT THROUGH 
NORMAL TROOP 
	
CIMIC ACTIVITIES 
OPERATIONS 
General forms of support in all areas include the ensuring of security, and thereby the creation of suitable conditions in which activities 
can take place, and the placing of premises on military bases at the disposal of representatives of the civilian component. 
— communication of detailed information on the population and 
authorities of the area of responsibility 
— material donations to the local police force 
— support for local police trainin 
— communication of detailed information on the area of 
responsibility 
— establishment of peaceful/stable conditions 
— maintenance of law and order 
— detention of criminals 
— protection of police operations 
— joint patrols 
— border control 
— maintenance of personnel evacuation plans 
— supervision of actions of local authorities and dissemi- 
nation of information on them 
— material support 
— educational support 
— ensuring of a safe operating environment 
— communication of detailed information on the area of 
responsibility 
— personnel training 
— security 
— communications 
— mine safety 
— map-reading 
— medication 
— supervision of the area of responsibility 
1. Restoration of 
social order 
2. Development of 
administration 
and democracy 
— location of voters 
— location of polling stations 
— arranging of training in election procedures 
— transport and storage of election material 
— preparations for public events 
— resettlement 
— festivals for minority groups 
— performing of local authority duties 
— provision of information on local attitudes and opinions 
u] 
W 
— maintenance of an evacuation plan and training for this 
— supervision of the activities of the local police 
— implementation of citizens' human rights 
— implementation of citizens' freedom of movement 
3. Support for the — creation of jobs in connection with the force's own ha- — creation of jobs through projects and other aid activities 
restoration sic functions — arranging of re-training for employment 
of the economy — making use of local companies in the provision of material aid 
— arranging of minor start-up loans for basic production and 
small-scale industry 
— arranging of commercial training 
4. Support for — ensuring the provision of emergency first aid services 
restoration of — reception of returning refugees and displaced persons — implementation of emergency first aid services 
the health and in the most problematical areas — planning of the reconstitution of the health care system 
social welfare — direction of the work of national NGOs in problem areas 
services — repair of ambulances 
— delivery of medicines received as aid to local health centres 
and hospitals 
— projects for renovation of health centre and hospital buildings 
5. Support for — supervision and guarding of project sites — support for civilians responsible for projects 
restoration of — provision of detailed information on area of responsibility 
the general — determination of resources available in the area 
infrastructure — support for projects by making the force's own services avai- 
lable to them (e.g. banks, post offices, telecommunications, 
computing) 
— implementing projects that contribute to the whole effort 
— implementing smaller projects that support the whole effort 
6. Displaced — protection of transport of materials — 	provision of detailed information on area of responsibility 
persons and — protection of returning minority groups and the prepa- — 	surveying of possible sites for resettlement of displaced per- 
refugees rations for their return sons 
— 	preparations for return of displaced persons 
— influencing opinions 
— cooperation with local authorities 
— 	transport of materials 
— 	documentation of the return of displaced persons 
— 	coordination and support for the work of aid organizations 
— 	mediation in disputes between contributing parties 
— 	implementation of projects to support the return of displaced 
persons 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff. 
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation. 
CML Civil-Military Liaison. 
CMO Civil-Military Operations, abbreviation used in MNB(C) for the 
CIMIC branch. 
CJCMTF Combined Joint Civil Military Co-operation Task Force. CIMIC unit 
at the operational level (SFOR). 
CJ9 CIMIC branch at the operational level in the SFOR and KFOR 
operations. 
ECMM European Commission Monitory Mission. 
EU European Union. 
FDIA Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan. 
FinBn Finnish Battalion. 
FINCENT Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 
G5 Brigade and division-level CIMIC branch in the SFOR operation. 
IFOR Implementation Force, a NATO-led multinational crisis 
manage-ment force that began operations in Bosnia in December 
1995 and was disbanded in December 1996. Predecessor of SFOR. 
IO International Organization, an organization that is internationally 
recognised and is able to function at an international level, e.g. the 
UN organizations. 
IPTF International Police Task Force, the UN police organization in 
Bosnia. 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force, a multinational crisis 
management operation located in Kabul. 
KFOR Kosovo Force, the NATO-led multinational crisis management force 
in Kosovo. 
KPS Kosovo Police Service, the local police force to be created in Kosovo. 
MNB(C) Multinational Brigade (Centre), a British-led multinational brigade 
in the KFOR operation. 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NGO Non-Govermental Organization, an organization that operates on 
a voluntary basis and is not funded by any national government. 
NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support 
NPB Nordic-Polish Brigade, in the SFOR operation. 
NPBG Nordic-Polish Battle Group, in the SFOR operation. 
OHR Organization of the High Representative, the highest official 
supervising observance of the Bosnia peace agreement, and his 
organization. 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
PfP Partnership for Peace, NATO partnership programme. 
PIC Peace Implementation Council, strategic-level working group 
directing the Bosnia operation. 
RDMHQ Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (UN). 
RRTF Reconstruction and Return Task Force. OHR body for coordinating 
repatriation and humanitarian aid. 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO). 
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (NATO). 
SCE Support to the Civil Environment. 
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SFOR 	Stabilization Force, a NATO-led multinational crisis management 
operation in Bosnia. Successor to IFOR. 
STF 	Support to the Force. 
S5 Battalion-level CIMIC branch in the SFOR operation. 
UN 	United Nations. 
UNHCR 	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
UNMIK 	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
155 





FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 
1 Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine 1945-1985 
Pekka Visiiri, 1990. 
2 .Flank or Front: Ari Assessment of Military — Political 
Developments in the High North 
Tauno Nieminen, 1991. 
3 NO11 Offensive Defence: A Criteria Model of Military Credibility 
Arto Nokkala, 1991. 
4 Development of Military Technology and its 
Impact on the Finnish Land Warfare Doctrine 
Markku Koli, 1992. 
5 The Impact of Arms Technology on Military Doctrines 
Pertti Salminen, 1992. 
6 The Baltic Republics: A Strategic Suivey 
Erkki Nordberg, 1994. 
7 Finlands Security in a Changing Europe: 
A Historia) perspective 
Risto E.J. Penttilä, 1994. 
8 Älands islands: A Strategic Survey 
Anders Gardberg, 1995. 
9 The Baltic — Sea of Changes 
MikkoViitasalo and Bo Österlund, 1996. 
10 Air Defence in Nothern Europe 
Heikki Nikunen, 1997. 
11 The New Geopoli tics: The World System and Nothern Euro 
seen from a Modern Geopolitical Perspective 
Osmo Tuomi, 1998. 
12 RIISSia'S Geopolitical Intcrests in the Baltic Area 
Ari Puheloinen, 1999. 
13 Futirre Operational-Tactical Level Warfare: 
Challenges and Opportunities for the Defence of Finland 
Pekka Toveri and Heikki Välivehmas, 2000. 
14 Intelligence in Peace Support Operations 
Pasi Väli mäki, 2000. 

